We Have a Donroe Doctrine in Venezuela
金門調酒 - Kinmen Cocktails #13
1. The operation to capture Maduro was a military feat of arms. As we discussed in our 18 October post:
“Such an operation would help to restore confidence in US military capability post-Afghan withdrawal. The three most important audiences are the American people and their faith in the armed services, American policy makers and their faith in the effectiveness of the military instrument, and Xi Jinping’s assessment of US capability.
Even a limited operation would be a testbed for validating new military equipment and doctrinal approaches. Gaps exposed during the 1983 Grenada invasion were key in spurring the passage of Goldwater-Nichols in 1986.”
2. The US has strengthened its coercive ability. Washington clearly communicated that Maduro should step down. This was backed up by significant military capability. When Caracas failed to comply with a credible threat, consequences followed, underlining the credibility of the American military instrument. Operation Absolute Resolve will affect the political calculus in Moscow, Tehran, Beijing, Pyongyang, and Havana.
3. Also from our 18 October post:
“The CCP has made an outsize bet on Venezuela’s future. US sources pin Venezuela as the second-largest recipient of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) money over the past two decades. Even the CCP itself admits that “China has poured about US$67 billion into Venezuela since 2007, far more investment than any other South American country…”
Losing a major socialist ally in South America would cause Beijing’s bets to go bust at a time when China’s domestic economy is hurting and multiple BRI projects are hemorrhaging cash. A successful Venezuela operation would likely cause other South American nations to curtail or end Chinese investments”
Washington is neutralizing a major anchor for Beijing’s influence throughout South America.
4. Venezuela has purchased export versions of Type 05 and Type 08 amphibious vehicles from the PRC. These are the main weapons systems that will be involved in an amphibious landing on Taiwan. SOUTHCOM must retrieve these vehicles for exploitation to understand their specific vulnerabilities.
Vermilion learned of the Type 08’s amphibious capabilities from Venezuelan videos displaying their Chinese-made Type 08s in exercises.
5. The administration still has more work to do. From our 15 November post:
“If Washington uses military means to secure gains in South America, expect Beijing to make hay. The CCP will attempt to justify the use of force in Asia on the grounds of successful US operations in the Western Hemisphere. The Trump administration had better be thinking about prudent arguments for the use of force, both against Caracas and in support of Taipei, even if only deployed in confidential channels.”
Washington needs to continue to draw contrasts between the socialist world and the free world. Unless there is a widespread understanding of the evils of malign totalitarian and authoritarian governments, whataboutism will run rampant in international discourse.
6. As the administration knows, it now must act rapidly to consolidate power, bring peace to Venezuela, and conduct a transition through legitimate Venezuelan elections. There is now a window of opportunity and a countdown timer for sticking to an effective political transition. It will be critical to co-opt the governors of the various Venezuelan states before the narcos dig in.
From our 15 November post discussing compellence, these goals should now be incorporated into talks on the transition of power:
“Goals for such talks should include significant changes in Venezuela’s internal political system, eliminating PRC business ties and influence, expanding opportunities for US businesses and trade in the petroleum, natural gas, agriculture, manufacturing, and mineral sectors, improving the Venezuelan economy for the median family, supporting the Central Bank of Venezuela, and Caracas’ relationship to OPEC.”
With risk comes possible reward. It is now the time for Washington to apply lessons learned from the past twenty years of nation-building projects to get this one right.



Strong frame: the raid is the easy part; the compellence is the hard part.
Your “coercive ability strengthened” point lands because it ties capability to credibility, not vibes. 
No Shots Fired add: the signal flips if the aftermath drags. If Washington cannot rapidly consolidate authority and produce a legible transition (security, interim governance, elections timeline), the lesson for Beijing is not “US is capable,” it is “US can strike, but cannot finish.” That is the deterrence risk hiding inside the “countdown timer” you mention. 
Also agree that Beijing will try to launder whataboutism through this case. The antidote is not speeches, it is sequencing: transparent objectives, clear legal framing, and visible handoff milestones that make “policing vs war” harder to blur. 
One more: the Type 05/08 exploitation angle is spicy and concrete. If that is real, it belongs in the “tells” bucket: watch for SOUTHCOM retrieval/technical exploitation activity and how loudly Washington chooses to talk about it. 
COIN works if you understand it means;
Buy them. COIN 🪙💰
Buy Pat Garett to hunt down Billy The Kid.
That’s what we learned.
We learned it so well we have Dave Petraeus greeting our new Bestie HTS Ibn D’aesh running Syria , but he’s D’aesh in a suit. In truth D’aesh was always a business.
In the case of Venezuela we don’t have religion to cloud the issue.
Buy.Them.