Changes Unseen in a Century
#83
This piece builds on Vermilion’s 2023 Changes Unseen article. Below, we discuss four major and emerging trends in the Sino-American rivalry for 2024. This article will also have a sister piece assessing our previous 2023 trends. We will then revisit our 2023 and 2024 trends in late 2025.
Xi is Running Out of Time on Taiwan
On 15 June 2025, Xi Jinping will turn 72. Mao Zedong died in office on 9 September 1976 at 82 years of age. Deng Xiaoping relinquished his last official post at 86. Jiang Zemin at 79. Hu Jintao was about 70 when he stepped down.
History gives us a rough average retirement age of 79 years and 3 months. If Xi truly wants to be the man to enslave Taiwan and break out of the first island chain, he realistically has about 10 years of viable time left. CIA Director Bill Burns asserted in public that the intelligence record states Xi has directed the PLA to be prepared for a Taiwan invasion no later than 2027.
This renders an initial window of 2027-2035. Xi is currently seeking an unprecedented 4th term in power, which would run from 2027-2032, with Xi turning 80 during the summer of 2032 (the average age of retirement for a CCP leader). It would be odd if Xi launched an invasion the year he decided to retire, unless he believes this would force the CCP to give him a fifth term.
Therefore, the period of highest risk is 2027-2031. It would definitely not be impossible, but difficult for an aging Xi to seize a fifth term. It would also be unusual if Xi were to pass the baton in 2032/33 and the next leader of the CCP launched an invasion before his domestic powerbase was secure (signalling a subsequent period of high risk around 2035 or beyond given a change in leadership).
With the ongoing purge of the PLA officer corps, Xi is certainly prioritizing loyalty over combat readiness for an impending campaign. With so many senior officers cashiered, the PLA’s project to be combat ready by 2027 is likely slipping to the right. For these reasons, Vermilion disagrees with senior US defense officials and sees peak risk almost certainly from 2029 through 2031.
For those observers who see the possibility of a Taiwan campaign, this timeframe should be of paramount importance. Xi’s problem is that while he has forged the CCP into a united entity capable of weathering international and domestic storms, the PRC (economy and state) and the PLA (military) lag behind. At least through 2028, Xi does not seem to be on a strong enough trajectory to overwhelm or seriously contend with US power in East Asia.
This means a Taiwan operation before 2029-2031 would not be so much a campaign, but a gamble - not something the Chinese Politburo is known for. The risks of 1) committing an act of naked aggression in East Asia, 2) invading a notoriously difficult island to subdue, and 3) playing into Washington’s hands on both the above accounts would be too high, particularly if the PLA was not maximally prepared.
If Taiwan is important to the PBSC but cannot be seized by Xi’s fourth term, expect the CCP’s decision makers to divest into other operational areas. Another avenue of aggression against a weaker opponent would have a higher chance of success and set conditions for Xi’s fifth term or China’s next ruler to finish Taiwan. This is a page straight out of National Socialist Germany and Imperialist Japan’s playbook. The Philippines is a prime target due to its absolute lack of naval and air power, as well as the country’s proximity to Taiwan.
The Credibility Deficit: Policy Makers’ Understanding of Nuclear and Conventional Coercion Has Atrophied
To coerce an adversary is to change their behavior through the threat of action. To accomplish this, national command authority must credibly communicate the nation’s capability. Said another way, the threat must be believable, it must be clearly transmitted to the adversary, it must be backed up by real strength (coercion is not bluffing), and the adversary must believe the threat.
To achieve coercion through military means requires that the coercing actor has the appropriate military capability (MILCAP) in relation to their adversary. MILCAP contains the five elements of posture (positioning of forces: places and bases), readiness (training, fielded equipment, on hand manpower), force structure (numbers of brigades/squadrons and how they are commanded), modernization (DOTMLPF-PC), and sustainment (logistics and supply).
These five elements must be sufficient at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels in order to deter. Military coercion is most effective when tactical, operational, and strategic approaches are stacked coherently and aligned through a single vision driven by competent leaders.
This does not seem to be the case for the US, Russia, or China in 2024. National decision makers and the bureaucracies and elites that support them must go back to school on coercion theory.
Some of the recent highlights: US conventional deterrence failed in 2006 Lebanon, 2008 Georgia, 2014 Ukraine, 2014 ISIS, 2022 Ukraine, 2023 Israel, and 2023 Yemen. The dominoes are falling faster and harder. At the same time, the US nuclear deterrent is eroding due to the combined and growing arsenals of Russia and the PRC.
Moscow has repeatedly issued nuclear and conventional redlines (threats) which the US has ignored just as often. Wikipedia keeps an entertaining list of twenty Russian redlines which have been crossed (and some that haven’t) only since the start of the Ukraine War.
Beijing often employs economic measures to support coercive approaches to US allies and partners throughout the Pacific. Yet the overall results from wielding the Yuan as a weapon have mostly harvested failure. In the face of economic attacks, resistance against the PRC has increased. Australia, Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines are all arguably more anti-PRC today than they were a decade ago.
On the military front, the PRC’s coercive approach is possibly more effective, which we will discuss below in the next section. Yet Xi just released four redlines that are poorly conceived, vague, impossible for the PRC to defend, and are already stomped on by Washington.
The first red line is the CCP’s core of core interests: “the Taiwan question.” While the CCP will provide more detail to US counterparts in private, the public statement was far too vague. The US has by far the upper hand in Taiwan. Just days ago, the Taiwan Army received US Abrams tanks, significantly upgrading their armored forces. Beijing fails to understand that this redline has already been thoroughly crossed and entangles Xi into a difficult position.
The second is “democracy and human rights,” which is again a position where the CCP is on the backfoot globally. Very few people believe that the PRC is a democracy, since that point is a communist doublespeak intra-party talking point. It has very little relevance to outsiders, and is closely related to the next point.
The third is “China’s path and system,” something that Americans and other allies widely detest. Public polling in any of the major polities demonstrates this, such as here, here, and here. The CCP system’s reputation is getting absolutely trashed in the international arena, with very little pushback from the PRC besides Beijing’s typically aggressive messages and actions. CCP decision maker’s must know that in voting republics, these attitudes eventually translate into policy.
For the foreseeable future Beijing will be unable to prevent Washington from applying pressure against one of the PRC’s greatest weaknesses, which is the yawning chasm between the CCP system and the Chinese people.
Xi’s final red line is “China’s development right” which likely means the growing web of trade restrictions between Beijing and the outside world. Here, Xi fails to understand that leverage in trade wars goes to the player that is on the buy side of the relationship. The US is a major purchaser of PRC goods, while the CCP autocrats in charge of the economy have made assiduous efforts to ensure that the CCP does not purchase American goods. Chinese leaders have made their own bed, and have very low coercive power in the economic domain.
Xi’s list of redlines is not at all an enforceable and realistic series of controls that can coerce Washington, but in fact reads as a series of PRC weaknesses. One cannot coerce utilizing weakness.
The current crop of world leaders’ handling of international affairs does not inspire confidence. The US, Russia, and China are all running major credibility deficits. When President Biden incessantly declared the US would fight for Taiwan, did Xi or other world leaders truly believe him? Who still believes that Russia is a great power, let alone a global one? When Xi says Taiwan will inevitably be united with the PRC, who believes him? Taiwan certainly does not, at least in the near term.
Washington & INDOPACOM Must Shift the Taiwan Status Quo or Risk Tactical Irrelevance
Deterrence in general is most effective when tactical, operational, and strategic methods are stacked coherently, which is currently not the case. As discussed, President Biden has publicly declared he would defend Taiwan. This is an attempt at strategic communication, but the statement lacks operational credibility since the administration maintains no capable US military force on or close to the island with which to defend it.
The CCP seeks to erode Washington’s deterrent effect from the operational level down. The PLA executes numerous Taiwan exercises per year, both practicing and demonstrating Beijing’s capability and resolve to isolate the island.
By allowing this operational activity to continue unarrested, the US is burning up its own ability to deter. If these exercises continue, Beijing will have the future ability to dictate when Taiwan’s borders are functionally closed or open. This allows the PRC to set conditions for follow on operations, reducing the amount of warning, posture, readiness, and sustainment Washington can achieve before a fight begins.
Beijing’s operational actions therefore reduce Washington’s MILCAP at an operational level, which makes it more difficult for POTUS to conduct credible communication. This does not mean that the whole enterprise is compromised. Washington can still threaten damage to the PRC by fighting back into the area of operations even if the tactical fight on Taiwan has concluded.
This raises another important question. The form of coercion that the US primarily relies on is deterrence, which is convincing an adversary to not take an action (in this case, invade Taiwan). Deterrence may be achieved through denial (fighting for the objective the adversary seeks), punishment (damaging the opponent during or after the adversary has achieved his objective), or both. Which form of deterrence should the US seek to rely on in this example?
Vermilion argues that blending deterrence by denial and punishment is far more effective and credible than punishment alone: promising to hurt the CCP after the PLA launches a Taiwan invasion.
Due to the crisis of credibility discussed above, Washington can more effectively increase credibility by actively tying its own hands and placing combat credible forces on and around Taiwan with the mission of denying or slowing Beijing's ability to accomplish its objectives during a Taiwan operation. These would be contact and blunting forces in the parlance of the 2018 national defense strategy. Surge forces would come later and be responsible for the punishment portion of the deterrent strategy.
Washington must shift the status quo. Basing appropriate military forces on Taiwan (such as anti-ship cruise missile batteries and/or air defense) would signal resolve and seriously degrade the effectiveness of any PLA blockade or joint firepower strike. Conducting a counter-exercise to maintain a humanitarian corridor to Taiwan would stymie the goal of a PLA blockade. Employing the State Department to negotiate a reciprocal exercise control agreement with the PRC could limit the scope and range of exercises conducted unilaterally around Taiwan. There are many options for creative policy makers.
However, if nothing is done, the CCP will continue to nibble away at Taiwan’s sovereignty through the increasing intensity and scope of the PLA’s exercise cycle. This will severely impact INDOPACOM’s tactical military capability.
The US & PRC Must Adjust to a Unique International Arena
The Sino-American rivalry almost certainly cannot be solved quickly, and both sets of decision makers have consistently fallen into the mistaken belief that they can easily dispose of the other side. The US and PRC are two continental powers with all-encompassing national identities, gargantuan economies, globally influential cultures, and powerful military forces with significant naval services.
The CCP previously calculated that a series of setbacks would force the US into terminal decline. The first such setback was the Great Financial Crisis of 2007/08, then the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, then finally Washington’s support to Ukraine. These events have produced no noticeable dent in US power. In 2024, the US is projected to comprise just above 26% of global GDP, chugging along quite effectively through the march of the decades. These events cast extreme doubt on the CCP’s assessment that the world is shifting towards multipolarity, a fundamental assumption of the current PBSC.
Similarly, American decision makers have long relied on a CCP collapse narrative. This was the openly-stated goal during the containment years of the early to mid Cold War by supporting Taiwan. This was the quiet goal in opening relations with the PRC - that trade would bring Beijing in line with American principles of government. This proved false at Tiananmen Square. The below quote is from a Brookings Institution report published in 2001:
Premise #2: Market-based economic development and the associated formation of a middle class and increased integration with the outside world will, over the long run, produce liberalizing effects in China.
This has demonstrably been the case over the past two decades. Anyone who visited China at the start of its economic reforms in the late 1970s and returned today would marvel at the enormous changes in lifestyle, individual choice, access to information, and growth of a non-governmental public sphere. China’s WTO entry will be the biggest influence on this ongoing process in the coming years. But the short-term effects of WTO implementation may instead be increased social unrest and political repression in order to maintain control. Premise #2, therefore, posits a long-term perspective that must be able to withstand short-term setbacks that periodically capture the headlines.
The above Ivy League fueled think tank advice was amongst the worst that could have been given to American decision makers. US support for China’s WTO entry produced exactly the opposite intended effect - a CCP strong enough to repress its citizens at home and engage in aggression abroad. Today, a “non-governmental public sphere” does not exist in the PRC.
American thinking today is still dominated by the collapse narrative, with some notable exceptions. However, our perception of time lies to us. Since technology is a dominant theme of our era, we have inbuilt assumptions that all things can happen quickly.
History argues otherwise. There were 24 significant battles and wars fought between Rome (Republic/Empire//Byzantium) and Persia (Parthian/Sasanian) over the course of about 680 years. Some of these military operations lasted a day, some a decade or more. In the end, none proved decisive.
A far more decisive struggle between two continental great powers still lasted about 70 years: the Mongol invasions of China beginning in the early 1200s. By the time the Mongols chewed through numerous Chinese polities and reached the Song Dynasty, the ground-oriented Mongol military incorporated an impressive fleet which was critical to securing the Yuan Dynasty’s final victories.
For a more maritime example, the Roman Republic and Carthage fought each other across three Punic Wars and more than 100 years, with the first two wars fought as extended struggles for dominance with no obvious outcome at the outset. Roman consuls and Carthaginian suffetes surely had logical and sound theories of victory at the outset of the first two wars. As Wellington said on Waterloo, “it was the nearest-run thing you ever saw in your life.”
History is not to be taken lightly in the great Sino-American struggle. Thinkers on both sides would benefit from a more expansive understanding of history to inform assessments on the likely character of the coming clash of titans. Vermilion will reassess our above trends in 2025.