The deeper problem is the way DOD interacts and structures contracts. Congress continues to give the pentagon more money than they ask for each year. Capabilities could be dramatically increased under current funding levels by improving readiness and maintence schedules, and not carrying failed procurement contracts past the point of no return.
While I agree spending as a case of GDP is an interesting metric to look at, it oversimplifies the problem. The underlying issues that lead to the lack of preparedness across DOD are largely a symptom of how it functions: you can't give more money to an organization that can't pass its own audit and expect your problems to be fixed. You could even make the case that simply throwing more money at the problems in an effort to make them go away exacerbates the problems and further intrenches them.
There's no point in spending more money until we figure out the way to make sure that spending is spent wisely and not wasted.
Blue36, very much agree on not only contracts, but workforce management, culture, leadership reform, and training issues. In the future we would like to write an article going into detail on such reforms. Ideally, the DoD needs an overhaul before money is added to the budget (as you point out). However, the best time to do such a reform was 10 years ago. The US is often unprepared or late to strategic competition. There is still a window of time to conduct an overhaul, but the opportunity is narrowing rapidly as the PRC continues to peak in capability and readiness.
However, we believe it would be unhelpful to not increase funding and simply shift dollars into O&M (Operations & Maintenance, the line of funding for force readiness) at this time. That would mean that funding would have to be cut from one of the other four "colors of money:" either from MILPERS (military personnel, which is active duty end strength), RDT&E (research, development, test, and evaluation, which is investment in future capabilities), MILCON (military construction, which is for new facilities and new bases), and Procurement (for new system acquisition).
1. A cut to MILCON is not likely because that line of funding is pretty low to begin with and highly political. Beyond that, the US military desperately needs to create more basing options throughout the Pacific while orienting the CONUS (continental United States) supporting establishment westward. These investments take years and decades to complete, so a cut now would be sorely felt down the road.
2. A cut to MILPERS is unadvisable because active duty end strength is already at around 1.3 million, which is historically quite low. Cold War end strength was always above 2.0 million personnel and below 3.5 million. During the 1990s, end strength ended up around the same as now: 1.3 million. Remember it took over 12 million troops to fight WWII. The DoD doesn't need a force of 12 million today, but to be ready to fight, a larger base force should remain in being to form the core of an expanded war fighting force. 1.3 is too low.
3. A cut to RDT&E is not possible within the next 3 years minimum because the force doesn't have the new weapons and capabilities they need to deter and fight the PRC. Just one example is hypersonics. The PRC has fielded a multitude of non-traditional hypersonic missiles, but the US has yet to field one. RDT&E is required to develop systems the DoD needs which it doesn't have yet.
4. A cut to procurement is equally not possible because once RDT&E creates a new capability, Procurement dollars are required to actually field the capability to the force.
Until Congress gets serious about DoD reform and accountability, the Pentagon is not likely to be in a position or have the incentive to become more efficient, let alone be able to get close to passing an audit. You go to war with the bureaucracy you have, not the one you want.
The deeper problem is the way DOD interacts and structures contracts. Congress continues to give the pentagon more money than they ask for each year. Capabilities could be dramatically increased under current funding levels by improving readiness and maintence schedules, and not carrying failed procurement contracts past the point of no return.
While I agree spending as a case of GDP is an interesting metric to look at, it oversimplifies the problem. The underlying issues that lead to the lack of preparedness across DOD are largely a symptom of how it functions: you can't give more money to an organization that can't pass its own audit and expect your problems to be fixed. You could even make the case that simply throwing more money at the problems in an effort to make them go away exacerbates the problems and further intrenches them.
There's no point in spending more money until we figure out the way to make sure that spending is spent wisely and not wasted.
Blue36, very much agree on not only contracts, but workforce management, culture, leadership reform, and training issues. In the future we would like to write an article going into detail on such reforms. Ideally, the DoD needs an overhaul before money is added to the budget (as you point out). However, the best time to do such a reform was 10 years ago. The US is often unprepared or late to strategic competition. There is still a window of time to conduct an overhaul, but the opportunity is narrowing rapidly as the PRC continues to peak in capability and readiness.
However, we believe it would be unhelpful to not increase funding and simply shift dollars into O&M (Operations & Maintenance, the line of funding for force readiness) at this time. That would mean that funding would have to be cut from one of the other four "colors of money:" either from MILPERS (military personnel, which is active duty end strength), RDT&E (research, development, test, and evaluation, which is investment in future capabilities), MILCON (military construction, which is for new facilities and new bases), and Procurement (for new system acquisition).
1. A cut to MILCON is not likely because that line of funding is pretty low to begin with and highly political. Beyond that, the US military desperately needs to create more basing options throughout the Pacific while orienting the CONUS (continental United States) supporting establishment westward. These investments take years and decades to complete, so a cut now would be sorely felt down the road.
2. A cut to MILPERS is unadvisable because active duty end strength is already at around 1.3 million, which is historically quite low. Cold War end strength was always above 2.0 million personnel and below 3.5 million. During the 1990s, end strength ended up around the same as now: 1.3 million. Remember it took over 12 million troops to fight WWII. The DoD doesn't need a force of 12 million today, but to be ready to fight, a larger base force should remain in being to form the core of an expanded war fighting force. 1.3 is too low.
3. A cut to RDT&E is not possible within the next 3 years minimum because the force doesn't have the new weapons and capabilities they need to deter and fight the PRC. Just one example is hypersonics. The PRC has fielded a multitude of non-traditional hypersonic missiles, but the US has yet to field one. RDT&E is required to develop systems the DoD needs which it doesn't have yet.
4. A cut to procurement is equally not possible because once RDT&E creates a new capability, Procurement dollars are required to actually field the capability to the force.
Until Congress gets serious about DoD reform and accountability, the Pentagon is not likely to be in a position or have the incentive to become more efficient, let alone be able to get close to passing an audit. You go to war with the bureaucracy you have, not the one you want.