To review, the inside blunting force (covered in Part I) hugs the PLA’s belt in engagements on and around Taiwan primarily for the purpose of setting conditions for the outside surge force. The inside force is meant to 1) delay the PLA, extending time and space for the outside surge force, 2) provide ISR data on the PLA’s combat deployment for targeting use, and 3) attrit & fix PLA formations adjacent to the inside force so that red is doubly vulnerable to attack.
The mission of the outside surge force is to conduct combined joint projections of air and sea power into the area around Taiwan in order to attrit PLA air and sea platforms. As the PLA loses platforms, red’s ability to control what happens in theater will diminish, allowing COM to seize the initiative.
The outside surge force is not to be constantly engaged as the inside force is. Force protection and preservation are high priorities for the outside force since blue is less able to replace platforms than red.
The character of this force is logically dominated by air, sea, long-range fires, and theater logistics. A generation of bomber pilots, submariners, Air Force/Navy/Marine fighter pilots, AEW&C pilots, Surface Warfare Officers (SWOs), Army Multi Domain Task Force (MDTF) officers, and logisticians must form a single coherent cohort dedicated to a single operational concept.
The USN and USAF will not be fighting separate battles (and likely not even separate tactical engagements). There will be critical times during the fight that windows of opportunity open when the PLA is most exposed to incoming attacks. By working together, the USN and USAF are more capable of identifying, exploiting, and expanding these tactical windows of opportunity.
Agile Combat Employment (ACE) and Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) cannot be separate operating concepts. These concepts must be merged into a single logical framework which enables the joint air-sea team to deliver crushing blows against the PLA.
All services but primarily the USN and USAF must work together to orient around 1) supporting submarines and bombers to destroy the PLAN and 2) supporting air defense (including the surface fleet and ground-based) and fighters to destroy the PLAAF.
The US Army must integrate the MDTF into this effort and understand how to 1) support the outside surge force and simultaneously 2) support the Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs) located within the inside blunting force.
The US Army must also task 8th Theater Support Command (TSC) with intimately understanding the outside surge force as a customer.
On a final note, the bulk of the attack submarine community must be folded into this operational concept. Submariners have become accustomed to operating independently, which is not an effective way to win the next war.
COM Priorities for the Outside Surge Force:
Counter Command, Control, Communications, Computing, Cyber, Intelligence, Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Targeting (Counter C5ISRT)
Persistent-Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (P-ISR)
Integrated Staffing Model
Public-Private Partnership for Pacific Preparedness (P5)
Kinetic deception munition (FK-HOUSE)
Littoral Infrastructure Kill Munition (LIKM)
Army Watercraft Systems (AWCS)
Modernization Board
Counterintelligence (CI) Support
Counter C5ISRT
Counter C5ISRT is already a major priority for COM. Here, we just want to highlight that two specific sub-efforts are critical.
There are two primary types of links the PLA relies on between 1) command and commanded and 2) fire support and requestor. They must be cut.
Persistent-Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (P-ISR)
P-ISR is already a major priority for COM. Here, we just want to highlight its priority and reiterate that 1) all sensors blink, and 2) the Taiwan military may play a role in the P-ISR capability.
Integrated Staffing Model
While most observers understand that modern military operations must be joint, there is not enough appreciation for integration. Modern joint combat will not be effective if the current service pure units assigned to INDOPACOM attempt to work together during exercises and under fire.
INDOPACOM unit staffs must be integrated as the standard business model. The majority of units operating in the Pacific must have officers and NCOs from all services mixed together at the brigade/group/regimental level. Otherwise, there is no way for any single unit to make sense of the larger warfighting picture.
Public-Private Partnership for Pacific Preparedness (P5)
As the DoD scrambles to field new capabilities and more platforms, there is a parallel scramble to achieve more access, basing, and overflight (ABO) across the theater. While uneven progress has been made, US military forces are still quite constrained, since this effort is led primarily by the Department of State.
One of the biggest items on the new unfunded priority list (UPL) is $3.3 billion for INDOPACOM military construction (MILCON) funds.

The solution is to unleash the private sector to develop and upgrade ports and air bases all throughout the Pacific. These sites should be connected through new autonomous and space-based capabilities to achieve greater efficiency. The desired end result would be a robust theater-wide hub and spoke basing model.
Priorities should be theater-wide increases in ramp space, runway construction and lengthening (required on Yap), hardening, cyber insulation, and manning.
Key private sector partners for the port and air base side of the partnership include AECOM, Bechtel, Matson, American Presidential Lines, and others.
Key private sector partners for the connectivity side of the partnership include Starlink, Anduril, and others.
The public sector backers for the partnership would be the Department of State and Department of Defense.
Kinetic Deception Munition (FK-HOUSE)
COM should fund a new start program called Fragmenting Kinetics for Holistic Obfuscation and Unconventional Strategic Effects (FK-HOUSE). This family of munitions would deceive the PLA as to the time and location of coalition strikes. Since the PLA has a deep magazine and should have a more confident/lower threshold for munition expenditure, COM can play this red strength to his advantage by presenting a multitude of fake targets.
FK-HOUSE launches would stimulate the PLA’s defense networks, forcing them to spin up radars and potentially launch interceptors. This would draw the PLA’s attention away from blue platforms, waste radar coverage and interceptors, and most importantly uncover the locations of red platforms.
So as to not take up sorely needed platform hard points, the munitions should be capable of launching from extremely long ranges from a variety of surface, ground, and air platforms.
For example, an Army MDTF or an F-15EX squadron should be capable of launching FK-HOUSE, which would fragment in flight and mimic the signature of a real attack. These signatures could look like an incoming LRASM swarm, an AEW&C aircraft, a wave of cruise missiles, or perhaps an aircraft carrier steaming towards Taiwan.
Littoral Infrastructure Kill Munition (LIKM)
As any cursory breeze through the history of amphibious warfare illuminates, attempting to destroy an attacking amphibious force through naval interdiction alone is not only unlikely, it's almost impossible. The PLA will gain lodgment somewhere.
In order to counteract this inevitability, COM requires a new family of munitions designed specifically to destroy joint logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS) operational zones and deny their further use.
The long range anti-ship missile (LRASM) is already capable of destroying the large amphibious warfare ships and civilian RO/ROs the PLA fields. But different types of munitions are required to destroy the links between these ships and the beach.
These JLOTS capabilities include targets that are fixed during operation like the PLA’s Yupai modular causeway, existing port facilities, bridge barges, and potential PLA Mulberrys.
There are also mobile targets that are not fixed but constantly move in lines between the sea and the beachhead. These include hovercraft (Type 726 & Type 728), LCUs, amphibious vehicles, fishing trawlers, LCMs, etc.
After attacking either of these targets, the munition should be able to deploy an area denial capability to stop the PLA from reusing that lane for delivering beach cargo. This could be in the form of remotely delivered mines, obstacles, or chemicals.
Finally, it would be helpful if the munition also marked and geolocated the lane for friendly forces (both blue and green), whether that be by visual and/or electronic means.
Army Watercraft Systems (AWCS)
Counterintuitively, the US Army runs a program which fields sealift. All theater forces would benefit from increasing the number of ships fielded by AWCS. Enhanced production of existing ships can be achieved by leveraging South Korean and Japanese shipyards. COM should also advocate for a rapid upload/download capability, where rotary UAS are able to move cargo on and off Army watercraft without the vessel ever having to beach onto shore.
AWCS is available to COM day on stay on, versus other fleets which would require further authorization and prep time.
Modernization Board
The US Navy and US Air Force are already overclocking to achieve readiness and modernization goals that fit well within an outside surge force operational concept. These initiatives include programs like the Constellation Frigate, TRAM, B-21, NGAD, NGAS, F-15EX, LGM-35A Sentinel, collaborative combat aircraft (CCA), deeper magazines, increased ship construction, and more.
The USN has failed to achieve logical progress in its shipbuilding program for the past twenty years. The USAF has been marginally more successful, staggering through the acquisition and fielding the F-22 and F-35 mega projects. It is clear that the services are not the most capable shepherds of their own modernization.
The answer is a resurrection of the General Board concept. A board composed of all terminally senior or retired individuals: military officers, defense officials, defense prime CEOs, and politicians must convene to synchronize and steer these mighty efforts.
As with the original General Board, the new Modernization Board must "deliberate selflessly and objectively on matters ranging from strategy to ship characteristics.” The board must have access to war plans, acquisition efforts, and other such information they require for deliberation. General Board advice is then delivered directly to COM, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of Defense.
Counterintelligence (CI) Support
While our first tranche of capabilities for the inside blunting force required IO support to send a clear deterrent message, the second tranche of capabilities discussed in this article would require enhanced CI protection. The details of these capabilities should be closely guarded so as to ensure maximum battlefield surprise and effect.
Conclusion
The outcome of the outside surge force should be a PLA that severely doubts its ability to continue a landing campaign. Our next article in the series will explore COM’s priorities for the Decisive Force.