Command
US military forces believe in the principle of unity of command, which ensures unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective. It is a fundamental part of US joint operations.
To ensure unity of effort and consistency with the CCP, the PLA believes in the principle of division of command to ensure unity of effort. Throughout the PLA in echelons from deputy company leader grade through theater leader grade, there is a defined Commander and Political Officer who are in equal command of nearly every echelon of the armed forces.
The political officer ensures that higher intent is understood throughout his echelon and builds, maintains, and runs that echelon of troops so that the echelon is ready to be employed by the commander through appropriate tactics and campaigning. In the PLA system, a division of labor does not mean a house divided; it means a house unified to achieve the political goals set out by the party.
The PLA system features numerous leaders and deputy leaders across echelon, giving the PLA the flexibility to sustain leadership casualties and continue the fight.
Tactical Lessons
1) The PLA has two leaders in charge of most echelons, with the majority of echelons having one to two sets of deputy leaders. While blue commanders should certainly focus on striking PLA C2 nodes, do not believe that destroying or rendering a single C2 node mission incapable will have outsize effects on the PLA. PLA echelons are packed with leaders to ensure C2 continuity.
2) The link between party and army will be quite difficult to sever; there is a mass of political officers at echelon.
3) Expect PLA planning pre-engagement to be an intensive and lengthy process. Do not expect the same once contact occurs. PLA leaders are taught to fight the plan within reason, keep driving after contact, and make appropriate decisions on the ground. Foiling the PLA’s initial plans are key to throwing Red off balance and forcing them to shift to less desirable branch plans.
4) Know which nodes to target. The critical C2 nodes are at brigade and above. These are the leadership cadres given the full capability to execute missions and plan 24/7 365. They are often defended by short-range air defense (SHORAD), both MANPADS and vehicle-mounted systems.
Maneuver Warfare
US military doctrine emphasizes maneuver warfare. Maneuver is the combination of movement and fire. Maneuver warfare is the use of maneuver to secure positions of advantage against the enemy before and during combat to inflict a defeat of psychology or, if necessary, destruction upon the enemy.
The main US principle underlying maneuver warfare is mission command. This involves pushing decision-making authority down to the lowest feasible level (platoon to company), giving lower-level commanders the ability to make decisions on the ground. These commanders know their tactical situation the best and are given the tools to change plans as the situation changes.
Contrary to popular belief, the PLA also believes in maneuver warfare. However, the underlying principle is not mission command, but tempo. Platoon and company-level leaders are not expected to make decisions but to execute rapidly. Battalion leaders have limited flexibility, and it is only brigade-level leaders who have full authority to fight the fight.
Fighting maneuver warfare at the brigade level means that plans and decisions are more centralized to create higher operational speed (tempo). The PLA plans to hit the US with high tempo, confusing lower-level blue commanders and gradually pushing them off plan until the PLA is able to unfold the main plan.
PLA maneuver warfare seeks to push blue off plan by winning the first engagement. This does not necessarily mean winning the very first contact (sometimes it actually means losing it on purpose), but developing a plan that forces Blue to commit at the wrong place and time, eventually suffering an initial setback. After this setback, PLA cadres seek to ruthlessly drive operational tempo to ensure that blue forces cannot regain their footing while the red plan unfolds.
Finally, the PLA recognizes the importance of key terrain, but does not anchor on it to the same degree as blue. Expect PLA cadres to be very willing to trade terrain for other key advantages.
Tactical Lessons
1) Do not expect the PLA to employ rudimentary tactics.
2) Do not let the PLA set itself up for a proper first engagement. Even though the PLA will often outnumber blue formations, be aggressive, decisive, but also know when to pull back. Raids, feints, reconnaissance in force, limited offensives, denying the intel picture, and defensive repositioning all have a big role to play in pushing the PLA off plan. A satisfied defense anchored on key terrain is a scenario the PLA often trains on - don’t play their scenario.
3) Be wary of putting full confidence in identifying a main effort; the PLA trains on deception and sacrificing terrain and troops to force blue to unfold.
4) Expect indiscriminate use of PLA fires to fix, suppress, blind (a PLA fires tactical task), and probe blue positions. It may not be accurate all the time, but these uses of fires have effects.
5) A robust 24-hour planning and ops cycle is required for blue forces to keep the PLA constantly off-balance.
Enlisted Recruiting & Conscription
Since 1975, the US has relied on an all-volunteer force with a selective service system (draft) backstop.
The US also has a very high GDP per capita, meaning more resources are available for each servicemember. This has many follow-on effects. US recruits are more educated, more exposed to sports, more familiar with technology, and more self-motivated than their PLA conscript counterparts.
In contrast, the PLA relies on conscription for the enlisted force. It is clear from anecdotal evidence and news stories that PLA conscription is not completely voluntary. The PRC’s GDP per capita is much lower than the US, so fewer resources are available to align with each individual service member.
The advantage of this system for the PLA is that 200,000 to 700,000 service members are inducted and separated each year, forming a huge reserve force with at least two years of military training.
The disadvantage is that 1) PLA units spend a large amount of time training fresh conscripts, 2) there are fewer expectations put on conscripts, and 3) fewer resources are applied to each conscript.
The PLA does not seek to have a US-style NCO corps, though there are reforms and programs to increase NCO quality. Many of the jobs that would be done by US NCOs are performed by PLA company-grade officers.
Tactical Lessons
1) Absent officers, do not expect lower-level PLA echelons such as squads, platoons, companies, patrol boats, single frigates, sections, flights, etc, to take independent action - they are not trained for that. The only exceptions are PLAN submarines (which operate singularly for periods of time by design) and PLA SOF units, which have a fully fleshed out 12-man team structure across the force designed for independent action.
2) There is always more. Due to conscription, the PLA has a massive reserve of troops - but expect the quality to degrade significantly as the war drags on.
3) The PLA does not see its NCOs as centers of decision-making. The best NCOs are retained as advisors to officers. The current force is nearly entirely officer-centric.