The Presidential Candidates on China
Election 2024
The United States is just weeks from the next presidential election on November 5th, 2024. In the run up to the election, candidates are holding interviews (Harris, Trump), press conferences (Trump), and rallies (Harris, Trump) to convey their visions for America’s future to prospective voters.
During these engagements, a common topic is some version of “What about China?” This is sensible considering that both the 2017 and 2022 National Security Strategies identified the People’s Republic of China under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party as the United States’ greatest competitor. Some media outlets and think tanks have tried to capture this breakdown, but are caught up in their own reflections of the domestic political environment (Harris, Trump). What are the candidates’ positions on China?
Vice President Kamala Harris and Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in 2022. Photo: White House/Reuters.
Candidate Harris
During Harris’s formal acceptance of the Democratic Party’s nomination on Aug 22, 2024, she stated:
“I will make sure that we lead the world into the future on space and artificial intelligence. That America, not China, wins the competition for the 21st century and that we strengthen, not abdicate, our global leadership.”
She reiterated these points during the presidential debate on September 11. In her 60 Minutes interview there was no additional statement on China and Harris’s campaign website does not expand on a China approach past the statements already listed above. Candidates may say things in public, but people are policy. The candidates’ potential national security advisors are sometimes more representative of their potential foreign policy approach than their public statements.
Looking at Harris’s most likely national security advisors, there are two distinct paths she could take.
Jake Sullivan & Phil Gordon: The Competitors
For Sullivan and Gordon, their approach (and the Biden administration’s current approach) to China begins with the accurate assumption that the era of engagement is over.
One of the major failures of engagement from the Competitors’ perspective was the assumption that engagement would lead to a fundamental change in China’s domestic political structure. Since the CCP has proven to be far more durable than the USSR and the US is still the world’s preeminent superpower, the proponents of competition believe that the US and China will have to live with each other for decades.
The task, as the Competitors see it, is to achieve coexistence with China in an environment favorable to US interests. The Sino-American relationship is therefore not a problem to be solved, but a condition to be managed. The Cold War strategy of containment was successful because, as George Kennan outlines in The Sources of Soviet Conduct:
“[...]the possibility remains (and in the opinion of this writer it is a strong one) that Soviet power […] bears within it the seeds of its own decay, and that the sprouting of these seeds is well advanced.”
Outside of a few years in the 1970s, the Soviet Union was never a serious economic competitor to the US. Sullivan points out that China is very different, since it is globally economically integrated. Therefore, a simple containment strategy would not work since the Chinese economy would not necessarily collapse once contained.
Competitors do not want to rely on collapse as a foundational element of their strategic approach. At the same time, Competitors see a strategy of accommodation (which we will discuss below) as totally unacceptable, since a grand bargain with China over East Asia would possibly permanently damage American interests and Beijing would be unlikely to hold up their end of the deal anyway.
Sullivan has sought to chart a middle path more prudent than containment (also discussed below) or accommodation. In his vision, Washington needs to create a favorable balance of power in the military, economic, political, and global governance sectors. Kurt Campbell, the current Deputy Secretary of State, buttressed these views in his public statements supporting a carefully balanced coexistence with China, not an end goal of regime change.
In terms of military capability, the competition crowd mostly does not seek a stronger US military as much as a reprioritized one:
“To ensure deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, Washington should reorient its investments away from expensive and vulnerable platforms, such as aircraft carriers, and toward cheaper asymmetric capabilities designed to discourage Chinese adventurism without spending vast sums[.] Just as China has relied on relatively cheap anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles, the United States should embrace long-range unmanned carrier-based strike aircraft, unmanned underwater vehicles, guided missile submarines, and high-speed strike weapons.”
On the economic front, the Competitors aim to condition China’s access to critical markets through the principle of reciprocity. When Beijing behaves, it will have some market access and when it does not, Washington should seek to narrow that access. Part of reciprocity is tying market access to China’s domestic economic reforms.
In terms of cooperation, Sullivan sees space exploration, contagious diseases, the environment, and the global commons as areas where the two nations can work together.
The Democrats currently run the executive branch, so the Sullivan and Gordon competition strategy has become the orthodoxy. It is likely that Harris, if she were to win, would continue in this vein for the next four years absent major Chinese aggression or rapprochement. However, there will be a scramble within the Democratic Party on China policy, and it is not preordained that the Competitors shall win - especially if Harris were to lose.
Ryan Hass & Jessica Chen Weiss: The Accommodators
Hass and Chen Weiss have staked out a different approach to China which seeks to preserve the benefits of the previous era of Sino-American engagement.
This line of thinking seeks to come to a grand bargain or accommodation between Beijing and Washington on a series of agreed to goals which do not include aspects of competition. The Accommodators think that each side should not prioritize each other as their respective top adversary.
Under this framework, deterrence requires a stronger diplomatic element while maintaining current military capability.
To keep the bargain together, Chen Weiss advocates that China and the US should maintain a degree of technological and economic cooperation so that they are able to monitor each other, a principle somewhat similar to Cold War era nuclear arms inspections. The Accommodators believe this would reduce the likelihood of conflict.
Further glue holding together the bargain would be a consensus on this approach appealing to American partners and allies:
“U.S. partners and allies would welcome the shift, as most of them seek constructive relationships with China and do not want to take sides in a contest between Washington and Beijing.”
While the Accommodators’ approach is more theoretical than reality at this point in time, a Harris administration could potentially import these views into the executive branch depending on personnel assignments.
Common Beliefs - Liberalism
The Competitors and Accommodators have differing views but similar foundational beliefs in a liberalist approach to foreign policy. Liberal is not related to the term liberal in terms of American domestic politics. Their shared liberalism includes the beliefs that 1) States are important actors in the international system, but so are international institutions. 2) International anarchy exists, but is only as bad as what states and international institutions make of it.
Chinese President Xi Jinping waves to the press as he walks with President Donald Trump at the Mar-a-Lago estate in West Palm Beach, Florida, April 7, 2017. Jim Watson | AFP | Getty Images
What of Candidate Trump?
At the start of Trump’s campaign he rolled out a policy proposal that advocates removing China’s most favored nation trade status, adopting a four-year plan to phase out all Chinese imports of essential goods, and banning federal contracts for any company that outsources to China.
Since then, he also stated that he would impose tariffs of 60% or higher on Chinese goods. Even with these proposals and statements, Republicans are not in control of the executive branch, meaning their foreign policy vision has not yet coalesced around a unified China strategy.
Within the Trump camp, the approach to China will likely be the result of either a synthesis or competition between the Matthew Pottinger vs Elbridge Colby schools of thought. Both are good friends as well as colleagues at the Marathon Initiative. This is not an enmity, but a professional difference of opinion. Whether Pottinger himself would serve in a second Trump administration is not as important as the idea of containment.
Matt Pottinger & Mike Gallagher: The Containers
Pottinger and Gallagher are not interested in managing competition, measuring balances of power, or half measures in general. Pottinger’s philosophy is that the US should win the Cold War which Beijing has already initiated. The end goal, from Pottinger and Gallagher:
“What would winning look like? China’s communist rulers would give up trying to prevail in a hot or cold conflict with the United States and its friends. And the Chinese people—from ruling elites to everyday citizens—would find inspiration to explore new models of development and governance that don’t rely on repression at home and compulsive hostility abroad.”
China would become a country satisfied living within the existing rules-based international order. In order to resource this approach, Containers advocate for POTUS level leadership to get American society on board.
The US government would reallocate, cut, and increase funding across different priorities, especially increasing defense spending. These changes in the budget would increase American economic competitiveness, support new technologies, and restore a favorable military balance in Asia.
A reprioritized budget and federal government combined with broad-based support from the American people would allow Washington to pursue full aspect coercion against Beijing. This includes the tools of compellence and deterrence.
Such a robust approach would give more credibility to the US coalition, creating a political example for US allies and partners to follow. These sources of strength would create a larger power differential between the US and China, which itself would cause peace through strength.
Elbridge Colby: The Denier
Elbridge Colby has a related but different vision. Colby believes that because China and the US are currently closer in terms of economic strength than previous US adversaries, that Washington is more realistically capable of only resourcing a limited strategy of deterrence by denial.
Colby is not suggesting that the US is weak or has lost pace. From Colby himself:
“We are now in a world where we [the US] are very, very powerful, we are one of the two superpowers, but we are not so dominant as we once were. That is not a self-flagellating comment, that's just a reality.”
Colby broke out his beliefs succinctly in an X post dated 14 April 2024, which we simplified and summarized below:
Regime change & liberalization is not necessary to achieve core American national interest.
Pursuing that goal raises the risk of total war. If Beijing perceives the rivalry as total, they will go all in.
The US should instead seek a favorable balance of power.
This is eminently possible with the US coalition.
Once in possession of a favorable power balance, pursue detente with China from a position of strength.
US is unable to resource a primacy strategy in Asia because of the Chinese industrial base and economy.
So, US should focus on a strategy of deterrence by denial.
In contrast to the Containers, Deniers seek a modestly strengthened military component able to affordably deny Beijing’s military aims throughout the first island chain. This force then would act as the critical pivot for all of Washington’s other policies aimed at keeping China on the back foot and revitalizing US strength at home.
Stephen Walt & Barry Posen: The Restrainers
Walt and Posen argue for a narrower American role in world politics designed to revitalize the US at home. In their view, Washington would maintain a favorable balance of power in a few key areas of global economic significance mostly through an off-shore balancer style military capability and maintaining normal relations with a wide variety of states.
The US military as offshore balancer would retrench most of its forward posture and return to American soil. The military would maintain significant power projection capabilities, but base most of them domestically.
“NATO’s European members together annually spend more than three times what Russia does on defense. The idea that the EU (whose roster includes two nuclear-armed powers) lacks the wherewithal to defend itself against a neighbor whose economy is smaller than Italy’s is risible.”
Since China would be the only significant player competing for regional hegemony, the offshore military force would focus on balancing in coordination in a coalition against Beijing, something the US would have more money for after it retrenches from Europe and the Middle East.
The offshore posture of the US military would allow Washington to open and maintain relations with a wider network of states, including Iran. This would force regional powers to compete for American support against one another (especially in the Middle East), putting Washington in the driver's seat diplomatically.
While Walt and Posen would be unlikely to serve in a Trump administration, their ideas of an approach based on restraint are gaining influence within the Republican Party.
Common Beliefs - Realism
The Containers, Deniers, and Restrainers have differing views but similar foundational beliefs in a realist approach to foreign policy. Their shared realism includes the beliefs that 1) The international system is anarchic and violent. 2) States are the most powerful actors in the international system. 3) State power has primary roots in economic and military capabilities.
Conclusion
We are all part of a big American family. It is important to respect and understand these views. The views you disagree with are not stray voltage, but the work of serious thinkers addressing the role America is to play in the world. Each thinker carries a part of the truth within themselves and it is up to the American voter and the President of the United States to decide which approach is most appropriate for our time.
Serious national security practitioners and thinkers should not lampoon accommodation as appeasement; restraint as isolationism; or containment as war mongering. Each one of us must wrestle with these theories to truly understand them. Only once we understand these ideas can we make informed decisions.