The New Axis
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has continued to increase aid to the Russian Federation, while American efforts to sustain Ukraine’s combat power may be plateauing.
It is clear from an analysis of funding and equipment that neither Ukraine nor Russia are capable of unilaterally sustaining combat operations without extensive financial and military support. However, Beijing is outplaying Washington in terms of choosing methods of support which strengthen the donor as well as the recipient of aid. Beijing’s support to Moscow is a process of addition for the Chinese.
PRC finance comes through purchases of Russian commodities (crude oil, coal, pipeline gas, liquid gas) at huge discounts to the PRC. This helps the Chinese economy vastly more than the Russian, but will still likely sustain Moscow for the course of a long war.
Simultaneously, the PRC provides a high level of support to the Russian military machine by supporting, not replacing, Russian military production. By focusing on substituting civilian and dual-use products instead of providing weapons (the Russians can build those), the PRC is able to:
1) Continue to grow the Chinese economy and firms in key dual-use sectors in particular.
2) Avoid converting revenue-generating economic resources into revenue-consuming military resources.
3) Specialize the Russian economy away from commercial competition with the PRC.
4) Expand PRC silicon chip manufacturing.
5) Avoid the global political ramifications of selling weapons directly.
6) Maintain PLA military stocks from being drawn dangerously low.
7) Ensure PRC weapons are not picked up on the battlefield and exploited by Washington (to develop countermeasures).
Xi’s approach to the Ukraine War is consistent with a common Chinese tactic when dealing with non-Chinese: the search for a “win-win situation” (双赢), where it is actually the Chinese that win twice.
The Chinese approach contrasts sharply with American efforts to support Ukraine. The majority of Washington’s aid has come in three forms: 1) direct contribution of weapons systems, 2) cash transfers to keep the Ukraine government running, and 3) a series of sanctions against Moscow.
The first two forms of support are direct assistance, closer to a form of charity. While highly effective in delivering advanced capabilities rapidly into the hands of Ukrainians, they have the drawback of costing the US serious resources as well as a drawdown of US weapons stocks.
Partial List of US material assistance since October 2023:
• 38 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and ammunition;
Annual HIMARS production circa 2022: 60 units
• 12 National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS);
• 1 Patriot air defense battery and other air defense systems;
Annual Patriot production circa 2022: about 6 “systems” which is vaguely defined
• 31 Abrams tanks, 45 T-72B tanks and 186 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles;
Annual Abrams production circa 2022: 22 units
• 300 M113 and 189 Stryker Armored Personnel Carriers;
• 2,000+ Stinger anti-aircraft systems;
Annual javelin production circa 2022: 3,000 units
• 10,000+ Javelin and 80,000+ other anti-armor systems;
Annual javelin production circa 2022: 2,000 units
• Over 1,000 Phoenix Ghost, Switchblade, and other UAS;
• 198 155mm howitzers &
• Up to 1,004,000 155mm rounds &
• 4,700 precision-guided 155mm artillery rounds &
• 9,000 155mm rounds of Remote Anti-Armor Mine (RAAM) Systems;
• 72 105 mm Howitzers and artillery &
• 180,000 105mm artillery rounds;
• 237 mortar systems;
• 7,000+ Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, WireGuided (TOW) missiles;
• High-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARMs);
• Other laser-guided rocket systems;
• 35,000+ grenade launchers and small arms;
• communications, radar, and intelligence equipment;
• 100,000 rounds of 125mm tank ammunition;
• training, maintenance, and sustainment.
The above list is quite costly, but stimulates serious demand for US weapons systems, initiates a warmup of the US defense industrial base and military acquisitions system, and tangibly improves US weapons effectiveness (Patriot radar and engagement algorithms for low-hypersonics, data on javelin performance against modern armor, data on Russian air defense radars and missile systems to develop US weaponeering capability, etc.).
The drawback is that handing over such equipment fails to fully stimulate Ukrainian or European rearmament. This is primarily because Ukraine has lost territories of significant economic value, including Kyiv’s defense industrial base in the Donbass / eastern portion of the country. While the PRC is able to supply a pre-existing Russian defense industry, Ukraine has no such ability to mass produce its own weapons.
In terms of cash transfers minus defense equipment, the US portion of Ukraine direct assistance is roughly $25b a year. For some perspective, this is half the yearly budget of the US Marine Corps. $25b is also the cost of purchasing 20 Constellation-class guided missile frigates, the US Navy’s entire planned purchase of the class.
Catastrophically Expensive Consequences
The price of supporting Ukraine is certainly high, especially when considering the opportunity cost of not purchasing more naval vessels. However, the Ukraine fight is critical. The CCP has used this war to strategically message to Europe (through actions, not words) that the US is no longer the primary determinant of global security.
Even if CCP efforts cannot keep Russia on the field of battle, Beijing hopes that Europeans will start proclaiming that the Ukraine War cannot be ended without the PRC’s cooperation. This would give Beijing inestimable clout in European politics, and open up a potential wedge issue to divide Europe from the US. Beijing does not need a European alliance, only indifference to its aggressive actions in Asia.
Escalate to Win - Moscow must lose
The only viable solution that secures long term American interests is a quick and overwhelming attack which dislodges Russia from at least the Donbass (eastern territories) excluding Crimea. After such an operation, the war needs to come to a quick negotiated close so that the US can redeploy men, material, and focus elsewhere. With a second war in full swing in Israel and a third war brewing between Venezuela and Guyana, Washington is taking enormous risks by allowing deterrence to fade away and then fighting the resulting wars slowly.
To end the war in Ukraine, the US should adopt a new strategy of rollback. European Command (EUCOM) should employ overwhelming airpower to peel back Russia’s integrated air defense system (IADS) and logistics network in Ukraine. This would set the conditions for Ukraine to launch a successful counteroffensive. As US forces built up to deliver such an air offensive, Moscow would almost certainly begin serious dialogues with Kyiv about ending the war for the first time since 2022.
Such a move would also require Beijing to put up or shut up, and provide direct lethal assistance to Russia, or forfeit the conflict. The PRC is not postured to aid a European partner, and any drawdown of PLA material would make Taiwan safer. If Beijing chose to pursue such an extraordinary course of action, it would serve to unmask their intentions to the global commons.
Now is the time to force an early defeat upon the new axis powers before they solidify into a more fearsome alliance.