Taiwan's T-Dome

金門調酒 - Kinmen Cocktails #4

From Bill Bishop’s Sinocism and China Daily:

Lai’s ‘T-Dome’ doomed to disaster - China Daily In his “Oct 10” speech on Friday, Taiwan leader Lai Ching-te reiterated the fallacious cliches of “Taiwan democracy” and the flawed “two states” theory. For the first time, he also announced plans to build a “T-Dome” air defense system aimed at providing multi-layered and effective interception against “enemy threats”. By escalating the rhetoric of threat, Lai and his Democratic Progressive Party risk pushing the island to the brink of military conflict, jeopardizing both the economy and the well-being of Taiwan residents.

We all love some CCP propaganda. Investment in Taiwan’s T-Dome or integrated air defense system (IADS) would be a welcome improvement to the cross-strait balance.

Time: The key operational variable in a Taiwan campaign remains time. Taiwan forces must be able to stave off defeat long enough for a coalition to intervene. Ideally, the CCP would prefer a short and sharp victory. A robust IADS fought intelligently can take a significant amount of time and resources to roll back. Even when the system has culminated, it can still impose costs through concentrated attacks against hard-to-replace aircraft.

Strike assets aren’t unlimited, and neither are all the resources that go into effective strikes. The lengthy process of target systems analysis, bomb damage assessments, and mission planning takes a staggering amount of man-hours and staff work. Investments in a T-Dome would lengthen PLA operational timelines to Taiwan and the US’ favor.

Burn: The greater the effectiveness of Taiwan’s IADS, the greater the burn on the PLA’s munition magazine and aircraft/drone flight hours. The magazine burn and operational burn spent on Taiwan means that those PLA forces are unavailable for other tasks such as supporting a PLA Navy blockade, deep strikes elsewhere in theater, or prosecuting other coalition military targets.

A more capable Taiwan IADS means the PLA has to burn more of its potential against Taiwan targets before contemplating a successful landing or conducting counterintervention.

Counter-lodgment: If a landing is to occur, then PLA amphibious forces must first seize a small lodgment on Taiwan’s shores and begin to expand it. Taiwan forces can more credibly counter these lodgments if they hold a portion of their IADS in reserve to cover the landing beaches. Taiwan’s IADS would allow for Taiwan Army counterattacks against lodgments. Giving Taiwan a chance to bounce back a lodgment or two would change the calculus of a landing campaign and give real teeth to any Taiwanese defense of the main island.

Tie-in with US IADS: A T-Dome would almost certainly tie its datalinks into the US IADS. This would give US forces a much sharper targeting picture in the Strait region and allow the US to conduct precision strikes more effectively while mitigating the risk to valuable US ISR assets. If Taiwan can pass the targeting data, more capable US strike platforms can wreak havoc on PLA air forces, amphibious forces, C2 nodes, logistics dumps, and marshaling areas.

Indications & Warning: Effective IADS require major investments in radars. Of course, these radars can be used for battle management and targeting duties for the IADS themselves. But another more effective use of IADS radars that is not discussed is their effectiveness in gathering intelligence. IADS radars can gather information on missiles, drones, aircraft, and enemy radars and radios far beyond the effective range of their interceptor missiles. Upgrading Taiwan’s situational awareness of the cross-strait region will allow for much more intelligence sharing on the operational picture on the mainland side of the Strait. This was perhaps the major reason for the PRC’s protests against the deployment of THAAD to South Korea in 2017 (announced in 2016).