Response to WSJ Article on USMC Force Design 2030
Response to WSJ Article on USMC Force Design 2030
Vermilion readers, after reviewing a recent Wall Street Journal article on Force Design 2030 (FD2030), we felt compelled to respond to the article in detail. The article is below, with Vermilion comments in block quote. Happy New Year 2024!
You can find the original article here.
The Marine Corps went all in when the Pentagon identified China as the prime national-security challenge facing the U.S.
To meet it, the Marines in 2020 proclaimed a thoroughgoing transformation. Under “Force Design 2030,” the Corps would do away with its tanks, make other cuts and devote fewer resources for its long-held mission as the nation’s premier crisis-response force. Instead, the focus would be on China, with small teams of missile-toting Marines hopping from island to island in the Western Pacific to attack the Chinese fleet in a conflict.
On a philosophical level, it is not true that the USMC made cuts to its ability as a “crisis-response force/capacity to respond” in favor of China. What the USMC did was in fact shift the focus of effort from unconventional warfare to conventional warfare. As we can see from the Ukraine War and the Israeli-Gaza War, this looks to have been a prescient move. A fascinatingly small number of analysts would have predicted the future return of conventional warfare in 2020. FD2030 was finalized in 2019.
From FD2030:
“The 2018 National Defense Strategy redirected the Marine Corps’ mission focus from countering violent extremists in the Middle East to great power/peer-level competition, with special emphasis on the Indo-Pacific. Such a profound shift in missions, from inland to littoral, and from non-state actor to peer competitor, necessarily requires substantial adjustments in how we organize, train, and equip our Corps.”
The effort, however, is raising questions about how ready the Marines are to handle unanticipated threats in an increasingly disorderly world.
As fighting rages in Gaza and Iranian-backed forces lob missiles at U.S. troops and commercial shipping in the region, a Marine expeditionary unit is now floating in the Red Sea, a sign of how the Middle East has forced itself back on the Pentagon agenda.
Even after modifications to the force structure the Marine Corps is still able to respond to threats and function as a form of deterrence via the MEU. The article points out its own counterargument. Many observers do not realize that the Marine Corps has maintained the great majority (but not all) of its MEU/MEB/MEF force structure. It is simply adding Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs) with missile combat capabilities. The MLRs are meant to support the traditional MEU/MEB/MEF elements, as well as other units of the joint force.
Corps leaders defend the changes, insisting the leaner but more modern force being fielded can handle the full array of missions. But the Marines’ new vision provoked unease among some senior officers—one of whom fired off a classified memo arguing that the plan went too far—and set off opposition from retired Marine generals.
“Like other retired Marines, I support some of the Marine Corps’ modernization efforts and its focus on the pacing threat in the Pacific,” said Sam Mundy, who served as the top Marine officer in the Middle East from 2018 to 2021. “But I’m also concerned about what this means for the service’s ability to respond globally.”
“The latest crisis in the Middle East underscores the risks of hyper-optimization,” said Mundy, who has since retired.
Is the Marine Corps hyper-optimized? That is simply taken as granted instead of explored. The US Navy forces engaging the Houthis as we write this article are employing advanced missile defense capabilities; and the Houthis are arguably an unconventional armed group.
The wrangling over the Marines’ role is central to a broader debate over how the Pentagon prepares for the future, balancing its strategy to counter Beijing’s growing might while preserving flexibility to respond to other crises.
Since the Pentagon identified China as a disruptive rival nearly six years ago, the Marines have moved farther than other services in shifting from decades of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan to preparing for great-power conflict.
China was not identified as a “disruptive rival.” It has been identified as “[...] the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the [...] power to do it.”
In addition to jettisoning its tanks, the Corps dispensed with most of its cannon artillery batteries, trimmed the number of its infantry battalions, eliminated its units that deploy bridges over rivers and difficult terrain and cut the number of F-35 jet fighters and helicopters it has deployed. Nearly $16 billion of the money that was saved is being used to develop long-range missile batteries to sink ships, pursue munition-carrying and reconnaissance drones as well as adding other capabilities.
The Marine Corps entered the modern age bereft of missile units aside from Stingers, ATGMs, and HIMARS, a ground to ground system (though that may change in the future due in part to FD2030). This clearly needed to change. Whether or not FD2030 was adopted, the USMC would almost certainly have adopted some type of long-range missile system. What this paragraph leaves out is the major radar systems and defensive missile systems the Corps is acquiring / would also have to acquire. Drones would also have been acquired regardless of the future shape of the Corps, which seems painfully obvious. Bridging units were only required because of the M1 Abrams tanks.
This leaves cuts to jets, rotary, infantry battalions (3), tanks, and cannon artillery. Certainly these are also capabilities required in a conventional war. However, critics here are conflating cuts to force structure and budget constraints. The Marine Corps needs to modernize within its current budget, which means that force structure has become the taxpayer. These issues are decided mostly by Congress, not the Marine Corps.
Defense Department officials who support the change argue the Chinese military buildup is so advanced that the Pentagon must shift its focus lest Beijing emerge as the dominant power in East Asia. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin has lauded the Marines’ “transformational effort” and willingness to make tough trade-offs “to deter the next war.”
This is a significant problem that the discussion around FD2030 brought to light. The Marine Corps under FD2030 is moving to address what the civilian administration set out as a national security priority in 2018 and then again in 2022, with force structure modifications being actively supported by civilian authorities. It is unbecoming of general officers active and retired to publicly detract from the Commandant’s planning priorities when they don’t get their way. These officers want to shape the Corps into what they think it should be and what threats they think the Marine Corps should address absent civilian input.
Others, however, cite the Pentagon’s poor record in forecasting where the U.S. might next be called on to fight, including in the Middle East where Iran remains a danger and which accounts for almost a third of the world’s oil production “My biggest concern is does this turn the Marine Corps into a niche force at the expense of its global response capability?” said Sen. Dan Sullivan (R., Alaska), who serves as a colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve.
The Marine Corps is a niche force whose job is to win the first battle and following ones. All Marines, officer and enlisted, are taught that the Marine Corps is in a constant state of existential struggle against the civilian administration and the other services. This view leads to the idea that the Corps must be everywhere all the time - something that may no longer be necessary.
The debate carries particular resonance for the Marine Corps, which has long seen itself as the nation’s top 9-1-1 response force but is also anxious to secure a place in the Pentagon’s priority mission of deterring China.
This likely stems from the insecurity mentioned previously. There are a multitude of other forces (82nd Airborne, XVIII Airborne Corps, SOF) that can fulfill the global response mission set. The Marine Corps is returning to its roots as a Pacific-oriented naval fighting force and has more help in its previous role as the “nation’s top 9-1-1 response force” (which in itself has an undefined meaning).
Gen. Eric Smith, who became the Marines commandant in September, has reaffirmed his commitment to the redesign while also opening a dialogue with many of the critics, who are urging him to reverse some cuts.
“I am open to adding back anything that I believe is required,” he said in an interview shortly before taking command. ”But you have to, again, have data research or gaming, analysis and experimentation that validates that. What I won’t do is co-commandant with anyone.”
The key to FD2030 is realistic wargaming. Realistic wargaming informed the development of this process the entire time, and also informed the adjustments to FD2030 (for example, when infantry battalion numbers were bumped up from the initial cut because they were too small to fight effectively). The traditional Marine Corps of the past does not meet the standard in a realistic, modern wargame focused on the first island chain.
Smith, who suffered cardiac arrest in October, plans to return to work in the coming weeks, a Marine officer said. So far, no course correction has been ordered, the officer said, but Smith plans to release planning guidance to the Corps after he gets back.
Battle for the Future
The fight over the Marine Corps’ future began nearly four years ago when Smith’s predecessor, Gen. David Berger, unveiled Force Design 2030. As an assistant commandant, Smith went through every part of the planning.
Like most Marines, Berger had served in the U.S.’s “forever wars” in Afghanistan and Iraq. His formative experience was in the Pacific, where he became preoccupied with a different challenge: China’s strategy to keep the U.S. at arm’s length if conflict erupts by attacking the military bases and aircraft-carrier battle groups the U.S. has long relied on to marshal forces and supplies in the region.
The vast majority of OIF/OEF Marines have retired from the Corps or are serving as senior enlisted/field grade or GOs. Many of the people detracting from FD2030 and the direction of the Corps under General Berger and General Smith have extensive experience conducting low intensity counterinsurgency operations but lack experience in a large conventional war. Because many are retired, much of this cohort even lacks the experience of wargaming a modern conflict.
“They were going to extend a lead on us or we had to take a step back, reassess where we were going, and figure out how to stay in front,” Berger said in an interview shortly before retiring in July.
Under the vision, while other services would use their “standoff” capabilities to fire missiles at the Chinese fleet from afar, the Marines would be a “stand-in force.” Small units, equipped with new antiship missiles and drones, would disperse to elude attack, moving from island to island in an effort to bottle up China’s naval fleet.
The decadelong plan, which envisioned the creation of three new littoral regiments in the Pacific, marked a striking departure from Pentagon jockeying. The Corps didn’t seek a bigger slice of the defense budget but would fund the transformation with offsetting cuts.
The new strategy had its risks. Supplying island-based units under attack would require new logistical capabilities that had yet to be developed.
Yet Berger’s champions said he was the change agent the military needed.
“Small, agile, difficult-to-target maritime forces tailored to confront specific Chinese or Russian malign activities in their regions make great sense militarily, economically, and diplomatically,” said Robert Work, a former deputy defense secretary and a retired Marine colonel.
Bob is a legend in the Department.
“The change is long overdue,” added Work, who thinks the Marines still retain enough capability to hedge against other dangers.
In pushing ahead, Berger relied on a small circle of planners whom he asked to sign nondisclosure agreements and didn’t consult with the generals who oversaw operations in Africa and the Middle East, those generals said.
“I think the Marine Corps made a conscious decision to ensure that the Central Command was not included in the process,” said Ret. Gen. Frank McKenzie, who ran the command that oversees U.S. forces in the Middle East.
Clearly, this was done to take the Marine Corps in a new direction more rapidly. Now is the time for Commandant Smith to bring CENTCOM (and now EUCOM) back into the picture and get more input on how FD2030 can scratch their itch. Littoral operations in Norway and SLOC operations in the Red Sea and Strait of Hormuz seem obvious starting points.
Berger didn’t respond to an emailed request for comment on McKenzie’s remarks that was relayed by a Marine spokesman. His supporters say it is the commandant’s responsibility to update the Corps.
The Fabric Frays
The discord went beyond grumbling, with some senior officers finding fault with Berger’s plan while some retired generals worked to oppose it.
Scott Moore, a retired Marine lieutenant colonel who served as senior analyst at Wargaming Center at the Marines’ base in Quantico, Va., said wargames he was involved with to test the new design were based on some unchallenged assumptions. Chief among those was that Marines would have no difficulty deploying to remote islands before a conflict and would be adequately supplied with fuel, ammunition, spare parts and medical supplies when fighting broke out.
A Marine spokesman said that other wargames have been conducted to assess the logistics issues.
Mr. Moore is talking out of turn here. Yes, wargames have assumptions. Yes, there are classified capabilities that cannot be released to all wargames that may affect wargame assumptions and outcomes. Also, Mr. Moore knows he should not be speaking in public about this. It is almost certain that Mr. Moore was not involved in every wargame that informed FD2030 development, or is even aware of every wargame series. What the unidentified Marine spokesman said is true: there are other wargames that assess logistics.
At Camp Pendleton, Calif., the commanding general of the I Marine Expeditionary Force, Lt. Gen. George Smith, sent a classified assessment in April 2022 warning that reducing aircraft, artillery and logistics capabilities would lead to the “fraying of the fabric” of the nearly 50,000-strong task force, according to people familiar with the document. This, he wrote, would hamper the force’s ability to train for and execute large-scale, combined-arms operations against potential adversaries around the globe. Smith retired from the Marines earlier this year.
Retired Marine generals presented Berger with their concerns in a day-long Quantico meeting in March 2022. Present were several of Berger’s predecessors as commandant, including Joe Dunford, who had also chaired the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Anthony Zinni, who had led Central Command, was also there.
Setting aside the leaking of classified information (which is a federal crime under the Espionage Act of 1917), LtGen Smith was likely correct when he identified a reduction of I MEF equipment would lead to a reduction in capability. This is self-evident. As discussed above, this is a budgetary issue that Congress has primacy of place to decide. Some type of modernization is required, and the answer certainly isn’t purchasing more of the same equipment. That modernization requires funds, which the Marine Corps typically has very little of compared to other services. Since Congress has not plussed up the USMC budget considering inflation, nor authorized pay cuts, healthcare cuts, or reduced the USMC operational tempo (O&M dollars), force structure is the natural taxpayer.
For seven hours they made their case that the new design would compromise the Marines’ global role. Berger said little. The next day, Charles Krulak, a former commandant, emailed Berger, who responded that he planned to stay the course, Krulak recalled.
The retired commanders looked to Congress for support. Rep. Seth Moulton (D., Mass.), who serves on the House Armed Services Committee, said he heard them out but found the Berger plan convincing. “The only concern I have about the Marine course is that they may not be moving fast enough given how fast China is modernizing its military,” said Moulton, who served as a Marine officer in Iraq.
These retired Marine generals have tried time and time again to reverse the direction of the Marine Corps and they have failed. This article is just one more effort by the same group.
Sullivan has been more skeptical. The Alaska senator inserted a provision in a defense policy bill, which passed this month, that mandates an independent assessment of the overhaul and its effect on the Marines’s ability to carry out other missions.
The current Marine commandant, Smith, likes to remind people that he is a plain-spoken man from Plano, Texas, and uses that to sell the proposition that he can strike the right balance.
“The first thing they teach you as a lieutenant in your first fire support class is don’t creep up on the target. You know, add 25 meters, add 25 meters. That’s a waste,” Smith said. “You make a bold correction, and Force Design 2030 was a bold correction. And now we’re doing top-down targeting, bottom-up refinement.”
On a side note, junior officers and junior enlisted are increasingly exposed to anti-institutional viewpoints from slightly more experienced Marines. A lieutenant or sergeant should be focused on closing with and destroying the enemy, not distracted by their direct senior’s personal opinions on FD2030, which are in turn, wholly adopted from the insurgent GO crowd without critical thought.