Response to Commentary on Proposed Taiwan Arms Purchases
There is a significant amount of commentary on rumors of Taiwan's potential weapons buy (Aegis DDG/F-35/E-2D/PAC-3). A major bias for American observers is a general failure to understand the potential impact of upgraded platforms.
E2-Ds. The E-2D would just upgrade the K models already in service with the Taiwan Air Force. Hawkeye can increase the effectiveness of all other systems it works with. This is extremely effective for peacetime as well as wartime missions.
F-35s. The F-35 would potentially be transformative. The sensor sharing capability with coalition forces would change the game. Every time a Taiwan Panther peeks out from the mountains, it could map PRC's IADS. This is not so with the Viper. Not to mention potential capability to smack down PLAAF or extend timeline compared to F-16V. Reference 1958. Problems are:
Sensitivity of the F-35 platform
Program partners' views on Taiwan's inclusion
Hangar survivability
Our recommendation is the creation of an F-35T platform optimized for combat over the first island chain which has a divergent development path from the current TR-3/Block 4.
Aegis DDGs. Aegis DDGs would have the same coalition networking effect and bring new capabilities to Taiwan's fleet like BMD (Ballistic Missile Defense), complex management for well over 100 entities per system (needed in a crowded AO like Taiwan region), and upgradeability. This would likely have small beneficial follow-on effects for the US shipbuilding industry. Problems are:
Sensitivity of the latest Burke baseline
Length of procurement
Our recommendation is chopping over older Burkes for now and including Taiwan, Australia, Korea, and Japan on the forthcoming Constellation class FFG. Make the Constellation like the F-35 program.
PAC-3s. We are sure most observers will welcome more PAC-3 purchases. The major problem is Lockheed and RTX's still limited ability to meet demand.
Taiwan likely needs a mix of upgraded platforms as well as the PATRIOTs, drones, ASCMs, and other supposedly "asymmetric" systems preferred by most Washington analysts. A military does not win or even delay successfully through fires alone. Even in a fires-dominant approach, there must be a capable fixing force.