Red Letters #5
Vermilion Q&A
This is the fifth installment in our Red Letters Q&A series. If you have any questions you’d like to have answered, please feel free to shoot us a message.
Red Letters 1, 2, 3, 4.
Will the PRC wait for its next batch of aircraft carriers to be built prior to invading ROC?
PRC’s current aircraft carriers are combat capable, but not really combat credible due to aircraft takeoff weight restrictions. They’ll have to wait for 003 or later to build a true carrier force. That being said, a Red carrier wing likely isn’t necessary in a contained Taiwan scenario.
What are the PLA’s best trained units? Any combat experience?
Rough guesses.
PLAAF: 9th Brigade
PLAA: 195th Brigade, 71 Group Army, 72 Group Army, 73 Group Army
PLAN: Eastern Theater Command forces in general, Renhai crews in specific.
PAP: Interestingly enough PAP will likely have the most experience doing their job, especially PAP SF.
What is the likely reason behind the Rocket Force personnel changes? Implications?
Most Likely: Corruption with defense state-owned enterprises and defense contractors. The Beihang faction was growing too fat.
Most deadly: PLARF leadership was contemplating a coup.
Possible: US turned them.
Implication: A Navy Admiral and Air Force General Commissar (the other services with nuke triad responsibilities) have been put in charge of the PLARF with no prior PLARF experience. Expect PLARF to lose political cache and autonomy as the nuclear triad (PLARF land-based missiles, PLAAF nuke bombers, PLAN nuke ballistic subs) strengthens independently under Xi’s direct control.
What are your top 3 resources for keeping up to date with China + Taiwan issues?
Bill Bishop does God’s work over at
trying to keep track of this stuff. Please support him.Local and regional news (think SCMP, CNA/Focus Taiwan, 人民日报/People’s Daily, Nikkei Asia, Caijing 财经). Language split is 70% English, 30% traditional/simplified Chinese.
US/Taiwan/China think tanks. (CSIS, Global Taiwan Initiative, National Defense University 國防大學, CCG)
Why doesn’t the US make more amphibious vehicles? China has a lot, we don’t.
The USMC was pretty short-sighted and lacked the funds to modernize, so amphibious capabilities were written off from 2005-2018. It was common back then to treat amphibious warfare as something antiquated that wouldn’t be attempted again. Very short sighted, but that is what happens when you grow officers on 20 years of land-based counterinsurgency.
This lack of strategy and ops led downstream to an acquisition decision to cut the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV)/ Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program. It’s pretty clear the PLA thought the AAAV/EFV was a great idea and copied it, fielding hundreds of them today (ZBD/ZTD).
Compounding all of this is the USMC, DoD, and Congress have really bought into the concept of safety during training and ops. It has eroded the capability of conventional forces to do realistic training on hard missions, where some amphibious vehicles may tumble in the surf.
How would China message to other countries such as Japan and the Philippines?
“This is not your fight, so don’t pay the price.” The PRC would pull all levers for information & influence operations and elite capture in Japan and the Philippines in order to block US access, basing, and overflight (ABO). If they can’t stop widespread ABO, they’ll try to stop US offensive strikes from third country soil.