PLA Armor - The ZTZ-99A Tank
Deep Dive on the Competitive & Affordable ZTZ-99 3rd Generation Main Battle Tank
This article is a translation and reworking of “Research on the Combat Effectiveness of the Chinese Communist ZTZ-99A tank” (中共ZTZ-99A戰車作戰效能之研究), written by Taiwan Army Major Li Zhengyun (林政運少校), a graduate of National Chung Cheng Institute of Technology and an instructor at the Infantry Training Command Special Operations Group.
Vermilion has not only translated, but restructured and significantly expanded the article. Some of the sentences below are direct translations/quotes. Many of the sentences have also been reworked with information and context added. We have reorganized Major Li’s article to focus on the topics of the ZTZ-99A’s protection, informationized systems, munitions, technical weaknesses, and a final assessment.
ZTZ stands for Armored, Tank, Main (装甲 坦克 主要 / Zhuangjia Tanke Zhuyao). The 99 comes from the rough year that the vehicle debuted in service, and the A stands for an upgraded baseline.
As the author points out, the ZTZ-99 has numerous prototypes and modified variants. While the industrial design code for this vehicle is the WZ1001, there have been references to production models ZTZ-99, ZTZ-99I, ZTZ-99II, ZTZ-99III, ZTZ-99G, ZTZ-99A, ZTZ-99A1, and ZTZ-99A2. To remain consistent with the author, we will refer to the latest post-2015 baseline model as the ZTZ-99A.
Protection
BLUF: The ZTZ-99A likely has equivalent armored protection to the German Leopard 2A6 model on the front turret and front upper glacis plate areas. This is a rough estimate of 1,000mm of rolled homogeneous armor equivalent (RHAe) on the turret and 700mm of RHAe on the front upper glacis.
Discussion: The ZTZ-99’s protection system is a five layer sandwich. The first layer is the body, constructed of mostly steel. The second is a modern layer of composite armor. The third layer includes specific areas of the tank which receive an installation of reactive armor. The final and fourth layer are those protection systems which extend beyond physical armor: soft kill measures such as laser warning and smoke generation, as well as hard kill measures such as submunitions which interdict incoming munitions.
Layer 1 - Steel
Every tank starts out like an automobile - as a high-strength steel shell. PRC workforce skills in casting, forging, welding, fabrication, and machining are good enough to create a decent tank chassis. There are also important components of other types of armor (composite, reactive, both described below) that utilize steel.
The PRC defense industrial base likely will experience difficulty with the consistency and quantity of the steel products used in the chassis. At least for foreign purchasers of Chinese steel (even in important infrastructure applications), there have been noted problems with the consistency of steel chemistry, inclusions, casting/forging exactness, and treatments.
PRC Consistency Difficulties
Steel chemistry involves the exact chemical/mineral makeup of the steel product. There are many different grades and types of steel, and steel used in armor applications includes high hardness and ultra-high hardness steels (especially in plates used for reactive armors) which have very specific recipes. If these recipes are not followed correctly, and the right mix of materials are not used, then the final steel product will not have the exact desired qualities.
Inclusions are the “other stuff” not desired in a piece of steel. Some amount of inclusion is unavoidable, but the total amount of inclusion must be kept low in high quality steels, since inclusions can change the final product’s qualities and weaken it. It is hard to test for inclusions after a steel product has been produced except for surface-level inclusion activity.
Casting is the process of converting a molten metal into a finally formed solid product. Forging is similar but more difficult and creates a better product. There have been noted problems with the final shape exactness of Chinese steel products. This means the casting or forging was not done properly. Obviously, parts that aren’t the exact required size will cause problems and defects in final vehicles.
Finally, properly treating steel products has also been a challenge for PRC steel firms. One example is galvanization, where a protective zinc coating is applied to a steel product in order to prevent/delay rust. Chinese steel more often exhibits uneven thickness of applied treatments and bare spots.
The PRC will likely have continued difficulties in steel quality that may have been a root cause for the many ZTZ-99A vehicle failures observed in Russia 2015 (more on that below). While PLA engineers are likely able to increase steel quality under peacetime conditions, it is hard to see how the PRC could avoid widespread defects in vehicle steel under conditions of wartime mobilization - though it will be easier for PRC to achieve mass production of at least steel casting versus the American industrial base.
Layer 2 - JN1 Composite
Mao Ming, chief designer for the 99A program (at least during the 2019-2020 time period) claimed the ZTZ-99A weighed in at 55-60 tons (lighter than Abrams) because JN1 composite armor is much more efficient than other main battle tanks including “American composite” which incorporates depleted uranium (DU) - though Chinese engineers did not specify if their American armor comparisons are against first, second, third, or higher generation American DU composite.
There is also the claim that the installation/application scope of JN1 is greater than other armors versus the surface area of the naked cast steel vehicle body. This means small angled areas like the front or corners of the ZTZ-99A turret are suitable for application of JN1 composite, strengthening the protection of traditionally vulnerable areas.
JN1 is almost certainly made of a wide variety of layered materials, including high hardness steel plates, anti-ballistic ceramic derived from Soviet/Russian origin, glass, empty space, potentially a Chinese depleted uranium product, plastic liners interlaced with other materials, and possibly other layers.
There will also likely be a layer dedicated to protecting crew installed either on the inside of the layer 1 cast steel chassis or just outside it. This layer is likely composed of aramid/kevlar or other anti-ballistic materials combined with some type of anti-spalling material (to reduce fragmentation upon munition impact).
Finally, Chinese engineers have also claimed that JN1 contains embedded internal shaped charges. The goal of such an innovation is to interrupt the penetrating force of an attacking munition with lateral energy. This could be a shaped charge’s ductile jet or explosively formed penetrator (EFP, depending on the type of shaped charge) or the solid dart of an armor piercing fin stabilized discarding sabot (APFSDS) round.
The internal shaped charge denies the jet/EFP/dart from stacking properly in alignment by creating shearing/lateral explosive forces which theoretically significantly dissipates the incoming munition’s penetration power.
Layer 3 - Reactive Armor Installations
Reactive armor is meant to react when hit by an incoming projectile, using various methods to blunt the incoming munition. It is usually packaged in large blocks which can be installed on the outer armored surface of the tank. The two most popular types are non-energetic reactive armoire (NERA) and explosive reactive armor (ERA), both of which may be fielded on the ZTZ-99A.
Non-Energetic Reactive Armor (NERA)
There is an argument over the existence of NERA in the latest ZTZ-99A armor baseline. Chinese engineers claim that the latest armor includes a layer of NERA, while most sources do not discuss it.
NERA can be constructed of fairly simple materials. For example, multiple NERA plates of steel with a small layer of rubber inserted and compressed between each set of two plates is fairly effective. The plates create shearing forces to stop the forward momentum of a munition as they move under impact, with the compressed rubber shooting into the munition as it breaches the front steel plate.
Chinese engineers claim they are using a modernized NERA which drastically reduces the number of NERA plates required to defeat incoming rounds. It is likely that the NERA is an additional armor package that is optionally installed on the ZTZ-99A.
FY (反応) series Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA)
FY-4 Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA)
PRC engineers claim that FY-4 blocks have been upgraded to defeat tandem charge warheads. In this application, the FY-4 counter-blast plates are thicker and there is more than one in order to defeat multiple incoming tandem rounds.
The major reason that ERA is not widely fielded across NATO forces is that the ERA explodes in order to defeat the incoming projectile. The explosion itself is not as much of an issue since blast forces are generally super concentrated. The problem is that ERA can create metal shrapnel which can travel for tens or hundreds of meters, creating a friendly fire threat to dismounted troops.
Supposedly, the integration of significant carbon fiber components into what is likely the PLA’s FY-5 ERA significantly reduces the shrapnel threat to dismounts and crew while also reducing the weight of each ERA brick by 30%. So far, this type of ERA has been fitted to the Type 15 light tank, since power to weight ratio is critical for that platform. Weight reduction is also critical in keeping the ZTZ-99A below 65 tons, which impacts speed, mobility, and transportability across the Tibetan plateau or Taiwan Strait.
Another type of ERA deployed on the ZTZ-99A are the FY-1D bricks applied to the top of the turret. These units are designed to fire vertically, protecting the platform from top-down attack munitions like the American FGM-148 Javelin. Specifically, Major Li posits that the turret is protected by 14 pieces of ERA.
These capabilities in the frame, composite armor, ERA, and potentially NERA have buttressed claims by PRC engineers that the ZTZ-99A has roughly 1000-12000mm of RHAe protection in the turret. RHAe is itself a rough and non-precise concept, but it seems possible that the ZTZ-99A is closing in on Leopard 2A6 / Challenger 2 levels of turret protection.
Finally, PRC domestic internet sources have discussed a 2019 PLA project to field next generation ERA composed of a large 80kg brick. This is an insanely heavy brick, and suggests the project was likely fielded to counter the American M829, the Abrams DU penetrator APFSD
S round. The M829 is the top of the pile in terms of ammunition threats, especially the M829A3 (penetrates heavy ERA) and M829A4 (penetrates heavy ERA and APS).
Layer 4 - An Active Defense
The outermost but first layer of defense for the ZTZ-99A are those hard and soft kill methods coordinated through input received from various installed sensors. These sensors are able to detect and combat threats ranging across tank munitions, ATGMs, precision guided munitions, mortars, rockets, grenades, drones, and other threats.
The hard kill portion of the system utilizes its own munitions to attack and defeat incoming munitions. The soft kill portion utilizes smoke and lasers to create a protective shield for the tank.
Active Protection System / Hard Kill:
The GL-6 is a PRC active protection system (APS) that relies on an array of sensors (radar, infrared detectors, lasers, etc) to identify incoming threats. These sensors are capable of detecting missiles and projectiles at long ranges and in rain, dust, or smoke. Once a threat is detected, the system analyzes data to assess potential danger. If the threat is deemed critical, the GL-6 automatically deploys its countermeasures.
These countermeasures, typically small high-explosive munitions, are designed to deflect, degrade, or destroy incoming projectiles before they can impact the vehicle. The entire process is fully automated, allowing the system to respond instantaneously without requiring crew input. This automation enables the vehicle's crew to focus on other mission-critical tasks during combat.
The PLA is fielding an active protection system to the ZTZ-99, likely based on existing GL-6 technology. The photograph above shows a ZTZ-99A with GL-6 radar assemblies mounted at the turret “points” and twin GL-6 kinetic defeat devices mounted to the top of the turret.
Close in shot of a GL-6 APS kinetic defeat device
What appear to be mock ups of the GL-6 kinetic defeat devices and radar assemblies.
The video below purports to be a GL-6 test televised by a PRC state broadcaster:
Active Protection System / Soft Kill:
Laser Countermeasure System (LCS):
The LCS consists of a laser early warning receiver and a laser automatic defense device (laser dazzler). The latter includes a vehicle-mounted laser, a connected microcomputer, a laser suppressor (which maintains the integrity and strength of the tank’s laser, it is not similar in function to a firearm suppressor), a thermal imager, and other instruments. When an enemy points a laser at the ZTZ-99A, the LCS early warning receiver automatically locates the incoming laser energy emanating from the enemy's observation equipment.
The LCS early warning receiver then 1) sends the information to the laser automatic defense device which fires a counter-laser to dazzle/destroy the enemy's observation equipment, 2) sends the location data to the ZTZ-99A’s fire control computer to cue up an immediate retaliatory attack from the commander/gunner, and 3) Prepares another laser to interfere with the enemy's inbound munition. This laser is capable of burning out certain anti-armor guided missiles (ATGMs), drones, or other munition seeker heads that rely on infrared or electro-optical guidance.
The LCS automatic defense device is also capable of burning out the sights/observation equipment of enemy tanks as well as physically blinding the eyes of enemy operators. It can damage the human eye within a distance of 2-3 kilometers, producing a short-term "blinding" effect.
This system also has a less understood capability to defend against rotary attack aviation. This likely includes automatic cuing of the ZTZ-99A’s main gun or other weapons.
Major Li (the Taiwan author of the article) also included technical specifications for one version of the LCS:
It can rotate 360 degrees horizontally, with a pitch angle of 12 degrees downward and 90 degrees upward.
The parallel tracking speed is 45 degrees per second.
The pitch speed is 40 degrees per second.
The laser output energy is 1000 megajoules with a pulse recovery frequency of 10 times per second.
The maximum operating distance is 4000 meters
The minimum operating distance is 200 meters.
The continuous operation time is 30 minutes.
Smoke System:
The ZTZ-99A tank uses Type 94 smoke grenade launchers, 5 on the left and 5 on the right in front of the tank, 10 in total. They can form an aerosol smoke barrier 50 to 80 meters away from the tank within 3 seconds. The smoke is effective in the visible and infrared (IR) wavelengths, and therefore has a good shielding effect and can block the signals of enemy laser rangefinders, infrared observation equipment, and other types of guidance equipment. The effect lasts for about 20 seconds.
Informationized Systems
BLUF: The ZTZ-99A contains significant ability to utilize and share battlefield information. If underestimated, these capabilities could deliver a PLA armored echelon the initial victory against an unprepared foe.
Discussion: The two main computers in the ZTZ-99A are Combat Workshop and the Fire Control System. Numerous sensors have been plugged into these computers to make them more capable. Multiple methods of connectivity are available for the ZTZ-99A to share information across the force.
Combat Workshop: One of the most important features of the ZTZ-99A baseline is the vehicle information system. The information system consists of onboard computers, a display system, a vehicle-mounted data link, and an inter-vehicle information system. This information system runs something called “Combat Workshop” which is appearing across PLA combat platforms.
Combat Workshop is able to display digital maps, identify friend or foe, utilize positioning navigation and timing data, transmit voice, email, combat reports, enemy locations, and other data collected by the ZTZ platform. Combat Workshop also tracks the ZTZ-99A itself, generating data and reports of various vehicle indicators (possibly ammunition load/mix, petroleum/oil/lubricants status, battle damage, etc).
These data are then shared in real-time across combat vehicles and other platforms. This information can eventually be transmitted and shared with higher echelons or logistics units. Major Li (The Taiwan author of the article) believes it to be a “leapfrog transformation.”
Combat Workshop appears to be a mixture of systems like the American Blue Force Tracker, Common Operating Environment (COE), and Link 16 or the Israeli Torch-X. All major military forces are attempting to move forward to a new platform and service agnostic information and data-sharing system that is not reliant on voice communications. Combat Workshop appears to be the PLA Army’s current version of this capability.
Laser Identification Friend or Foe (LIFF) and Radio Communication System:
The ZTZ-99A tank uses the VHF-2000 tank radio communication system. This system has decent anti-electronic interference capability, good system versatility, easy maintenance, and high reliability. Most of the external equipment is installed at the right rear of the turret.
More importantly, the Laser Identification Friend or Foe (LIFF) communication system has been modified and expanded for many different uses. This system employs laser light waves as carriers to transmit signals. The vehicle commander can employ the LIFF system to identify friend or foe, transmit digital commands, encrypt voice, email, and other communications. The range for the LIFF is about 3.6 kilometers. It is assumed that Combat Workshop information can be exchanged over the LIFF system.
The fact that the PLA is using lasers to pass communications is significant. Under the right conditions, it is much harder to detect lasers blasting data short range than it is to detect radio waves which have a major propagation signal that is much easier to intercept and detect.
Major Li (the Taiwan author of the article) also included technical specifications for one version of the LIFF
The range point to point is about 3.6 kilometers.
The altitude is 10 - 45 degrees.
The horizontal direction is 360 degrees.
The target identification time is about 0.6 seconds per target.
The system is equipped with 60 sets of identification passwords and can display the results of an identify friend or foe interrogation.
Hunter-Killer Fire Control System (HKFCS):
The Hunter-Killer fire control system includes a laser rangefinder, night vision system, a third generation staring focal plane thermal imager system, laser guidance system, a digital ballistic computer, four-in-one white light system, and a dual-axis gyro fire stabilization system.
On the software side, HKFCS has an indigenously designed “aiming and guidance integrated into one closed-loop" control system. This system is capable of automatic tracking of targets (both manually and automatically indicated) and intelligent management of multiple information streams and multiple targets.
This software has the option to automatically complete target tracking and main gun firing, greatly improving system response speed and hit accuracy. HKFCS allows ZTZ-99A crew to shoot dynamic and static targets 2,000 meters away with wing-stabilized armor-piercing projectiles (likely APFSDS) while traveling. PRC engineers have claimed a first-shot accuracy rate of 85%.
The maximum distance for the sight is up to 4,000 meters. The thermal imager can observe targets at a distance of 7,000-9,000 meters at night or in complex weather. In harsh environments with visibility below 100 meters, the observation distance can reach up to 4,000 meters with a recognition distance of 3,100 meters.
The simple “hunter-killer” appellation was likely utilized in order to highlight that the ZTZ-99A has achieved parity with modern western designs where the tank commander and tank gunner can work separately but collaboratively through a computer system. The tank commander acting as the “hunter,” finds and prioritizes targets, while the tank gunner executes.
Millimeter Wave Identifier Friend or Foe (MM Wave IFF):
The ZTZ-99A tank is equipped with an ST-16 millimeter wave Identifier Friend or Foe. The system is mainly divided into an Identification Friend or Foe transmitter interrogation antenna (located at the gun root) responsible for bouncing signals against targets and a system mounted onto the rear half of the turret responsible for sending signals to friendly forces.
This system gives the ZTZ-99A crew multiple tools to identify friend or foe. As we shall discuss below, the laser-based systems face persistent challenges. There is also the possibility that experienced crews are able to utilize the MM wave radar to aid in counter-battery location, rotary detection, and electromagnetic warfare survey/detection.
Major Li points out that various other advanced electronic equipment can be installed on the ZTZ-99A. This is an interesting statement and is certainly within the realm of possibility. The Abrams optionally mounts equipment like radio-controlled IED jammers and there is no reason the ZTZ-99A couldn't have similar equipment. A big advantage for tank survivability would be an effective GPS-spoofer that redirects precision-guided munitions in the last moments of terminal guidance.
Munitions
BLUF: The ZTZ-99A is equipped with a 125mm smoothbore cannon that can fire a variety of
munitions such as APFSDS, HEAT, HEF-FS, and GLATGMs. PLA authors believe the ZTZ-99A is able to compete with the Abrams in the depleted uranium APFSDS and GLATGM categories.
Discussion:
ZTZ-99A Deputy Chief Designer Wang Zherong claims the DTC-10 125mm tungsten with tungsten carbide core armor-piercing fin-stabilized discarding sabot (APFSDS) projectile can penetrate 850mm of rolled homogeneous armor equivalent (RHAe) at about 2,000 meters.
Major Li (the Taiwan Army author) corroborates that the PLA has developed a depleted uranium (DU) 125mm APFSDS round, which the ZTZ-99A is able to fire. PRC engineers have previously claimed that their DU APFSDS round can penetrate Abrams armor at 1.4km. That statement lacks details about the specific type of munition and version of Abrams armor targeted.
However, Major Li offers some figures (likely at least partially based on Wang Zherong’s comments), claiming that the PLA’s DU APFSDS round can penetrate 960mm of RHAe at 2,000 meters. That is pretty high, and suggests that at 1,000 meters, this round can penetrate more than 1000mm of RHAe, which may be enough to punch through weak parts of the Abrams frontal protection.
The above claims notwithstanding, the only confirmed PRC government leaks regarding the DTC series APFSDS round claimed anywhere from 600-680mm of penetration against RHAe at an unknown distance. This would likely not be enough to cut through Abrams armor. This 600-680mm figure is partially derived from an export munition version which is almost certainly less capable than domestic variants. Considering standard PLA high explosive anti-tank (HEAT) rounds have an alleged penetration capability of 680mm RHAe at 2,500 meters, it is likely that domestic APFSDS rounds have greater penetration capability.
The ZTZ-99A is also fielded with high explosive fragmentation fin-stabilized (HEF-FS) rounds that are intended to be used against field fortifications, personnel, and light armored vehicles. Major Li asserts the range of this munition is 10km.
Additionally, the ZTZ-99A is equipped with laser guided 125mm gun-launched anti-tank guided missiles (GLATGMs) with a range of approximately 5km and a first shot hit rate of 90%. Under dynamic conditions, the GLAGTM can allegedly penetrate 700mm of RHAe. The ZTZ-99A also has the ability to utilize GLAGTMs against low-altitude targets such as rotary attack platforms.
According to Major Li, the ZTZ-99A can carry 43 rounds. The carousel automatic loader ammunition bay (video of a reload here) can store 22 rounds of ready-to-fire ammunition, 20 rounds in the hull, and 1 in the chamber. The automatic loader is a rotating bomb bay-type, an improved modification of the license-built system installed in the Russian T-90. The gunner follows the instructions of the commander and presses buttons on a control panel to select the type of ammunition required. The automatic loader is capable of shooting 7-8 rounds/minute. The manual rate of fire is only 1-2 rounds/minute.
Noted Technical Weaknesses
Build Quality
Major Li notes that during the 2015 Russian Victory Day military parade rehearsals, the following vehicle failures were noted:
ZTZ-99A tank failures were as high as 210.
ZTD-05 amphibious assault assault vehicle: 108 failures
ZBD-04A infantry fighting vehicle: 75 failures.
Other tracked vehicles: less than 80 failures.
In this context, it is not clear what “vehicle failure” means. Was the vehicle deadlined or did it simply require an on-the-spot repair? Were the vehicles loaded onto the Trans-Siberian railroad and subjected to harsh weather before arriving in Moscow? Were these fresh from the factory baseline models before the kinks were worked out? While there are many unknown questions, it does seem that the ZTZ-99A had a much higher rate of technical problems than other platforms.
Laser System Consistency
There is a specific component of the Laser Countermeasures System (LCS) called a scatter suppressor or laser suppressor whose purpose is to significantly improve the stability and dependability of a firing laser. Major Li notes that this specific component is a significant vulnerability for the ZTZ-99A because the LCS frequently misjudges targets and is overly impacted by smoke and dust interference.
Many nations are having difficulties getting next generation lasers to work for military purposes, and PRC is not exception.
Weakness to the American M829A4 and Follow On Munitions
Putting future developments aside, the existing ZTZ-99A armor is very unlikely capable of stopping the Abrams M829A4 APFSDS round. This is a major problem for the PLA because Washington can simply export the M829A4 to any nation which operates armored vehicles with 120mm cannons. This includes Japan, Korea, and Taiwan when Abrams M1A2T vehicles (M1A2SEPv3 equivalent without DU materials incorporated into the composite armor) are delivered later this month.
Assessment
Red Reflections
The PLA’s combat experience in armoured warfare is mostly drawn from facing enemy tanks, not fielding their own. Examples include the Korean War (where the PVA operated for the most part without major armored support), clashes with the KMT where Nationalist light tanks provided by the US proved decisive, and the Sino-Soviet Border Clashes where the PLA was again at an armor disadvantage.
These experiences shifted during the 1969-1991 Sino-Vietnamese War, where the PLA began the war with about 600 tanks divided into 6 armored battalions. While sustaining heavy casualties, these armored units were critical to capturing key objectives (mostly villages) in the face of stiff Vietnamese resistance.
The culmination of these experiences convinced CCP and PLA decision makers that mechanization on the battlefield was important enough to warrant adaptation of existing light infantry People’s War concepts.
After an era of utilizing Russian-derived armor (1959-1997), the CCP/PLA has chosen to field an indigenous midweight MBT (inline with other non-American great powers), taking advantage of good-enough technology and transportability to offer decisive punching power across many different Theater Commands when integrated into a larger Group Army concept of maneuver.
From a systems warfare perspective and not accounting for training quality, the ZTZ-99A delivers world-class last kilometer lethality when armor forward in the attack or hull-down in the defense with the most advanced PLA DU ammunition. Under these conditions, the ZTZ-99A is able to act as a lethal hunter-killer and a key information node, exchanging battlefield information across PLA formations and platforms.
The ZTZ-99A provides significant overmatch against Vietnam (T-90S/T-54M), Philippines (Sabrah), and Thailand (VT-4, a Chinese ZTZ-96/ZTZ-99 hybrid export).
The ZTZ-99A offers significant advantages against the Indian Arjun as well as the lesser armor the Indian Army fields. The Arjun Mk1A is expensive and difficult to maintain, with a price per unit of around $9 million. As the Indian Army produces more Mk1A, that unit price will naturally come down, but likely not enough to eliminate the ZTZ-99A’s cost advantage.
Still, the PLA claims a $2.5 million price tag per ZTZ-99A, which has allowed the PLA to field at least three times more ZTZ-99A vehicles than the small number of Arjuns produced (perhaps less than 200). Regardless, Indian and Chinese main battle tanks are unlikely to duel across the Himalayan region. Those roles will be taken on by the PLA Type 15 (another PRC indigenous design) and the Indian Army Zorawar light tanks. For Vermilion’s discussion of the PLA’s Type 15, please read here.
Russian tanks are more of a mixed bag. The recent leak of Russian armor training manuals has indicated that while the crew inside the T-90M is networked together and can pass off targets internally, the T-90M has nothing like Combat Workshop or the PLA’s laser communication system for inter-tank or inter-platform collaboration. Conversely, Russia’s Arena-M active protection system (APS) is getting much more real world iterative improvement than PRC’s GL-6 APS, unless the Russian Federation Army is handing over their data and lessons learned to the PLA.
The ZTZ-99A would have a tough go against the Korean K2 Black Panther or the Japanese Type 10. While the K2 doesn’t currently have an APS, the Black Panther’s indirect fire (howitzer type capability), battlefield awareness, in-arm suspension unit (ISU) system for mountainous terrain, communications, and indigenous industrial base make it a formidable opponent.
The K2 is optimized for combat and C2 tasks throughout cold urban and mountain warfighting environments. For every tank, the specific terroir (soil, topography, climate) or operational environment it is designed for is where it excels. The Korean Army plans to fight on the peninsula, not something the ZTZ-99A has dedicated its entire existence towards.
The upcoming K2 KAPS PIP (K2 Black Panther Korean Active Protection System Product Improvement Program) or a derivative of the K2 EX (K2 Black Panther Export) will install an APS into the K2 as baseline. KAPS is an indigenous Korean design while the K2 EX features the current Israeli-American Trophy gold standard. This will significantly improve the K2’s ability to combat the ZTZ-99A and drone threats.
Finally, the Japanese Type 90 / Type 10 combo is again engineered for the Japanese terroir. Both tanks feature hydropneumatic suspensions which give the platforms big advantages in mobility over rough terrain, establishing advantageous fire positions (especially in mountains), conforming to hull-down cover opportunities, cornering, and generally being a hard to detect target.
Both platforms’ lightweight make them easier to transport throughout the first island chain as well as far more trafficable across bridges throughout the entire archipelagic region.
The Type 10 features a continuously variable transmission (CVT), allowing it to go max speed in both forward and reverse. This is very helpful in urban terrain and in tank duels where poking around terrain and quickly falling back allows for less exposure after shooting.
For this match up, the terrain could prove decisive. Continental warfare favors the ZTZ-99A and archipelagic combat favors the Type 90 / Type 10.
Blue Reflections
The US military’s combat experience in armored warfare is mostly drawn from WWI and WWII. Americans have been operating with tanks since 12 September 1918, when soldiers of the American Expeditionary Force, First Army went into the attack at the Battle of Saint-Mihiel supported by American armor commanded by Colonel George S. Patton Jr.
Ever since 1918, the American conception of armor has been heavily influenced by fighting in Europe. Facing late-WWII German tanks in the European Theater of Operations also left a significant impact. Many of these German designs achieved overmatch against the American Sherman platform, imparting the lesson that weight equals capability. In fact, the Abrams itself was a development of a cancelled program between the Americans and West Germans to create a combined tank program.
It is somewhat counter-intuitive, but the US (a maritime power) has chosen to field some of the heaviest and most expensive to supply armored vehicles in the world. Compared to the ZTZ99A, the M1A2SEPv3 as well as M1A2T Abrams are more capable and versatile in all-aspect armored warfare including armored penetration/thrust offensive operations, urban warfare, and acting as an information node. The Abrams is expensive, but impressive.
The extreme weight and POL requirements of the Abrams severely constrict its expeditionary deployment. Even the recovery (M88 Hercules) and support vehicles for the Abrams are heavy, expensive, and resource intensive to operate. The weaknesses of the Abrams do not lie primarily on the front line, but in the logistics and industrial chains that support the program.
Since the ZTZ-99A is primarily fielded to the Heavy Combined Arms Brigades (HCABs) of the Central Theater Command, we will briefly discuss how these formations would match up with their primary US Army counterparts.
The modern US Army relies on three different types of ground maneuver units to achieve victory: armored brigade combat teams (ABCTs), stryker brigade combat teams (SBCTs), and infantry brigade combat teams (IBCTs). This discussion would not be complete without the fires and enabling capabilities of the combat aviation brigades (CABs) and developing Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTFs), but these last two will be set aside for brevity.
Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT)
ABCTs are explicitly not expeditionary. They are massive and slow to deploy formations equipped with the best firepower, mobility, and protection that the American people can afford.
The ABCT uniquely focuses on destroying enemy formations through orchestrating joint combined arms operations.
The Abrams is the beating heart of the ABCT and designed to be the pinnacle of ground dominance. In the Army’s current operating concept, this system can’t simply be dismissed as an obsolete hunk of metal that a few drones can destroy. As planned and programmed, the US joint force is limited in achieving ground victory if the Abrams system is not “working as intended.”
Current US M1A2SEPv2 and M1A2SEPv3 models, as well as the upcoming M1E3 would almost certainly starch the PLA ZTZ-99A during combat operations. The Abrams is likely to have better all-around protection, better trained crews, and better (but perhaps more easily detected) communications between blue platforms.
Every Abrams also contains four American soldiers versus a ZTZ with three PLA soldiers. More soldiers means more brain power per vehicle. Protecting that brain power is the Israeli-designed, American-modified Trophy APS which delivers world-class protection backed by real combat data, an advantage over the GL-6.
American armored formations are likely to have decisive advantages against their PRC counterparts in both the offense and the defense - another reason why Taiwan is interested in the Abrams program.
However, the Abrams overmatch must be increased. Most of the M1A2SEPv4 program has been cancelled. This program was intended to upgrade the Abrams’ firepower. These upgrades were scratched in favor of funding a next generation Abrams program focusing on advanced equipment like hypersonic munitions for the main cannon.
These upgrades would be on top of an already expensive platform. The unit cost for an FY24 (fiscal year 2024) US Army-procured M1A2SEPv3 Abrams is roughly $17 million (please review these Army acquisition documents, Volume 1-112 to Volume 1-116).
This is a rough figure because most every M1A2SEPv3 requires an older Abrams seed vehicle to act as the baseline vehicle for upgrade. The $17 million number captures the seed vehicle cost, but because some of these vehicles were produced decades earlier, the cost accounting can be tricky.
At the same time, the ZTZ-99A’s $2.5 million figure is more opaque. Cost accounting in the CCP-driven mixed command economy is very difficult to compute, and the platform is almost certainly more expensive. A 50% higher cost of $3.75 million per copy is much more plausible.
Even with this back-of-the-napkin math, the PRC is able to field four ZTZ-99A for a single M1A2SEPv3 Abrams, a factor that could prove important.
Both the US and PRC are attempting to advance their armored platforms and leapfrog each other in Mobility, Protection, and Firepower. For more on the discussion of future armor, check out this Vermilion article.
Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT)
SBCTs are designed as the middleweight force with low enough weight/cube to deploy quickly (but not rapidly) and operate through most terrain (but not all). Once on the battlefield, SBCTs are designed to aid the commander in seizing the initiative as well as key terrain.
Stryker vehicles rapidly carry an SBCT’s infantry squads during dynamic moments of operational transition (first deployment, transition to offense/defense, deception, etc) to seize key terrain and dig in. The defensive advantage of infantry dug in and supported by mobile 30mm cannon fire is the key value proposition for the SBCT.
Due to their mission and mobility, SBCTs should be training to fight in the hasty defense against Russian Federation Army tank divisions (such as 1st Guards Tank Army’s 4th and 47th Tank Divisions) and People’s Republic of China People’s Liberation Army Heavy Combined Arms Brigades (Such as 82nd Group Army’s 6th, 112th, and 151st Heavy Combined Arms Brigades).
If the SBCTs are not prepared for ZTZ-99A and other platforms utilizing combat workshop, they risk defeat by the PLA HCAB applying heavier combat power against combat workshop-identified gaps in the SBCT’s position.
Most of the Stryker’s organic weapons (M2, M240, Mk19) are less than marginally effective against ZTZ-99A vehicles. This is why, in the wake of the retirement of the Stryker M1126 mobile gun system (MGS), the Stryker Dragoon replacement 30mm cannon upgrade is so important.
Theoretically, a 30mm cannon firing DU ammunition could do enough damage to the ZTZ-99A to get a mobility kill, force the ZTZ-99 to blow off its APS rounds and destroy the ERA (leaving it vulnerable to ATGMs, artillery, attack aviation, etc), or maybe even get through the armor with enough rounds on target (which is risky for the Stryker).
Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT)
IBCTs are designed for maximum global mobility (lightweight and able to deploy to another country rapidly), joint forcible entry operations (air assault, amphibious assault, airborne drop), the capability to operate most effectively in difficult terrain (urban, mountain, jungle, littoral, dense forest, swamp, or even extreme weather conditions like the arctic) and most importantly, operate where two or more types of difficult terrain overlap.
US Army IBCTs are some of the best trained infantry in the world as well as some of the heaviest, with a high density of heavy weapons. To underline this density, IBCTs are currently being equipped with the M-10 Booker armored combat vehicle.
Unfortunately, the ZTZ-99A would provide significant overmatch against this vehicle. Oddly enough, the first new Army armored vehicle with a main gun designed in over four decades is not designed to fight enemy armor, but simply to counter strong points the light infantry (eg 82nd) may encounter in broken and tough terrain.
The US Army does not maintain a large, permanent, forward deployed combat presence in the first island chain. Many Pacific Army units are light or rotational. This means that broken terrain or not, lighter Army formations will more quickly respond to crisis or combat in Asia until heavier units can arrive. The M10 will be on the ground quickly, potentially facing a mass of 105mm and 125mm direct fire guns, ATGMs, attack aviation, artillery, naval gunfire, and more.
Yet the current M10 baseline lacks an active protection system (APS). It even lacks any explosive reactive armor (ERA), a head scratcher for a vehicle that will at least face future upgraded RPG threats in most environments.
To compound the farce, the M10 doesn’t even field an ATGM - it is wholly reliant on its 105mm gun, which suffers from range and penetration overmatch at least compared to the ZTZ-99A’s 125mm. There is also no drone interface or integrated drone protection system which makes one think the M10 designers were mostly asleep.
While none of this makes sense, these missing capabilities will surely be retrofitted onto the M10 at extreme taxpayer expense later in the vehicle’s lifecycle.
Conclusion
The ZTZ-99A has helped the PLA Army’s heaviest units achieve parity or overmatch on the continent against any Asian neighbor. This is the type of capability a regional power, but not necessarily a regional hegemon fields. To achieve a greater tactical advantage, the PLA would have to increase the number of ZTZ-99A platforms, train the crews better, and field a next generation main battle tank.
In terms of increasing the number of ZTZ-99, it seems like the PLA may be sticking to a mix of ZTZ-99A and ZTZ-96B for the short term until a replacement for either the high or low model is fielded. ZTZ-99A improvements have been trickling down to the ZTZ-96B for a number of years.
The biggest question is how the next generation of PLA ZTZ will stack up against the next generation of Abrams.