Covering for Conduct Unbecoming

The Army must Fight a War at Sea the Navy Cannot - 金門調酒 - Kinmen Cocktails #12

We do not have to review the US Navy’s contemptible record in managing its own fleet. This has been covered here. Suffice to say that for twenty years, the Navy has been unable to field a new class of ships, grow the fleet, or even display anything greater than signs of life in the operational competition with the PLA.

When a service abdicates its core functions, the other services must step in to fill the gap. Until the fighting Navy gets on its feet, the US Army, US Air Force, US Marine Corps, and US Special Operations Forces must stand guard in the First Island Chain (FIC).

Until the Navy is ready, Washington must deter China in the areas where it is weak and the US is strong, fighting on the ground. The PLA is designed to attack and deny US maritime and air power, with glaring capability gaps for fighting expeditionary US forces on the ground.

A strong forward ground force allows the US to preserve its air and naval platforms, buys time for the US to mobilize, harness, and protect air and maritime power, and provides the air and naval forces the durable forward sensors and protection they need to deliver powerful periods of projection in which to unleash devastating salvos against PLA centers of gravity.

The US Navy is particularly vulnerable to PLA force design, including the PLA Rocket Force and PLA Air Force. After countless wargaming iterations, it is clear that the Navy’s carriers, cruisers, and destroyers cannot be defended in forward-deployed areas and provide limited utility in a Taiwan campaign. INDOPACOM Commander, invariably a Navy fighter pilot, cannot lead the fight deploying the Navy with any platform besides submarines - this is like driving from the back seat.

These same PLA strengths are hard to employ against distributed, hard-to-target, and hard-to-destroy ground forces operating along the FIC. US ground forces have more operational and combat experience than US maritime forces.

INDOPACOM should change its planning cycles to reflect more ground force participation in deterrence and operational activities until the fleet is stronger. The President needs to consider basing far more ground forces forward, including air defense, logistics, intelligence, command, special forces, theater missiles, and heavy ground combat units.