#23 - McCarthy Visit to Taiwan

打打谈谈 - Da3Da3 Tan2Tan2 - Fight Fight, Talk Talk

With a bruising election complete, Kevin McCarthy has assumed the gavel as 55th Speaker of the United States House of Representatives. It is highly likely that Speaker McCarthy will make a trip to Taiwan within the year, as his predecessor, Nancy Pelosi did. In response to former Speaker Pelosi’s visit, the People’s Republic of China intensified a campaign of military intimidation against Taiwan which is summed up here. The question is now what will happen next?

In the summer of ‘22, McCarthy himself stated he intends to visit Taiwan. Depending on how this potential trip unfolds, a visit by the Speaker to Taiwan could become a yearly or ad hoc feature of US-China relations. Mainland Chinese are already posting to social media and taking to the news (CN) to discuss the hidden danger (隐患) of a potential Speaker McCarthy visit, which some Chinese see as a metaphorical throwing down of the gauntlet or challenge to battle (挑战). 

If Speaker McCarthy does conduct an official visit, The PRC has essentially three options. Escalate, maintain the previous response, or de-escalate.

Escalate

There is a high ceiling for possible escalatory responses and it is almost certain that a CCP group working for Xi Jinping is already evaluating potential responses to a visit. It is almost certain that the CCP will not initiate war in response to the Speaker’s potential visit. However, it is possible but unlikely that Xi is contemplating the seizure of small remote Taiwan islands such as Kinmen or Lesser Kinmen Island. While this would enable the CCP to send a clear deterrent message to Taiwan about further cooperation with the US, it runs the risk of major (perhaps even nuclear) escalation while not getting China much to show for it (Kinmen is not a strategic treasure) and is therefore judged as unlikely. Any overtly aggressive military moves would be a sign that Beijing feels that time is running out rapidly and it is not on China’s side.

At the high end of realistic escalation, Beijing could employ the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to declare a temporary blockade of Taiwan in order to waive off the Speaker’s visit. This would likely lead to an escalatory spiral with the chance of producing a crisis. More likely and less escalatory, Beijing could still enact a temporary blockade but simply wait for the Speaker to leave, punishing Taiwan without entangling the personal safety of a US leader. 

In any scenario where Beijing executes a temporary blockade, it would be quite difficult for Xi Jinping to clearly communicate to President Biden that the blockade is not a prelude to war. It can be impossible to disentangle when an adversary is training or signaling resolve versus when an adversary is preparing for invasion. Under blockade scenarios, the chance for miscommunication and escalation is still high. 

Xi could also slyly dip his toe into the water by increasing the typical air incursions and naval exercise sea exclusion zones to create a de facto blockade of Taiwan without declaring one. With the air and sea space around Taiwan inundated by military traffic, most civilian aircraft and vessels would be squeezed out of any transit corridor leaving or entering the island. This would enable the CCP to beta test a blockade operation without publicly committing to one.

Maintain

The PRC could roll out a very similar response compared to the operation executed after Speaker Pelosi left Taiwan. This would solidify a new normal response to US high level political engagement and signal that Beijing has baked in these types of visits to their assumptions about how the US will engage Taiwan in the future. This puts the ball back in the US’ court. Will the US stay at Speaker level engagements or escalate perhaps by sending former President Obama to visit with Taiwan President Tsai? 

The PRC could also take the step of declaring Taiwan’s baselines for territorial seas. This would be a document that maps out in detail the tidelines of all of the land features that Beijing believes are part of Taiwan (and from Beijing’s perspective, part of mainland China). These tidelines then act as the baseline that determines a country’s 12 nautical mile territorial sea, which is the zone in which a country has sovereignty over the air, sea, and seabed just as if it were national soil. The CCP then may even attempt to submit this map to the United Nations. 

De-escalate

The CCP could still send out air and sea platforms to interfere with Taiwan’s sovereignty, but deploy noticeably fewer numbers in the effort. It is highly unlikely that China would not respond to a Speaker visit in some way.

If China responds in a way that is noticeably less provocative, one of two possibilities is most likely. The first is that the CCP desires a reduction in tensions in order to manage the outfall from the “dynamic let it rip” COVID policy of rapidly opening the country and dropping previously strict protocols. The poorly managed transition to a post-COVID society has the potential to cause serious chaos, including civil unrest, across China. Escalating tensions with Taiwan at this time may not be productive if the CCP desires to deal with COVID and resuscitate the domestic economy.

The second more dangerous possibility is that of a false negative. In this scenario, the CCP de-escalates purposely because Xi understands that an anti-China coalition is beginning to coalesce. Japan has chosen to rearm with the explicit goal of deterring China, while Australia has enthusiastically joined AUKUS, and the Quad continues cooperative efforts. In an increasingly hostile Asia, Xi adopts the Mao Zedong tactic of fight fight, talk talk (打打谈谈). Here, Xi would not change any of the aggressive objectives at the true heart of Chinese foreign policy, but would still enthusiastically engage in the endless foreign ministry discussions, military-to-military engagements, confidence building measures, and treaty/agreement signing that so dominate the Western diplomatic circuit; as long as none of these efforts affect Beijing’s true goals.

Consequences for Strategic Competition: 

Regardless of what option China chooses, flooding the sea and air around Taiwan is advantageous to Beijing for two reasons. The first is that these incursions create an aggressive baseline which can easily mask the preparations for a real invasion of Taiwan. This makes it very difficult for the US and Taiwan to sufficiently prepare, very similar to the problems at the beginning of the Ukraine War. Second, large scale training exercises and drills will familiarize the PLA with the Taiwan operations area. Clearly, Russia’s conventional troops were unprepared for war, so it is logical for China to focus on the training and operation of their military force. This is currently the only way for China’s military to obtain experience. 

Visits by US Speakers are likely laying the groundwork for something the CCP never wants to see; the return of a US sitting president to Taiwan, which only occurred in 1960 when President Eisenhower met with Chiang Kai-Shek. From Beijing’s perspective, US-Taiwan executive level meetings run the risk of gluing Taiwan and the US closer together, as they were in the early Cold War period before the diplomatic opening to China.

Whatever response the PRC chooses will be instructive. Americans should keep in mind that the PRC response will not be the responsibility of the Speaker, since the responsibility for the PRC response is squarely on the CCP, the same as the Pelosi visit. US lawmakers shall visit anywhere they’re invited and some places they aren’t. No country shall infringe upon or threaten consequences for US movement of persons.