The earlier focus on the downed F-15E is notable in terms of US domestic partisan politics, but is yet again another sideshow. The US military shredded the regime’s air force, navy, and integrated air defense system in exchange for single digit aircraft losses (which will creep up) and about a dozen expendable drones on the American side.

Aircraft go down in combat, especially onces designed in 1969. The US has capabilities to retrieve pilots and destroy sensitive equipment - all working as normal.

The current focus on negotiations also misses the point that Tehran is either acting in bad faith or is sending negotiators with no authorization to sign a deal. Decision makers in Iran clearly believe that negotiations give the regime time to breath and a shot at crumbling the Trump administrations resolve. Washington should not let Tehran off so easily. It must be clear to Iranian decision makers what will happen if they fail to reach an agreement acceptable to the US.

If Tehran Cannot Agree to War Termination on US Terms

1. Exercise control of the Strait of Hormuz until such a time that the government in Tehran is able to work cooperatively with Washington to maintain the strait.

2. Employ conventional forces to seize Iran’s arch defense of islands, consisting of all or some combination of Kharg, Qeshm, Abu Masa, the Tunbs, Larak, Hormuz, Hengam, Lavan, Sirri, and Kish.

3. Occupy these islands at a future time during which they are defensible. Maintain these positions for defense of maritime shipping, US military access, and leverage over Tehran.

4. Continue eliminating Iranian leadership (especially in the IRGC) that chooses not to negotiate.

5. Continue eliminating elements of the Iranian nuclear program.

6. Surge SOF to assist civilians in overthrow of the totalitarian theocratic regime.

7. Continue to remove the Iranian regime’s governable space through a combination of strategic bombing campaigns and support to protestors forming their own government.

8. Publicize Moscow and Beijing’s support to Tehran so they all pay the reputational cost.

9. Counter Iranian propaganda in the US by exposing Tehran-regime linked accounts more aggressively. Expose links between these accounts and Russian/Chinese accounts and tools like Seed Dance.

If Tehran Can Agree to War Termination on US Terms

1. Significant financial assistance to the Iranian government and people.

2. Significant reconstruction aid, materials, and expertise.

3. Mutual defense reassurances conditioned on Iran’s future non-aggressive behavior.

Iran’s Options Have Played Out

The regime is out of gas. The strategic bombing campaign, combined with the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, removes economic levers from Tehran’s hands. The country is still cut off from the global internet, incurring continued economic damage. Tehran will continue to murder protestors, further eroding domestic support.

With the Iranian navy gone, Tehran only has small attack boats (which are usually not even counted within a nation’s naval battle force) with which to control the strait. The IRGC has not pushed these assets into the Strait, because they know without air cover, the entire attack boat force will be ground into a pulp by drones and A-10s (many have already been destroyed). Instead, they make vague threats about employing their attack boats. Good luck.

There is a significant divide between Iran’s negotiating team (led by Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi) and the Iranian military leaders in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). If Tehran’s leadership cannot even get on the same page and sign a binding ceasefire document, expect Iranian political will to fade rapidly.

Washington needs to freeze Tehran in this position and not let up the pressure. This will lead to a death spiral for the current regime and force the negotiators to the table. Absent unrelenting pressure, Washington allows time for Iranian extremist elements to launch a terrorist attack on the US domestically, which would cause escalation orders of magnitude beyond what the administration could control in the short term.

Sustainable Force Commitment Level

The current US forces supporting Operation Epic Fury / Economic Fury number around 60,000.

Three carrier strike groups (CSGs), two Marine Expeditionary Unit/Amphibious Readiness Groups (MEU/ARGs or perhaps expeditionary strike groups if additional cruisers/destroyers are attached), what appears to be elements of Destroyer Squadron 28 (DESRON 28), about 150 aircraft in theater, tanker and bomber air elements, air defense elements, submarines, and special forces.

To give some scope to these numbers, this is about the number of US personnel stationed in Japan. Not huge, not insignificant. But compare these numbers to the 2003 Invasion of Iraq and the 1991 Gulf War.

The 2003 initial invasion force numbered over 300,000 troops. This included six carrier battle groups (CVBGs), 15 air wings (a division-level air echelon), and multiple Army and Marine divisions. And let’s remember this was the middleweight force package for a relatively small war.

The 1991 initial invasion force (a heavyweight option for theater war) numbered around 541,000 US troops. This force was composed of six CVBGs, 807 in-theater USAF aircraft (which included six USAF fighter air wings and not including joint or allied airpower), and multiple ground corps, including seven Army divisions and two Marine divisions, plus allies.

The 2026 level of US force commitment is sustainable for Washington with little to no mobilization. Which is astonishing, considering the small size of today’s US military. While force levels are well within sustainable limits, magazine expenditure is of course a concern. However, nothing gets the government moving like an emergency on top of an emergency, so expect additional resources to flow into the US munitions plant.

Linkage to the Pacing Adversary - Triple Strait Control

US occupation of islands within the Strait of Hormuz will allow for military placement and access to directly control the waterway that delivers 10-20% of China’s imported oil.

While about 80% of the PRC’s imported oil and 20% of imported natural gas comes through the Strait of Malacca, the US has no direct control of Malacca outside of friendly relationships with Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, as well as the use of a deployed military force.

At the onset of a US-PRC conflict, Malacca nations may vacillate, remain neutral, or even bandwagon with Beijing. These countries would likely not choose to choke off Beijing’s trade flows on their own.

However, if the US can control Hormuz today, this would significantly lower the chances of Malacca defections. If Washington can credibly communicate its intent to staunch PRC energy flows from their source, this gives far more wiggle room for Indo-Pacific nations to accede to a US blockade since PRC-bound maritime traffic will already be significantly reduced.

Controlling the Hormuz and Malacca straits will make controlling the Taiwan Strait easier if war comes to the Pacific.

A period of strategic opportunity has opened for Washington. To review from our previous post, Run the Board:

The US should immediately apply pressure to Nicaragua, Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Burma/Myanmar, and Cambodia in a sequential campaign to remove their authoritarian leaders and destroy the authoritarian global alliance network.

The severe degradation of this network will force the CCP General Secretary (Xi) to issue a new estimate of the 全局, or global situation, to the party. It will also likely force the CCP PLA Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman (also Xi) to issue new Military Strategic Guidelines (MSGs) to the PLA.

The new 全局 and MSGs will force the PLA through a bureaucratic rework requiring 2-3 years to complete and erode China’s military focus and readiness at the same time their partner network implodes. Now is the time to stamp our foot on the gas.

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Putting all that aside, we want to point out that Ray is amiss on point number four of his article:

4. As history has shown, the most reliable indicator of which country is likely to win [a large conventional war] is not which is most powerful; it is which can endure the most pain the longest.

That certainly is a factor in the US-Iran war, with the president assuring the American public that the war will be over in a couple of weeks, gas prices will then decline, and we will go back to our normal prosperous times. There are many good indicators that point to whether a country has the capacity to endure the pain for an extended period of time, such as popularity polls (especially in democracies) and/or the power of government leaders to remain in control (especially in autocracies, where popular opinion doesn’t matter as much). In fighting wars, winning doesn’t occur until surrender. That is because it is impossible to eliminate all enemies. When China entered the Korean War against the United States at a time when China had very little power and the United States was a nuclear power, Mao supposedly said, “They can’t kill us all,” meaning that the enemy can’t win if there are people who keep fighting. The lessons of Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan are clear. Winning happens when the winning country can get out with the losing country no longer remaining a threat. While the United States appears to be the most powerful country in the world, it is also the most overextended major power and the weakest at withstanding pain over a long period of time.

The strongest single predictor of victory in major interstate war since 1900 has precisely been which country is more powerful. Large-scale systemic conflict is more often won by the nations that possess superior manpower, military assets, economies, and logistics.

The victors in WWI, WWII, the India-Pakistan War, the Falklands War, and the Gulf War were certainly the more powerful states.

What are the outliers? Some analysts may point to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. While Russia at the time was given more respect as an established imperial power, the fact is that the Japanese outspent the Russians over the course of the war. Adding to this, due to the Russian Empire’s unique geography, Japan had more military assets in the theater of war than did Russia, and Japan handily won. It would be strange to say that the side with more money, resources, manpower, and military assets committed to the conflict was not the more powerful party.

Ray brings up the Korean War as an example. UN/US forces certainly were more powerful than China and North Korea. But Ray’s point is about winning, and Mao never won. In fact, he lost his son on the Korean front. Both Washington and Beijing decided to call it quits, which worked well enough for the Americans. The war was started by the North Koreans to take over the entire peninsula, at the time a peripheral interest in the ongoing Cold War.

There are then examples Ray points out, such as Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. But these were never the type of large conventional interstate wars that Ray is talking about in his post. These were quite small-scale counterinsurgencies, which play by a whole different set of rules than large-scale systemic warfare.

We would even take Iraq out of the equation because the insurgency, in fact, did not win - the US and the new Iraqi government are the victors and defended those gains by defeating ISIS.

What of willingness to endure pain? During WWII, Japan and Nazi Germany displayed incredible pain endurance - they simply would not surrender until functionally incapable of resistance. It is hard to argue that the Imperial Japanese Army, defending the first (Okinawa) and second (Iwo Jima, the Marianas) island chains to the death, was not willing to endure pain to its bitter end. The same can be said of the kamikazes.

In January 1945, the Nazi war machine was collapsing on all fronts. Despite this catastrophic failure, the German people were motivated to designate their towns and cities as fortresses and initiate the Volkssturm, pouring teenagers and old men into the meat grinder to win the final battle. The Italians? Not so much.

Our Soviet allies fought bitterly; our Chinese allies not so much. And what do we make of Great Britain? Her European alliance defeated, she stood alone against the Nazi onslaught in 1940, after the fall of France, yet before Pearl Harbor. Her peoples suffered daily bombings, sinking of vessels, extreme rationing, malnutrition, and total war on the land, at sea, and in the air. Yet British freedom persevered and a “weak” democracy never blinked.

Willingness to endure pain is, of course, an important factor in war. But to claim that it is the most important reliable factor does not survive a cursory Google search.

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The only senior general left is Xi Jinping’s hatchet man, Zhang Shengmin, who leads Central Discipline and Inspection work (ratting out your own people). He is the second green box in the Central Military Commission (CMC) at the top of the graph.

Xi Jinping, after reforming seemingly most aspects of the PLA’s doctrine, organization, training, and material acquisition, now has a generational opportunity to reshape the leadership - the people who lead the PLA. As we all know, people are policy.

What does this mean?

1. Unless a successor paramount leader conducts a similar level of PLA purges, it will be Xi Jinping’s hand-picked few that will guide the PLA over the next generation, starting time: current date.

2. The PLA in the short-term will turn from political rectification towards a new series of reforms focusing on coercion and warfighting. We are going back to the future of the 2016 PLA reform era, and we expect a new series of military strategic guidelines (MSGs) to be issued from Xi Jinping to the force. This will be driven by a new paramount leader-level assessment of the 全局 or global/international situation.

3. This new assessment of the 全局 will be driven by lessons observed from the Nagorno-Karabakh War, Ukraine War, Israeli War in Gaza, and Iran War. It will be further informed by the partial collapse of Beijing’s partner network across Venezuela, Iran, Cuba, and potentially other shoes that have yet to drop.

4. These reforms will provide justification for the continued surge in the PLA budget, including funding for the nuclear arsenal, despite economic and budgetary constraints.

5. The Politburo will take partner relationships more seriously in the future. Expect Beijing to seek closer ties with Moscow, Pyongyang, Islamabad, and Phnom Penh.

6. Expect consolidation in relationships with Kazakhstan and Tanzania to diversify energy flows.

7. Expect reach out to Brazil and Gulf Monarchies to secure commodity markets and additional energy.

8. The pressure Washington is exerting on Beijing (intentional or not) is tremendous at the moment. We also expect Beijing to reinvigorate its quest for overseas PLA basing. The current basing structure does not give Xi credible options to counter or dampen US actions globally.

9. Xi’s commander plus commissar leadership cadre at mostly every level of the PLA will be strengthened and persist for a very long time.

10. What the paramount leader wants, the paramount leader gets. If Xi wants options for a Taiwan or Korea campaign, the PLA will figure out how to achieve at least limited objectives with the tools they have.

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Nuclear-Enabled Maneuver

10 kiloton surface burst at Bali Beach

“I can reveal that the U.S. government is aware that China has conducted nuclear explosive tests, including preparing for tests with designated yields in the hundreds of tons,” U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Thomas DiNanno told a Disarmament Conference in Geneva.

The Chinese military “sought to conceal testing by obfuscating the nuclear explosions because it recognized these tests violate test ban commitments. China has used ‘decoupling’, a method to decrease the effectiveness of seismic monitoring, to hide their activities from the world,” he said. DiNanno said China had conducted one such “yield-producing test” on June 22, 2020.

There are a multitude of reasons why China is likely conducting nuclear tests. The People’s Liberation Army could be validating a new warhead design, improving the efficiency of an existing weapon, or signaling to the United States and other adversaries.

All of these are significant, not least because they represent a direct violation of test ban commitments the Chinese Communist Party publicly claims to uphold. Yet the “hundreds of tons” detail deserves particular attention because it may challenge a deeply held assumption about what nuclear weapons are and what they are for.

When many of us think about nuclear weapons, we think of the 15-kiloton Little Boy dropped over Hiroshima or Cold War tests like the 50-megaton Tsar Bomba detonated in Novaya Zemlya. These weapons were developed in vastly different contexts. Little Boy and Fat Man were meant to end the Second World War by destroying Japan’s will to fight, and Tsar Bomba was a form of nuclear coercive messaging.

The conventional wisdom in 2026 is that any employment of nuclear weapons is immediately a doomsday scenario. But conventional wisdom is rarely reality.

A Historic Precedent

During the Cold War, both the United States and Soviet Union trained to fight on nuclear-degraded battlefields where the employment of tactical nuclear artillery enabled ground troops to maneuver and seize objectives.

The ill-fated Pentomic Division, fielded in the late 1950s and ultimately abandoned in 1962, is an example of this. The Pentomic plan reorganized standard US Army divisions into five dispersed battle groups designed to survive and exploit tactical nuclear strikes on the battlefield. Offensive doctrine called for nuclear fires to blast through an enemy’s main defensive line, after which mobile ground forces would maneuver through the gap. The organizational structure failed, but the underlying assumption persisted for decades: low-yield nuclear weapons would be employed on the battlefield, and ground forces needed to be prepared to fight through the aftermath.

This was not unique to the United States.

Soviet tactical doctrine of the same era envisioned nuclear strikes as integral to offensive operations, replacing the massed conventional artillery fires of WWII with nuclear fires to destroy defensive positions and enable rapid armored exploitation. The yields of these Cold War-era systems, the Honest John for the US and the Luna for the Soviet Union, ranged from 2 to 30 kilotons.

These yields were well below the strategic weapons that often dominate our discussions today. China’s alleged test yield of hundreds of tons sits very much at the lower end of this tactical spectrum and could very well be employed in the same way that the Cold Warriors of yesteryear envisioned.

It is well known that the People’s Liberation Army faces what is potentially one of the most complicated military operations in human history. The challenges are plentiful: successful covert mobilization, crossing the strait without immense attrition, landing at designated sites, assaulting through hardened defensive positions against what will likely be a numerically superior force at first, establishing a lodgment, achieving a breakout, and then pushing towards Taipei to achieve victory. This does not even consider the actions required to keep Japan and the United States out of the fight.

PRC Nuclear Doctrine

If PLA forces suffered destruction in the strait, were repelled at the beaches, or were otherwise unable to break out from lodgment, the CCP could face its most dangerous moment. As risk to the PLA military operation rises, risk to the CCP’s hold on power also rises.

An abortive Taiwan campaign could destroy the CCP’s legitimacy. Under those conditions, PLA leadership might authorize limited tactical nuclear strikes to salvage the operation.

The stated policy of “No First Use” would not prevent this. NFU is a diplomatic tool, not necessarily an operational constraint. It operates within the same framework as “active defense,” in which the CCP alone decides what constitutes aggression against Chinese sovereignty and, therefore, what qualifies as a defensive response.

This is not speculation about a future departure from established behavior. It is the pattern. The CCP has engaged in these definitional gymnastics for its entire existence. The invasion of Tibet was a “peaceful liberation.” Entering the Korean War against United Nations forces was the “War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea.” The 1962 offensive into Indian territory was the “China-India Border Self-Defensive Counterattack.” The 1979 invasion of Vietnam, in which hundreds of thousands of PLA troops crossed an international border to punish Hanoi for deposing a Chinese client state in Cambodia, was the “Self-Defensive Counterattack Against Vietnam.”

Deng Xiaoping told the world that Vietnam was “a child that needs to be spanked” and then called the spanking self-defense. The seizure of South Vietnamese-held islands in the Paracels in 1974 and Vietnamese-held reefs in the Spratlys in 1988 followed the same line. In every case, the CCP determined that the other party had struck first, politically, strategically, morally, or imaginatively and that China was merely responding.

A Taiwan scenario would be no different. The CCP already considers the island a province in a state of rebellion. Any foreign military intervention to prevent unification would be framed as an act of aggression against Chinese sovereignty, the “first strike” to which nuclear employment would be a “defensive” response. And if the operation were to fail, if the regime that had staked its legitimacy on unification faced the prospect of a humiliating defeat broadcast to the world, the political conditions for authorizing tactical nuclear use would not require abandoning NFU. They would require only the same wordsmithing the CCP has exercised in every conflict it has ever fought.

Operational Vignette

The scenario that should concern US planners is not a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear strike. It is the moment when the PLA's cross-strait assault begins to founder.

Bali Beach sits on Taiwan’s northwest coast, less than seven miles from Taipei. Flanked by the Port of Taipei to the SW and the Tamsui River estuary to the E, it is a critical location. For this scenario, this area is designated “Red Beach”.

In this scenario, Eastern Theater Command is the main effort. Two amphibious combined arms brigades (ACABs) from the 73rd Group Army (GA), embarked from training areas in Fujian Province and launched across the strait aboard a mix of PLAN amphibious ships and requisitioned civilian RO-RO vessels, hitting the beach in the first wave.

Following a massive preparatory bombardment, 73rd GA ZBD-05 amphibious infantry fighting vehicles churn through the surf and crawl onto the gray sandy shoreline under fire.

The Taiwanese defenders are ready. Beach defense brigades have had weeks, possibly months, of strategic warning to occupy prepared positions in the low hills, parks, and urban areas behind the beach. They are dug in and armed with Javelin anti-tank missiles, Kestrel shoulder-fired rockets, light anti-armor weapons, and Stingers.

Overhead, Taiwanese drones are striking the PLA amphibious force as it transitions from sea to shore. Behind this defensive line, Taiwan’s M1A2T Abrams tanks are positioned in defilade along the roads leading inland, ready to counterattack any element that breaches the beach. Further back, HIMARS batteries are delivering precision rocket fire onto PLA assault lanes, turning the narrow landing zone into a killing field.

The 73rd Group Army is taking catastrophic losses. The two brigades have failed to secure the beachhead and cannot push inland. Follow-on forces are stacking up offshore and taking fire with nowhere to land.

Simultaneously, the airborne seizure of Taoyuan International Airport, the linchpin of the operation’s western flank, is in doubt. Elements of the PLA Air Force Airborne Corps dropped into the airport complex to seize the runways and establish an air bridge for follow-on forces, but surviving Taiwanese air defense units attrited PLAAF transport on approach.

Several Y-20s and Z-20s have been shot down and the airborne units that made it to the ground are fragmented and fighting without support. The PLA holds sections of the airport but cannot form a perimeter against Taiwanese army counterattacks supported by mechanized infantry. Without securing the airport, there is no air bridge. Without the air bridge, there is no reinforcement. Without reinforcement, PLA forces on the ground will be destroyed in detail.

Eastern Theater Command is now fighting for its life on two axes and losing on both. The lodgment at Bali Beach is a slaughter. The airborne objective is collapsing. The operational timeline, which depends on rapidly establishing a secure foothold, has been shattered.

Meanwhile, US forces are building up throughout Japan and cancelling training missions. Japanese Self-Defense Forces are mobilizing their southwestern island garrisons. The window for a fait accompli is rapidly closing.

At this moment, the PLA Rocket Force receives the order.

The Strike

The PLA Rocket Force has maintained a battery of DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) on heightened alert since the operation commenced. The warheads are low-yield, in the range of hundreds of tons, consistent with the yield the United States alleged China tested in June 2020.

The first strike hits Taiwanese defense positions just behind Bali Beach. A warhead in the range of 500 tons, detonated as a low airburst over assessed Taiwanese lines, produces a blast radius sufficient to destroy nearly everything within several hundred meters.

The overpressure shatters the fighting positions of both sides. Thermal radiation ignites everything flammable across the beach zone. The defenders who survive the initial blast are irradiated and unable to maintain a coherent defensive line. The Abrams tanks in defilade along the Tamsui river roads are outside the immediate kill radius, but their crews are flash-blinded and their communications are severed. For the first time since the landing began, the beach is quiet.

A second warhead detonates over the Taiwanese defenders south of Taoyuan International Airport. The mechanized infantry moving to counterattack the PLA Airborne are destroyed, and air defense units in the area are neutralized. The surviving PLA Airborne Corps elements at the airport are suddenly operating in a permissive environment. Within hours, the first Y-20 transports land unopposed and offload reinforcements. The air bridge is open.

The total expenditure is two tactical warheads. The combined yield is less than two kilotons, a fraction of what was dropped on Hiroshima. No warhead has struck Taipei directly. Most targets may have been military units in a combat zone on territory Beijing considers sovereign Chinese soil.

The CCP’s narrative machine is already framing the strikes as a regrettable but necessary defensive measure against foreign-armed separatists who threatened the lives of Chinese soldiers conducting a lawful “reunification” operation.

In the space of minutes, the operational picture has inverted. The Taiwanese beach defenders threatening the future of the CCP ceased to exist. The airfield seizure that was collapsing is now being reinforced. The 73rd Group Army’s follow-on echelons, stacked offshore with nowhere to land, are now moving toward a beach that is no longer a kill zone. The Eastern Theater Command has gone from losing the battle to winning it.

Aftermath

Breaching the nuclear threshold would, of course, open Pandora’s box, but this article will not explore the issues that arise the day after (which are many). Suffice to say, that when the Department of Defense/War has modeled out nuclear warfighting scenarios, even a small tactical employment eventually meanders into a general exchange.

But this may not be Beijing’s point of view. The Pentagon must be planning and preparing for PLA nuclear use not only against Taiwan, as in the scenario above, but against US forward positions in the Pacific.

A CJTF does not need to match the PLA platform-for-platform. It needs to field the right men, the right weapons, on the right platforms, integrated into kill chains that move faster than the PLA's operational plan can adapt. What follows is an overview of the critical systems that will enable a coalition CJTF to prevent Beijing from achieving its political objectives through force (and one that will hinder it). These weapons systems span every service and every domain.

LRASM - Lockheed

The AGM-158C LRASM (A = air-launched, G =surface-attack, M = guided missile, Long Range Anti-Ship Missile) is the US military’s primary air-launched anti-ship cruise missile. Stealthy air-launched cruise missiles are critical for overwhelming PLA surface vessels, including platforms like the Type 055 Renhai CCG cruiser, Type 052D DDG Luyang destroyer, and amphibious lift platforms like the Type 076 Yulan LHD, Type 075 Yushen LHD, and Type 071 Yuzhao LPD.

The advantage of the LRASM is that it can be fired from extremely long range, preserving American air assets, and that it is more difficult to detect than a standard cruise missile.

All Up Round - RTX

US tactical hypersonic weapons across the Army and Navy are likely to rely on the All Up Round (AUR), including the Army’s Dark Eagle LRHW (Long Range Hypersonic Weapon and the Navy’s sea-based CPS (conventional prompt strike). Ideally, the AUR will deliver a common hypersonic weapon that can be tweaked by the various services, saving time and money.

AUR-based weapons will be far more capable of penetrating the PLA’s air defense to hit critical platforms, C2 targets, and critical radars/sensors.

AIM-174B Gunslinger - RTX

This missile is critical to securing the American edge in air-to-air combat. The PLA fields the PiLi (thunderbolt) family of missiles, which, until the AIM-174B Gunslinger (A = air-launched, I = intercept-aerial, G = guided missile), have seriously outranged comparable US air-to-air missiles (AAMs). The Gunslinger will allow US fighter aircraft to make maximal use of their sophisticated onboard sensors and destroy enemy aircraft at ranges comparable to or longer than those of PLA Air Force platforms firing PiLi missiles.

JASSM-ER - Lockheed

The AGM-158B JASSM-ER (Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile, Extended Range) is the workhorse standoff cruise missile for US air power. With a range exceeding 500 nm, it allows air platforms to strike heavily defended targets from outside PLA threat rings. Like the LRASM, the JASSM-ER is a stealthy missile that uses terrain-following navigation and an imaging infrared seeker for terminal guidance.

Bombers can deliver large salvos against PLARF missile sites, PLA logistics hubs, airfields, and SAM batteries, etc without penetrating contested airspace. This allows the US to attrit PLA air defense networks and C2 infrastructure in the opening phases of a conflict while preserving aircraft for follow-on strikes.

Lockheed is also developing the JASSM-XR (eXtreme Range), which extends range beyond 1,000 nm, further expanding the standoff envelope and complicating PLA targeting of US air platforms.

HIMARS - Lockheed

The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) is central to the US ground combat element’s ability to deny the PLA freedom of movement throughout the first island chain. The system provides the US Marine Corps MLR and US Army MDTF with an organic long-range precision fires capability. Additionally, Taiwan will possess multiple HIMARS systems and will be able to use ATACMS to strike ground targets within the PRC.

PrSM - Lockheed

The PrSM (Precision Strike Missile) is replacing the ATACMS in the US inventory. A PrSM ordinance pod will carry two missiles instead of a single ATACMS. Additionally, incremental enhancements to the PrSm will likely enable it to engage targets beyond 500km, hit moving targets, hit fleeting targets, and, most importantly, hit moving surface ships.

The newly reorganized Army HIMARS battalion has about 27 launchers, while a USMC battalion has about 24. This means an Army battalion would generate a decent-sized salvo of 54 PrSM shots, enough to overwhelm the edges of a PLA Navy flotilla, depending on how the strike is conducted.

Virginia-class Sub - General Dynamics Electric Boat & HII

The Virginia-class is the most deadly nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) on the planet and provides the US with a serious kinetic asymmetric advantage over the PLA in a Taiwan contingency. Virginia-class boats are multi-mission platforms with anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-surface warfare, land-attack, ISR, and SOF support capabilities.

In a Taiwan scenario, it is likely that the PLA will attempt to use a naval blockade to isolate Taiwan prior to/ concurrent with an amphibious assault. The Virginia-class can exploit significant gaps in PLAN ASW capability to tear through PLAN subs and PLAN surface vessels, degrade the PLAN’s ability to protect amphibious lift, and either strike the lift itself or open up additional gaps for the Combined Joint Force to chew away at vulnerable Red lift. If the conflict expands past local war, these boats can also be used to sink merchant vessels transiting to Mainland ports.

In addition to this, the Block V features the Virginia Payload Module (VPM), which raises the VLS count to 40 Tomahawks per boat. This increased land-attack capability shores up the US Navy’s ability to strike PLA landing sites on Taiwan, mustering locations on Mainland China, and conduct other counter-force strikes on Mainland China. The VPM might also enable the Virginia-class to employ Conventional Prompt Strike.

Columbia-class Sub - General Dynamics Electric Boat & HII

The Columbia-class is the replacement for the aging Ohio-class ballistic missile subs (SSBNs) that currently function as the cornerstone of US sea-based nuclear deterrence. This program, also the victim of ongoing US Navy shipbuilding issues, will shore up US nuclear deterrence until at least the 2080s, with the expectation that the first Columbia-class boat will be commissioned in 2031.

If short-term deterrence succeeds and a Taiwan contingency is pushed into the 2030s, the Columbia-class and the Ohio-class will both serve as a backstop against increased PLA escalation. These boats ensure that the US retains a credible first & second-strike capability that Beijing cannot neutralize, which will impact PLA planning.

Some of the Columbia class will likely also be converted to Tomahawk missile carriers, like three of their Ohio-class ancestors. These subs give the combatant commander a massive 150+ Tomahawk saturation strike deliverable anywhere along the first island chain or the Chinese seaboard.

F-35 - Lockheed, Northrop Grumman, BAE, and Pratt & Whitney (RTX)

The F-35 is the most widely fielded fifth-generation fighter in the world and serves as the backbone of US coalition airpower in the Indo-Pacific. The aircraft’s sensor fusion architecture combines radar, infrared, synthetic aperture radar, and electronic warfare inputs and outputs into a single integrated picture, allowing the pilot to see the battlespace rather than piece it together from disparate systems. This makes the F-35 less of a traditional fighter and more of a flying C2 node that can detect, track, target, and share data with the Combined Joint Task Force in real time.

In a Taiwan scenario, the F-35’s value in analyzing and penetrating contested airspace to conduct ISR, suppress PLA integrated air defense systems, and strike landing forces and amphibious lift is high. More importantly, the F-35 functions as an elevated sensor that feeds targeting data directly into the Combined Joint Fires Architecture.

An F-35 operating over the FIC can cue Navy surface combatants for SM-6 shots, pass coordinates to Army MDTF or Marine MLR batteries for PrSM strikes, and designate targets for standoff munitions from bombers loitering outside the threat ring. The F-35 is a sensor that will be able to feed nearly any shooter.

US, Japanese, Australian, and South Korean F-35 fleets (eventually 300+ aircraft permanently based in the Indo-Pacific) create a sensor network that complicates PLA planning at every level.

B-21 - Northrop Grumman, BAE, Collins (RTX), GKN Aerospace, Janicki Industries, Spirit AeroSystems, Pratt & Whitney (RTX)

The B-21 Raider is the first bomber designed from the ground up for a conflict with the PRC. It is a dual-capable (nuclear and conventional) penetrating-strike platform that can deliver munitions deep into contested airspace.

The B-21 can penetrate PLA A2/AD and IADS (integrated air defense system) networks to strike hardened and buried targets on Mainland China, including PLARF missile bases, C2, and logistics nodes that standoff weapons cannot reliably destroy.

It can also conduct maritime strikes against PLAN surface action groups and amphibious lift using direct-attack munitions such as Small Diameter Bombs, LRASM, and JASSM-ER. Similar to the F-35, the B-21 Raider serves as an airborne sensor that facilitates combined joint strikes.

One That Will Lose It

The State Department

The US will not lose a war against the PLA. It may, however, suffer unnecessary casualties because the State Department has spent decades building a bureaucracy optimized for cocktail parties while the institutional spine required for action in the Indo-Pacific has atrophied.

Access, Basing, and Overflight (ABO)

Every capability listed above is worthless without access to allied and partner territory. HIMARS cannot hit amphib lift in the Taiwan strait from Guam. Subs need ports. F-35s need fuel. The joint force’s ability to fight and win in the Indo-Pacific depends on ABO agreements that the State Department is responsible for delivering. State is not delivering.

DoW operators who actually understand what the joint force needs are hitting a roadblock at State when trying to translate operational requirements into diplomatic asks. The translation is butchered every time. Requirements get watered down, deprioritized, or sacrificed on the altar of whatever policy fad is pushed that week/ whatever strange political position State happens to be pushing at the moment.

This is institutional malpractice and a strategic vulnerability the CCP is actively exploiting.

The AIT Fiefdom

The American Institute in Taiwan is what happens when an organization is allowed to operate without adult supervision for decades. AIT has become a fiefdom staffed by FSOs who treat Taiwan policy as their personal property and resist any outside interference with the zealotry of medieval landowners.

The result is an institution that has completely lost the plot. While the PLA conducts increasingly aggressive exercises around Taiwan, AIT has been busy promoting LGBTQ+ rights in the most progressive country in Asia. Thankfully, the current administration is setting this straight. Taiwan does not need lectures from American diplomats on social policy. It needs weapons. It needs training. It needs combined integrated planning for the defense of its homeland.

AIT should act as a warfighting combat multiplier. Every FSO assigned there should wake up asking two questions: what can I do today to advance US interests, and how can I make Taiwan harder to invade?

Instead, AIT is a resume-building waystation for FSOs who want a “challenging” posting without any actual challenge. They host cultural events and cocktail parties, and rotate out before anything they did or failed to do has consequences.

The FAO Problem

The Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program is supposed to produce warrior-diplomats/ regional experts who can operate at the seam between military power and politics. Some fulfill this mission, but they are in the minority.

The selection process is broken, the culture is broken, and the quality of personnel is abysmal. FAOs increasingly reflect their FSO counterparts by prioritizing career management and being risk-averse. By and large, these are not the people you want representing American interests against a rising authoritarian power. They have been tainted by generations of highly politicized leadership, lack a killer instinct, and have no strategic vision. They have MAs from Georgetown and an encyclopedic knowledge of which embassy & think tank events have the best booze.

Experts Who Aren’t

The Indo-Pacific policy community in Washington is infested with people who have confused proximity to power with actual expertise. These are your think tank fellows who haven’t been in-country since the Obama administration (reminiscing about the Hu Jintao era), former FSOs who parlayed a single tour into a career of grift, and academics who have built entire reputations on theories that will never survive contact with reality and will likely get Americans killed. These are the “experts” who brief the National Security Council, testify before Congress, and write op-eds that shape elite opinion.

These people do not understand strategy. They understand career management. They know how to position themselves for the next administration, how to cultivate relationships with journalists, and how to say things that sound profound without ever committing to an actual position. When they’re wrong, and they have been catastrophically wrong about China for thirty years, there are no consequences. On the contrary, they pick up cushy positions at SAIS.

These institutions have an accountability problem. The same people who got everything wrong are still in positions of influence. They have faced no professional consequences for being wrong about the most consequential geopolitical development of the century. Until that changes, the “expert” community will continue producing analysis that is completely disconnected from the world as it actually exists.

The State Department, the FAO community, and the broader policy establishment are not supporting elements. They are critical vulnerabilities. And until that changes, the US will not be as ready for a war with the CCP as it should be.

The President elected in 2028, whether a Republican or Democrat, needs to enter office in a much stronger position relative to the CCP. To accomplish this, Washington must act while it has momentum. The opportunity to push back Beijing’s decision cycle by a half-generation presents itself.

Venezuela

The capture of Maduro was important not because of effects in Venezuela, but because it communicates through action how Washington can execute coercion and military operations in novel ways.

The operation against Maduro did not target the authoritarian state as a gestalt, as many IR academics see states. Instead, it simply targets the authoritarian individual at the head of the state. This is the point of maximum coercion against authoritarian/totalitarian regimes, since they accumulate an undue amount of power in the hands of the central leader.

Again, we want to reiterate why this approach was novel. Washington did not feel the need to pursue a traditional strategy aimed at affecting traditional measures of total-state leverage. It aimed at the point of maximum leverage - the authoritarian leader himself.

This novel coercive message was communicated clearly to China, Russia, Iran, Nicaragua, Cuba, North Korea, Turkmenistan, Belarus, Burma/Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Of these regimes, only China and Russia have the means to defend themselves from this approach - maybe.

Washington issued a clear coercive message designed to compel Maduro to step down. When Maduro refused and demanded Washington “come get him,” the US military came and got him in a couple of hours.

This type of coercion is effective because it hurts the CCP and Putin exactly where they are most lacking - allies and partners. Operation Absolute Resolve showed that the US is capable of deposing any member of Beijing or Moscow’s weak alliance network, even in the face of support and military hardening.

Moving Forward

It is imperative that Washington runs the board during this small window of opportunity before the new Cold War disintegrates into WWIII. Putin is entirely consumed in Ukraine, while Xi has purged nearly all his senior PLA officers. This leaves a window of time where both Beijing and Moscow have severely handicapped their ability to respond.

The US should immediately apply pressure to Nicaragua, Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Burma/Myanmar, and Cambodia in a sequential campaign to remove their authoritarian leaders and destroy the authoritarian global alliance network.

The severe degradation of this network will force the CCP General Secretary (Xi) to issue a new estimate of the 全局, or global situation, to the CCP. It will also likely force the CCP PLA Central Military Commission Chairman (also Xi) to issue new Military Strategic Guidelines (MSGs) to the PLA.

These instructions will force a step change and take time to trickle down through the bureaucracies in both the CCP and the PLA, burning precious time as they are ingested and slowly enacted. This bureaucratic process will likely push Beijing off its internal timelines by about 5 years, or half a generation. Russia will be further enervated in its downwardly mobile spiral as a great power.

This is the best opportunity to avoid a Taiwan campaign since the 1995/96 Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. Godspeed.

1. The operation to capture Maduro was a military feat of arms. As we discussed in our 18 October post:

“Such an operation would help to restore confidence in US military capability post-Afghan withdrawal. The three most important audiences are the American people and their faith in the armed services, American policy makers and their faith in the effectiveness of the military instrument, and Xi Jinping’s assessment of US capability.

Even a limited operation would be a testbed for validating new military equipment and doctrinal approaches. Gaps exposed during the 1983 Grenada invasion were key in spurring the passage of Goldwater-Nichols in 1986.”

2. The US has strengthened its coercive ability. Washington clearly communicated that Maduro should step down. This was backed up by significant military capability. When Caracas failed to comply with a credible threat, consequences followed, underlining the credibility of the American military instrument. Operation Absolute Resolve will affect the political calculus in Moscow, Tehran, Beijing, Pyongyang, and Havana.

3. Also from our 18 October post:

“The CCP has made an outsize bet on Venezuela’s future. US sources pin Venezuela as the second-largest recipient of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) money over the past two decades. Even the CCP itself admits that “China has poured about US$67 billion into Venezuela since 2007, far more investment than any other South American country…”

Losing a major socialist ally in South America would cause Beijing’s bets to go bust at a time when China’s domestic economy is hurting and multiple BRI projects are hemorrhaging cash. A successful Venezuela operation would likely cause other South American nations to curtail or end Chinese investments”

Washington is neutralizing a major anchor for Beijing’s influence throughout South America.

4. Venezuela has purchased export versions of Type 05 and Type 08 amphibious vehicles from the PRC. These are the main weapons systems that will be involved in an amphibious landing on Taiwan. SOUTHCOM must retrieve these vehicles for exploitation to understand their specific vulnerabilities.

Vermilion learned of the Type 08’s amphibious capabilities from Venezuelan videos displaying their Chinese-made Type 08s in exercises.

5. The administration still has more work to do. From our 15 November post:

“If Washington uses military means to secure gains in South America, expect Beijing to make hay. The CCP will attempt to justify the use of force in Asia on the grounds of successful US operations in the Western Hemisphere. The Trump administration had better be thinking about prudent arguments for the use of force, both against Caracas and in support of Taipei, even if only deployed in confidential channels.”

Washington needs to continue to draw contrasts between the socialist world and the free world. Unless there is a widespread understanding of the evils of malign totalitarian and authoritarian governments, whataboutism will run rampant in international discourse.

6. As the administration knows, it now must act rapidly to consolidate power, bring peace to Venezuela, and conduct a transition through legitimate Venezuelan elections. There is now a window of opportunity and a countdown timer for sticking to an effective political transition. It will be critical to co-opt the governors of the various Venezuelan states before the narcos dig in.

From our 15 November post discussing compellence, these goals should now be incorporated into talks on the transition of power:

“Goals for such talks should include significant changes in Venezuela’s internal political system, eliminating PRC business ties and influence, expanding opportunities for US businesses and trade in the petroleum, natural gas, agriculture, manufacturing, and mineral sectors, improving the Venezuelan economy for the median family, supporting the Central Bank of Venezuela, and Caracas’ relationship to OPEC.”

With risk comes possible reward. It is now the time for Washington to apply lessons learned from the past twenty years of nation-building projects to get this one right.

We do not have to review the US Navy’s contemptible record in managing its own fleet. This has been covered here. Suffice to say that for twenty years, the Navy has been unable to field a new class of ships, grow the fleet, or even display anything greater than signs of life in the operational competition with the PLA.

When a service abdicates its core functions, the other services must step in to fill the gap. Until the fighting Navy gets on its feet, the US Army, US Air Force, US Marine Corps, and US Special Operations Forces must stand guard in the First Island Chain (FIC).

Until the Navy is ready, Washington must deter China in the areas where it is weak and the US is strong, fighting on the ground. The PLA is designed to attack and deny US maritime and air power, with glaring capability gaps for fighting expeditionary US forces on the ground.

A strong forward ground force allows the US to preserve its air and naval platforms, buys time for the US to mobilize, harness, and protect air and maritime power, and provides the air and naval forces the durable forward sensors and protection they need to deliver powerful periods of projection in which to unleash devastating salvos against PLA centers of gravity.

The US Navy is particularly vulnerable to PLA force design, including the PLA Rocket Force and PLA Air Force. After countless wargaming iterations, it is clear that the Navy’s carriers, cruisers, and destroyers cannot be defended in forward-deployed areas and provide limited utility in a Taiwan campaign. INDOPACOM Commander, invariably a Navy fighter pilot, cannot lead the fight deploying the Navy with any platform besides submarines - this is like driving from the back seat.

These same PLA strengths are hard to employ against distributed, hard-to-target, and hard-to-destroy ground forces operating along the FIC. US ground forces have more operational and combat experience than US maritime forces.

INDOPACOM should change its planning cycles to reflect more ground force participation in deterrence and operational activities until the fleet is stronger. The President needs to consider basing far more ground forces forward, including air defense, logistics, intelligence, command, special forces, theater missiles, and heavy ground combat units.

Honor, Fear, and Interest

For the first time in 35 years, we once again live in a world shaped primarily by the clashing interests of powerful nations rather than by liberal internationalism. Washington must again adjust its strategic approach.

If you were a 30-year-old median American when the Berlin Wall fell 35 years ago, you probably had some idea of the twilight struggle between the free world and communism. When you grew up, you practiced nuclear drills, talked about the space race, and harbored a distrust of the Soviet Union.

Since the wall fell, entire generations have lived under the unspoken axioms of liberal internationalism - unchallenged American primacy, free trade, international multilateralism, a taboo on the use of force, and unquestioned optimism about the future. We are all naive. And yet events have transpired to put our hands back on the rudder of our nation during a time of storms, just as our parents and grandparents did. And if you’re 20, your great-grandparents.

This change in the international order did not happen overnight. The PRC and the Russian Federation have worked diligently to undermine the World Trade Organization (WTO) for decades. Beijing never had any intention of following trade rules; it only sought to hollow out the economic activity of free nations.

Adding to the friction, US allies’ intransigence on non-tariff barriers has continued up to the current day. These factors have caused the US, the foundation of the global order, to also pull back from normal WTO procedure.

The United Nations is similarly deteriorating, with the Russian veto on the Ukraine War, the PRC veto on the Rohingya Crisis, and indecision on Syria. Current members of the UN Human Rights Council include China, Cuba, Vietnam, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The UN is fading into League of Nations-level irrelevance.

Dysfunction in the global order is only half the problem. The more important issue is that it will become increasingly clear in the coming years that Moscow and Beijing have unlimited aims. Russian and CCP strategies threaten the current political life of Washington and the political existence of America’s allies and partners.

If China and Russia were pursuing limited strategies, Xi would seek to assure the US, Japan, and South Korea that they could live securely with a CCP-dominated Taiwan. Putin would cut a deal, keep the Ukrainian territory he has conquered, rebuild his military, and prepare to nibble away more slices of territory at an opportune time.

But Putin is not satisfied with occupying a scant 20% of Ukraine. His goal, no matter how quixotic, is to become the arbiter of European politics, fundamentally altering the political existence of the nations in Russia’s near abroad.

Xi will not deem the party's historic march complete after occupying an island the size of Maryland. The CCP seeks to replace the US as the foundational power in the international order, preferably altering the US international political position forever and decoupling the US from Asia.

Attempting to negotiate a balance of power with nations that have unlimited aims is simply handing your enemies the rope they need to hang you. This is what the Lost Generation and the Greatest Generation discovered when they attempted to appease Germany, Italy, and Japan.

A new moment calls for new kinds of American leaders. Beginning with the Clinton Administration, American leaders have been soft. They have found it difficult, if not impossible, to formulate a coherent strategy.

These are generations of leaders who explicitly ran away from service in the Vietnam War, have scant experience in national security, and have been too weak to stop Russia and China from trampling on the international order that older generations of Americans forged in blood.

Our current environment is not one in which nations with limited aims negotiate agreements with the goal of eschewing violence. The world has passed into a new age dominated by honor, fear, and interest. The United States must adopt a more ambitious strategy of assuring Moscow and Beijing that they will face a Washington pursuing unlimited aims to counter aggression. The regimes in both nations must face certain consequences for further violations: economic depression, internal collapse, regime change, or unconditional surrender.

Cleansing of the Party Will Continue

Xi Jinping is grinding down the middle and top ranks of the party until his cadres form the hard core of the organization that is fit for wartime political service. Excessive corruption, laziness, and factionalism outside of Xi’s patronage network will continue to fill up the gulags before, during, and after any Taiwan campaign.

As Xi’s eradication campaign approaches the level of Mao Zedong, he will not pump the brakes. While Vermilion assesses that the constant purge of PLA officers will undermine readiness, Xi likely believes that these actions consolidate the party’s control of the military and clear away deadwood from the pre-2016 Xi Jinping military reform era.

The Phoenix of Asia Burns Hot

Japan’s military will continue to rise from the ashes of its post-war defeat. In its 14th consecutive year of defense budget increases, the 2026 budget is projected to be roughly $60 billion, around 2% of GDP.

While current acquisitions focus on domestically produced Type 12 surface-to-ship missiles, a next-generation fighter, and Tomahawks, we should expect Tokyo’s ambitions to expand.

Japan will likely seek to join the AUKUS nuclear submarine pact. Tokyo could make substantial cash investments, offer naval shipyard capacity, and contribute technology to the pact.

Tokyo will also furtively test the waters of becoming a nuclear weapons state. A senior security official recently floated a trial balloon on this subject, and we should expect much more of this probing from Japan going forward.

Prime Minister Takaichi is also looking to create a powerful new national intelligence agency to consolidate the command and control, as well as analysis of existing intelligence capabilities and organizations. This has been a long-standing LDP goal since the 1950s, and it seems Beijing’s bellicosity may give LDP leaders the demand signal they need to pursue significant reforms.

As Japan focuses on hard power, this will strike fear into the hearts of Beijing and Pyongyang, causing escalation. The CCP will feel compelled to go further and faster in its current nuclear breakout, creating a trilateral nuclear competition more complex, precarious, and difficult to manage than during the Cold War.

As the CCP’s 2025 white paper on nuclear arms control confirms, Beijing refuses any negotiations or frameworks that may limit its nuclear weapons while simultaneously calling for Russia and the US to limit their arsenals.

This is an impossible and unsophisticated position that will further add to the escalatory spiral in Asia. Hypersonics, AI-enabled operations, and modern air defense projects like the Golden Dome and T-Dome will add more layers to the nuclear weapons discussion.

Washington must consider how to prudently encourage and rein in Japan simultaneously. Tokyo plays the same offshore balancer role in Asia that the UK does in Europe, but Asia is now the main theater.

Japan and Taiwan are Joining Forces

In late 2025, the CCP’s diplomatic missteps and messaging unwisely telegraphed its unlimited aims by framing Japanese mobilization as an attack against the CCP, necessitating a military response under the PRC’s doctrine of active defense.

Instead of looking like a responsible Bismarckian rising power with limited goals, Beijing currently appears more to Asia like the Germany of Kaiser Wilhelm II, in an offensive crouch, looking for a pretext, and salivating at the first signs of mobilization. Tokyo’s fear of this version of China has become a motivating factor. Honor demands a response.

In addition to the rejuvenation of the Japanese military, Tokyo is working with Taipei. In March of 2025, Taiwan’s Cabinet appointed Shigeru Iwasaki as advisor to Taiwan’s Executive Yuan (similar to the United States Cabinet and the federal executive branch). Shigeru was the former Chief of Staff of the Japanese Self-Defense Force and the former head of Japan’s Air Self-Defense Force. It is known that during his current post, he has taken part in wargames with Taiwanese, American, and Japanese participants.

This will lead to the PLA increasing large-scale exercise activity near and inside Taiwanese and Japanese waters in the coming months and years. These developments will signal the initial whirls of a death spiral in the relationship between Tokyo and Beijing.

The increasing scope of PLA exercises will provoke large coalition exercises, limiting PLA freedom of movement around Taiwan's good weather windows. Beginning in 2027, expect massive PLA and coalition exercises throughout the first island chain akin to the Cold War Zapad-81, Okean, REFORGER, and Grand Slam.

If Washington is smart, Beijing’s ongoing diplomatic bluster and saber-rattling will be the falling domino that leads to greater recognition of Taiwan’s government, as well as something closer to a NATO in Asia.

Taiwan: The Powder Keg of Asia, its Pivot, and its Cold War Vienna

Beautiful flowers bloom in the most dangerous of soils. Taipei is the place to be during the last half of the 20s. We have already discussed the importance of Taiwan in this publication from a geographic perspective. Beginning in 2026, Taiwan will become a more important force in the military, cultural, and political domains.

The Taiwan Ministry of National Defense (MND) has made it clear that it is open for business, with a $40 billion budget adjustment. That is ⅘ of the total US Marine Corps military budget. There will be far more US companies and defense contractors establishing offices in Taiwan as MND expands business.

Expect AIT (the de facto US embassy) to grow, as well as the number of US servicemembers working with the Taiwan military establishment. Outside of the defense sector, more Americans will be living in Taiwan for language study, work, and the expat life. Expect Americans to be a growing and permanent fixture on the island.

With more focus on Taiwan from the US and Japan, expect more Taiwanese media, politics, and culture to seep into the public consciousness.

The CCP will counter this growing influence with operations of their own, placing people on the island and continuing to attempt to subvert Taiwanese politics. Taiwan has been surprisingly resilient to these approaches for the last 75 years, but do not expect Beijing to stop.

In 2026 and beyond, the Taiwan vibes will be both impeccable and dangerous.

The CCP Will Lose Strategic Depth While the US Gains It - Contributing to the Party’s Insecurity Spiral

CCP officials’ party line to US interlocutors since 2023 has been outrage (fear) that the US is “containing China.” Of course, US reactions to the CCP are just that: responses to Beijing’s irresponsible and aggressive moves.

Following this trend, in private meetings throughout the past year between CCP and US officials, the Beijing side has turned up the heat. Tantrums, screaming, bluster, and arrogance are doled out in excess. When your adversary is acting really weird, pay attention to them.

For PRC citizens under 45, who won’t clearly remember the Tiananmen Protests, these are trying times. These younger generations have known China’s meteoric economic and cultural rise, balanced by the daily friction of living under a totalitarian regime. What they have very little experience with is a serious international pushback against the idea of communist China.

While the CCP is feeling a full-court press from the US, Asia is turning more hostile. China’s traditional enemy, Japan, is on the rise. South Korea remains committed to a deep US alliance, Vietnam is pushing back hard in the South China Sea, and the Philippines has swung decisively towards Washington. Even if Vice President Sara Duterte wins in 2028, Beijing will almost certainly still be unable to modulate its territorial aggression against the Philippines.

As China’s neighborhood becomes more hostile to Beijing, America’s backyard will lean toward Washington.

Mexico has approved 50% tariffs on countries with which it has no trade agreement, a move that will affect China the most. Panama is in the process of cutting a deal to reduce the CCP’s influence in the canal zone (which the party is fighting). Members of Panama’s Parliament have conducted an unofficial visit to Taiwan. The US is considering designating Peru a Major Non-NATO Ally, and:

“Argentina has also reduced China’s influence in a few key sectors. The South American giant opted for U.S. F-16s instead of Beijing’s JF-17s fighter jets and also canceled the installation of a Chinese surveillance radar.”

If President Trump sees his Western Hemisphere strategy through, Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua will look much different in the future than they do today.

NATO is reinvigorated with purpose. EU member states spent €189 billion on defense in 2014. This figure has surged to a projected €381 billion in 2025, a more than two-fold increase.

Ultimately, these developments will make the CCP more insecure, driving the fear factor of honor, fear, and interest that will dominate the coming decades. Many CCP behaviors, including the constant revolution within the party, stem from this fear.

The Naval Arms Race Has Finally Begun

We’ve all been waiting for the US to respond to the largest naval buildup of the post-war period. The US Navy is finally getting executive attention with President Trump’s BBG and national security cutter concepts. Let’s hope the attention isn’t fleeting and lasts across administrations. Expect Beijing to announce grander plans for the PLA Navy as each great power gets more serious about putting hulls in the water.

Russia Will Go Big in 2026

We assess that Moscow has no intention of ending the war in Ukraine. The current negotiations are buying time for the Russians to rearm, retrain, reset, build their industrial base with Chinese aid, and transform the Russian Federation Army into a divisional structure better able to wage ground combat in the European theater.

Russia will continue to pursue an operational approach of victory through attrition. It is likely that Putin will increase Russia’s level of mobilization in 2026 in order to surge combat power into Ukraine, attempting to overwhelm the Ukrainian Ground Force’s ability to reconstitute ground combat units.

The CCP is heavily involved in the Ukraine War, the Gaza War, and potential conflicts between Venezuela and Guyana, Pakistan and India, Lebanon and Israel, Iran and anyone, the Koreas, and the United States and Venezuela for one primary reason.

Beijing understands that since the Obama Administration, the US military has been structured and funded to handle only a single major combat operation (MCO) or regional war. Therefore, if Beijing were to light the world on fire, the US military would, at a mechanical level, be unable to respond to a Taiwan invasion, giving the PLA the best chances of a short war and the opening for a negotiated settlement with Washington.

Europe Will Continue to Flounder

The 2022 invasion of Ukraine was one of the greatest unifying events for Europe since the Cold War, yet European nations, especially Germany and France, still struggle to take any meaningful action in their own backyard despite defense funding increases. Continental Europeans will continue to balk at US-led efforts to end the war in Ukraine that don’t prioritize European interests.

For the time being, the fate of Europe is increasingly in the hands of the US. Regarding China, many German business elites have been captured by the CCP, resulting in Berlin acting as the CCP’s standard bearer on the continent. This group will almost certainly continue to lobby against EU efforts to stem the flow of low cost subsidized Chinese goods flooding into Europe.

This will likely create more tension between Berlin and the EU, where European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has pushed anti-subsidy investigations and tariffs on Chinese EVs over German objections. Ultimately, this will almost certainly lead European elites to question the value of ceding national sovereignty to a union that is slow to act and structurally incapable of protecting European interests. The institutions designed to give Europe weight in a multipolar world may instead accelerate its irrelevance.

Our Previous Predictions for 2025 Made in 2024

Xi is Running Out of Time on Taiwan

We continue to expect Xi Jinping to at least get a fourth term in 2027, the year he turns 74. In the last year of his potential fourth term, he will be 79, about the average age for a CCP leader to retire.

During Xi’s fourth term, Taiwan will hold its 2028 general election in January. If the DPP’s Lai Ching-te wins a second electoral victory and secures a majority in the Legislative Yuan, it will be clear that the CCP’s political work approach to subjugating Taiwan has failed under Xi’s leadership.

The results of this election will be known before the twice-yearly good-weather windows in March-April and October-November. March is somewhat early to reveal your cards based on a January election, which puts Vermilion’s highest-risk window for invasion at late ‘28 to ‘32.

The Credibility Deficit: Policy Makers’ Understanding of Nuclear and Conventional Coercion Has Atrophied

While the outlook here remains bleak, if President Trump can change the Maduro regime at low cost and avoid a large or medium-sized military conflict, it will at least provide a modern classic for teaching strategy, escalation, and coercion. On the nuclear front, President Trump also recently mentioned a nuclear cruise missile (likely the SLCM-N or a variant), which would be a welcome addition to the arsenal.

Washington & INDOPACOM Must Shift the Taiwan Status Quo or Risk Tactical Irrelevance

While there has been a slow improvement in this department, we still believe the US should openly base defensive US military forces on the island of Taiwan to ensure deterrence.

The US & PRC Must Adjust to a Unique International Arena

We assess that the US and CCP continue to think in the short term. Washington considers preventing or deterring a Taiwan invasion within a short window. Beijing is thinking about invading Taiwan quickly.

Our Previous Predictions for 2023 Made in 2022

The Global Economy is Devolving into Two Competing Trade Blocs

Trump is degrading the Beijing-led bloc through his actions in the Western Hemisphere. The second Venezuelan oil tanker recently seized by the US was destined for China.

Washington has nearly all the cards to play in the global economy, and it seems like President Trump and any successor will play them. This will radically increase pressure on Beijing and Moscow, present a closing window of opportunity, and pressure both totalitarian leaders into the horns of a dilemma.

China and Russia are Forming a Lasting Union

We continue to see Beijing and Moscow growing closer together.

Japan is Rearming

This trend is accelerating, as discussed above in this article.

Taiwan is Preparing to Repel a Future Invasion

This trend is accelerating, as discussed above.

The Primary Theater is now Asia, not Europe

We continue to assess that Asia has greater strategic importance than Europe, as confirmed by the recently published 2025 US National Security Strategy.

As of Early 2023, the Ukraine War is a Complete Toss-Up

This trend is accelerating, as discussed above.

The US Military is Not Even Close to Ready

The Pentagon is moving at the speed of crawling on glass, but making positive changes.

The 2025 National Security Strategy looks very similar to FDR’s strategy in the 1930s. The US once again finds itself in a world with totalitarianism on the rise, challenges to international trade, an American industrial base in need of revitalization, and voter malaise.

The American Voter

American strategy often reflects the beliefs of a significant American voting bloc, and this NSS is no different. The beliefs that American voters hold about foreign policy in the 2020s are very similar to those of the 1930s in some respects. American voters are questioning the value of foreign intervention.

During the ‘30s, there was significant pessimism about the US role in WWI. In the short 1917-1918 window, the US would suffer over 100k war dead, when the benefits were unclear to voters at the time.

During the Great War, the US had to fight to retain control over its own military forces, lest they be redistributed as replacements to French and British officers. Paris and London would only begrudgingly accept the US at the table for wartime planning and post-war negotiations.

Wilson’s League of Nations experiment would also fail. By 1936, it was clear that the Treaty of Versailles was not working as intended when Germany reoccupied the Rhineland.

Smedley D. Butler, the retired Marine Corps General and two-time Medal of Honor recipient, would become a spokesman for virulent left-wing anti-war protestors. He would write his influential 1935 speech, “War is a Racket,” which became a best-selling book. One of the solutions General Butler offered was to make it illegal for the US to deploy the Navy or Army.

These were the times of the Lost Generation that had come of age during WWI. As F. Scott Fitzgerald wrote in This Side of Paradise, the Lost Generation was “a generation grown up to find all Gods dead, all wars fought, all faiths in man shaken.” Sound familiar?

This paradigm had a profound influence on younger generations. During the 1935 student protests, millions of American students would hold massive anti-war demonstrations, though the US was not at war. The students marched against ROTC programs, their own university presidents, and pledged never to support conscription for another foreign war. These protests would be a feature of campus life for years.

This flier advertises an April 22, 1936 anti-war demonstration in the Great Hall at the City College of New York (CCNY). The event, attended by 3,500 students, featured addresses from student and faculty leaders as well as a vote that reaffirmed the students’ fight against both the ROTC on campus and CCNY President Frederick Robinson.

This was the political atmosphere that would lead Congress to pass the first of many Neutrality Acts in 1935:

“Congress passed the first Neutrality Act, prohibiting the export of ‘arms, ammunition, and implements of war’ from the United States to foreign nations at war and requiring arms manufacturers in the United States to apply for an export license. American citizens traveling in war zones were also advised that they did so at their own risk. President Franklin D. Roosevelt originally opposed the legislation, but relented in the face of strong Congressional and public opinion. On February 29, 1936, Congress renewed the Act until May of 1937 and prohibited Americans from extending any loans to belligerent nations.”

Adding to the disillusionment was the widespread idea that the defense industry and big banks pushed the US into WWI. The Special Committee on Investigation of the Munitions Industry led by Senator Gerald Nye (R-North Dakota) suggested that bankers and war profiteers were secretly pulling strings to generate massive profits.

There are obviously many parallels to the 2020s here. We once again have an American electorate suspicious of the value of foreign intervention at the exact time totalitarian nations are on the march in Europe and Asia.

Disappointment with the outcome of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, distrust of the defense industry, student anti-war movements, and a disillusioned younger generation are all features of our modern times.

These views have shaped Trump’s NSS, with direct echoes from the 1930s (brackets added by author):

“Our elites badly miscalculated America’s willingness to shoulder forever global burdens to which the American people saw no connection to the national interest [anti-intervention bias from the 30s]. They overestimated America’s ability to fund, simultaneously, a massive welfare regulatory-administrative state alongside a massive military, diplomatic, intelligence, and foreign aid complex [Nye Committee pessimism]. They placed hugely misguided and destructive bets on globalism and so-called “free trade” that hollowed out the very middle class and industrial base on which American economic and military preeminence depend [anti-free trade sentiment]. They allowed allies and partners to offload the cost of their defense onto the American people, and sometimes to suck us into conflicts and controversies central to their interests but peripheral or irrelevant to our own [disappointment with the WWI experience]. And they lashed American policy to a network of international institutions, some of which are driven by outright anti-Americanism and many by a transnationalism that explicitly seeks to dissolve individual state sovereignty [disappointment in the failure of the League of Nations].”

America First

The above sentiments inevitably lead to an America First stance. During the 1930s, the America First movement would grow into one of the largest anti-war movements in American history.

America First supporter in 1940

America First supporter at a 2024 Trump rally

The country, during the 1930s and today, has swung towards higher acceptance of isolationism. If political leaders can use this sentiment to consolidate American power as in the 1930s, it won’t count as wasted time.

Focus on the Western Hemisphere

During the 1930s, Franklin Delano Roosevelt faced many of the same headwinds as the Trump administration. FDR’s initial response, beyond focusing on New Deal policies to bring the country out of the Great Depression, was a focus on the Western Hemisphere.

FDR needed to shore up American diplomatic and trade relations to prepare for the coming storm. This imperative could be pursued first in the Western Hemisphere without risk of involvement in foreign wars.

At the same time, getting Western Hemisphere countries lined up behind US leadership would strengthen the US hand in negotiations with the British, French, Russians, and Chinese since the US lacked extensive colonial or overseas possessions.

FDR and Cordell Hull struck out on the Good Neighbor Policy across the Caribbean and Latin America. This included declaring non-intervention and non-interference in Latin American affairs, opening up cultural and transport links.

This policy would end the US Marine Corps’ occupation of Haiti and pull back American troops in the region. This would appease the isolationist America First faction in domestic US politics while allowing Washington to recoup a small measure of military capability and focus.

This has direct echoes with the Trump NSS and the ongoing operations in SOUTHCOM. FDR did not have to face down a Latin America with significant communist, Russian, and Chinese influence. Trump is seeking to address a bad neighbor problem in the region.

Foreign policy circles have for decades decried the lack of strategic prioritization from the White House. Well, now they got it, good and hard. And not in the way they expected. The NSS explicitly prioritizes the defense and consolidation of the Western Hemisphere.

Enlisting Allies

FDR would also take extraordinary measures to strengthen potential US allies in the coming war. The Roosevelt administration, with the assistance of Henry Morgenthau, implemented Cash and Carry and Lend-Lease policies to invigorate potential allied nations on the front lines of fascism.

In a direct parallel, the Trump NSS discusses the following topics:

“Second, the United States must work with our treaty allies and partners—who together add another $35 trillion in economic power to our own $30 trillion national economy (together constituting more than half the world economy)—to counteract predatory economic practices and use our combined economic power to help safeguard our prime position in the world economy and ensure that allied economies do not become subordinate to any competing power [...] A favorable conventional military balance remains an essential component of strategic competition. There is, rightly, much focus on Taiwan, partly because of Taiwan’s dominance of semiconductor production, but mostly because Taiwan provides direct access to the Second Island Chain and splits Northeast and Southeast Asia into two distinct theaters [...] We will build a military capable of denying aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain. But the American military cannot, and should not have to, do this alone. Our allies must step up and spend—and more importantly do—much more for collective defense [...] Our goal should be to help Europe correct its current trajectory. We will need a strong Europe to help us successfully compete, and to work in concert with us to prevent any adversary from dominating Europe.”

Rebuilding the Defense Industrial Base

FDR would also deal with a complicated global trade regime and a hollowed-out American industrial base due to the Great Depression. The Roosevelt administration would sign much legislation to correct these deficiencies, seeking to reduce trade barriers with allies and cooperative nations and to rebuild the industrial economy.

One key piece of legislation was the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, which created the National Recovery Agency (NRA). The NRA was deeply anti-competitive, and consolidated American industry, promoted price-fixing, and supported the growth of labor unions.

Supporter of FDR’s National Recovery Agency (NRA) hanging a poster in their business window

The goal of the legislation was to breathe new life into American industry. While FDR would reverse direction when promoting the Second New Deal policies of 1935, the goal remained the same.

We are once again in an era of government tinkering in the private economy to revitalize American industrial capacity. From the 2025 NSS:

“We want the world’s most robust industrial base. American national power depends on a strong industrial sector capable of meeting both peacetime and wartime production demands. That requires not only direct defense industrial production capacity but also defense-related production capacity. Cultivating American industrial strength must become the highest priority of national economic policy.”

How Russia and China Should View this Document

This is the final warning. While Moscow and Beijing should pay heed, they likely lack the wisdom to listen. Washington is entering a period of strategic consolidation and opportunity, rearmament, and strengthening allies.

Once consolidation has picked up pace and paid dividends, expansion and projection under another president, or even the same president, is inevitable.

Conclusion

While the strategy will be widely derided in left-leaning news outlets and international relations circles, ignore the partisan heat of the times.

This is a restrained, sensible, bipartisan strategy document that harkens back to successful American strategies of the past. It is remarkable how similar Washington’s current strategy is to the 1930s. This is an appropriate plan for a second-term president in his back three years, and will form an extremely durable foundation for the next president, regardless of party, to form his own strategic approach.

Vermilion would argue that this unclassified version of the document does not go nearly far enough in addressing the Chinese Communist Party as the central organizing threat of the century. But that may be an updated strategy for a future time.

As we have thoroughly discussed, China is not a traditionally maritime power. The foundations of the Chinese state's strength have always been rooted in its status as a continental power.

In the continentalist view, the more territory, the better. More territory means more people, land, security, and sovereignty. We can see the psychology of this viewpoint in the CCP’s approach to its near seas - to remarket them as blue national soil (蓝色国土) and construct artificial features in order to introduce a land element that the Chinese are more comfortable operating with.

Regardless of whether this view of sea space is recognized under international convention (it’s not), it directly clashes with the US as a maritime power.

Where the CCP views the near seas as territory to be controlled, the US views most maritime space as a commons to all nations under the auspices of US naval strength. Since 1945, Washington has generally managed its dominance in the maritime domain in a way that appeals to a broad swathe of nations, especially its many European and Asian allies.

While it is true that the CCP has massively benefited from free-riding off of Washington’s naval power, this doesn’t mean that the CCP has to like this fact. Beijing knows that if it chooses violence against its neighbors, it will be punished by American naval and economic tools.

When a continental power goes to sea, it aims to close and shut out others from spaces it will deem its own national territory.

Genocide & Ethnic Nationalism

The CCP had the advantage of observing the USSR’s complete breakdown from afar. The USSR was sewn from a patchwork of ethnicities that the Soviets promoted and attempted to integrate into the union.

In the end, these constituent elements were more than happy to break off from the USSR and declare independence based on local non-Russian identities. The CCP clearly sees this as a significant weakness and promotes a policy of genocide to wipe away competing identities and thoroughly sinicize all regions under CCP control.

The CCP believes it can only be powerful when the vast majority of PRC citizens buy into the Han ethnic project. This is an expensive and risky undertaking. The CCP must ruthlessly commit heinous crimes and continue to do so for generations. Pumping the brakes at all, as the USSR and other examples suggest, will lead the Chinese people to turn on the party.

This Chinese blood and soil nationalism will never sit well with Americans. It runs counter to American ideas about citizenship, freedom, rights, and the individual.

Change is Dangerous - Avoid Chaos

The rise and fall of dynasties give Chinese history a rhythm unlike that of any other civilization. There are repeated lessons. Change is risky. Warfare is costly. Political control is paramount. Chaos, natural or manmade, is the sorrow of the people.

Avoiding chaos and promoting stability, no matter how draconian, is the government's role. It is no wonder that China ended up with the CCP.

In contrast, Americans believe politics is only valid when it flows from the people. And when political power comes from the people, it is chaotic by nature. The raucous and lively political character of Ancient Athens, Republican Rome, and modern America is not only absent from the cultural tradition of China - the idea is anathema. This is why Taiwan’s robust democratic experiment is so surprising and threatening to Beijing.

It wasn’t Churchill that uttered “the best argument against democracy is a five-minute conversation with the average voter,” but it may have been a Chinese communist bureaucrat.

The Americans are much like the Athenians; a people constantly striving for the next big change. This restless pioneering energy is actively pruned out of mainland Chinese culture and stamped out through education (this doesn’t mean that the PRC doesn’t innovate in its own way). This is bound to lead to friction and a mismatched set of political aims.

Sinification, Harmony, and Hegemony

The CCP seeks to sinify its own citizens and those abroad, a project to cement Chinese culture as more important than the rest. Secondly, the CCP wants to impose what it calls harmony, meaning order, on the world. Third, as the CCP seeks to become the regional and global hegemon, the concept of hegemony differs between Mandarin and English.

Sinification is inherently a project of order and position. The Han race is first above all others. The CCP is first above all other parties. The Chinese state is first above all others in Asia.

These themes are promoted not only to the domestic audience, but to Chinese ethnicities living in the Philippines, Singapore, Australia, Canada, the US, etc. The CCP promotes the message that blood is more important than the citizenship of free people.

The sinification project includes cultural elements and tools of control like TikTok, which aggressively censors American audiences, steering them towards pro-CCP and anti-American content. It also includes tools to destroy others’ culture, like the CCP-backed fentanyl trade into the US.

Standing on a unified Chinese culture, the CCP seeks to impose harmony outward. This is a tangible hierarchy that the CCP is on a quest to forge. 和谐, translated as harmony in English, does not mean peaceful and quiet. Harmony in Mandarin implies order and position, like musical harmony.

The CCP seeks to impose harmony on the international order, with itself as the central note. As the Qing Dynasty analogy goes, the crane calls out, and its young fly to it in birth order.

Ultimately, sinification and harmony are supporting elements of the CCP’s central project: struggling for hegemony, or 争霸. Many CCP officials are obsessed with who shall become 霸. However, 霸 comes from the Warring States period, and denotes a state that becomes the most powerful by the exercise of violent, illegitimate force. It is closer to the English word tyrant, and can be translated that way.

CCP officials view the US’ 霸 status as illegitimate. This is one reason the CCP has a hard time conducting diplomacy. The US position is cemented by mutual consent with a diverse coalition of countries through official written treaties. To put it succinctly, the US is in Japan post-1952 because Japan wants it there, not because the US has forced the issue.

The communists in Beijing fail to understand this dynamic and believe that the US position is maintained by brute force alone. This informs the CCP’s own ideas about how it should gain power and operate in the international system.

Conclusion

The clash is inevitable. Whether it looks violent is currently in a fragile balance. Are the CCP’s aims limited or unlimited? How will US allies react to Chinese bellicosity? Does the PLA believe surprise strikes against US forces are necessary?

In the final analysis, it is the CCP that will make the decision and own the decision, regardless of what Washington does and regardless of what is rational.

*wakes up and reads news, sees Constellation cancelled again, promptly spits out coffee and shits log down my pajamas*

WHAT THE FUCK. WHAT IN THE COCK-SMOKED BALL-SACKED FUUUUUUUCCCCCK IS THIS FRESH HELL. Why does the Navy cancel EVERYTHING IT MAKES? Jesus fucking christ, they’re forced to pick an Italian ship design, and THEY’RE SURPRISED IT WAS CANCELLED.

The last time the fucking Italian navy dominated the seas, it was using OARS IN 31BC FOR CHRIST’S SAKE. AND ON THE MEDITERRENNEAN - Oh, surprise, the good ship lollypop bobbing and coasting in the Mediterennean’s calm fucking seas is GOING TO FOLD LIKE A LAWNCHAIR on the open ocean swell of the Pacific Ocean - nO WoNdeR YoU HAd TO ChANgE 85% of this ITALIAN PIECE OF CRAP, their IDEA OF A BLUE WATER NAVY IS WHEN THEY RUN OUT OF ROSÉ.

*reads Commander Salamander’s article, ulcer flares up in gurgitations*

WHAT THE FUUUUUCK NAVSEA. WHO CARES ABOUT THE FUCKING MILLIMETER OF THE FUCKING GUN, is 57mm too smol? Is 76mm too thicc? I DON’t GIVE A FUUUUUCK ITS ABOUT VLS CELLS and RADARS.

OOOHHH, you’re going to keep two? Oooooohhhh GOOD. You’ll have TWO FUCKING SHIPS you have to maintain and crew - THAT MAKES NO FUCKING SENSE, NAVY.

You’re going to replace it? WITH WHAAAAAT? IT WILL TAKE YOU ANOTHER 5 YEARS TO DECIDE YOU DUMB GUCK AND THE…AND THE… WHAT…I HAD NO IDEA YOU WERE STILL BUILDING THE LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP, WHAT THE FUCKKKKKKKK?!?!?!

MEANWHILE, THE FUCKING CHINESE HAVE COMMISSIONED THEIR FIRST NEW FRIGATE (the 054B Luohe, soon to be sunk off Taiwan) IN JANUARY OF 2025. WHAT DOES THE NAVY HAVE TO SAY?

“Sometimes, you’re just better off designing a new ship,” Navy’s former top acquisition executive Nickolas Guertin said at some circle-jerk conference in February. “Turns out modifying someone else’s design is a lot harder than it seems.”

Narrator Voice: Turns out, it was.

NNOOOOOOOOO SSHHHIIIITTTT. EXCEPT YOU HAVEN’T EVEN DESIGNED A SUCCESSFUL SURFACE SHIP SINCE THE COLD WAR, YOU PIECE OF SHIT.

CRUCIFY THE ADMIRALS AND SES OF NAVSEA ALONG THE VIA TRUMPIA. NAIL THEM UP WITH SPIKES FORGED FROM LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP HULLS. REPROGRAM 10% OF THE FLEET BUDGET EVERY YEAR INTO THE B-21 UNTIL NAVSEA UNFUCKS ITSELF. GET RID OF EVERY SENIOR NAVAL LEADER, DRAFT ELON MUSK AS COMMANDER AND ZOHRAN MAMDANI AS POLITICAL COMMISSAR, AND ROLL THE FUCKING DICE.

Vermilion needs a more aggressive day drinking schedule. And new pajamas. Again.

Quick Ship to Shore Recap

We have been seeing more articles about ship-to-shore connectors, so we made a quick review of the major capabilities below.

Roll On/Roll Off Ferry

In the above image, Sheng Sheng 1 (of the Wei Hai passenger transport company), a white Roll On/Roll Off ferry (RoRo - a large transport ship), offloads a ZTZ-96 main battle tank and an unidentified armored vehicle onto a green semi-submersible barge (ship-to-ship transfer vessel).

The vehicles will then roll onto a floating pier in the foreground (a ship-to-shore connector [SSC] able to hit the beach). Pending sea state, these barges can be used to transfer equipment at sea across the amphibious fleet.

Everyone knows about the RoRo ferries, and for good reason. The larger ones can transport more vehicles than gray-hull LHD and LPD vessels. Some of the RoRos even have well decks, allowing them to launch amphibious vehicles at sea without getting too close to shore.

PLA Bridge Barges (Shuiqiao-class LPU Landing Barges)

Chinese jack-up barges on the beach at Nansan Island, off Zhanjiang. Note different sets of legs, reduced draft on first barge, extendable platforms on structures left and centre.

These are ostensibly civilian ships (they aren’t). As Mike Dahm and Thomas Shugert point out, their lack of Automatic Identification System (AIS) transmissions indicates the barges are very likely PLA Navy auxiliaries, not civilian vessels.

The barges are equipped with a bow (front) gate that kicks down and releases an extending suspension bridge like a tongue out of a mouth. You can see the tall tower mounted to the front of the ship, meant to suspend the retractable bridge. This bow bridge is intended to bite hard onto the beach, providing safe purchase for forces moving onto the beachhead.

If we look at the stern (rear) of the ship, we see another gate. This is a telltale sign that the stern gate is meant to be kicked down and mated to another ship, which we will call ship2 (could be any vessel with shallow enough draft to make it close to shore next to the bridge barge). Ship2 can then disgorge its load onto the bridge barge, and then the load can traverse the bow bridge onto the beach.

If you’d like a super in-depth article on these LPU vessels, we wrote one here.

Civilian Deck Cargo

Cargo vessel Huayizhixing conducting joint logistics over-the-shore, unloading about 20 military vehicles.

These are cheap civlian vessels with a shallow draft that can get close to the shoreline and unload under the proper sea state without a port facility. US Navy analysts have consistently underplayed the ability of the PRC to simply use civilian cargo ships to unload assault and landing forces, ditching the ships in the shallows temporarily if need be.

Yupai Expeditionary Pier

From a 2025 exercise, we can see Yupai floating pier sections above motoring towards the beach. Primarily composed of modular, self-propelled causeway sections (as well as warping tugs, roll-on/roll-off discharge platforms, ferries, etc), the Yupai can splash at sea, motor to the beach in sections, connect closer to the shoreline, and embed into the sand as an expeditionary pier.

Then, other causeway sections or tugs can be used to head to sea, pick up troops, and motor back to the expeditionary pier and re-attach, allowing the troops to drive onto the beach. It is a fancy and temperamental capability.

Traditional Gray Hull Lift

Just one type of landing ship is the above Type 072A LST (Landing Ship Tank), the 982 Taihang Shan. These LSTs can carry about 400 tons of soldiers/vehicles, or almost 1,000 tons of supplies. The bow ramp (the open door at the front of the craft) is useful for landing troops and vehicles on the beach, but makes the LST slower and less seaworthy. The 072A also has a stern ramp at the rear and can also dock at a pier, as pictured.

The US Navy and PLAN have many amphibious vessels and ship-to-shore connectors in their respective fleets. This acronym soup includes LHD, LPD, LCAC, LCU, LST, and LCM. If you would like to get into gnat’s ass detail on how all this works, we have our in-depth article here.

Moat: Mahan believed that a maritime nation must have significant waters separating its territory from that of potential land invaders.

The US has the ultimate moat. Girded by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, an invasion force would have to be projected from Europe or Asia to reach the shores of the lower 48.

Beijing has the opposite of a moat. It is bordered by fourteen countries (North Korea, Russia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam), all of which it has complicated histories with, and most of which have invaded China at some point.

It also shares near seas with nine additional neighbors (Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, Cambodia, Thailand).

The CCP has done a decent job of creating a diplomatic moat with its land-based neighbors. Close relationships with Burma/Myanmar, Pakistan, North Korea, and Laos are currently insulating the CCP from ground-based external threats. Still, India and Vietnam remain weak points.

At the same time, Beijing has gone to great lengths to antagonize some of its sea-based neighbors, particularly Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines.

America: A+

CCP: D

Internal Transportation: Again, the US takes top place. The US has the most extensive and most efficient freight rail system in the world. Additionally, the Mississippi River network is one of the most comprehensive internal waterways in the world, facilitating the movement of goods at a fraction of the cost of even the cheapest rail transport.

Mahan also included things like the Panama Canal in the concept of internal transportation. The Trump administration’s deals with Panama continue to cement US primacy over the canal zone.

The CCP fares better when evaluating internal transportation. The Yangzi/Yangtze River is highly navigable and highly trafficked, connecting many PRC provinces. The CCP has built the world's most extensive high-speed rail system, with nascent freight use that could be repurposed in wartime.

Still, internal transportation is poor in the western half of the country. Additionally, Beijing cannot leverage any potential Panama Canal-type feature to ameliorate its maritime problems.

America: A+

CCP: B

Reliable Egress by Sea - Maritime powers must have access to the maritime commons. This seems obvious, but nations like Germany and China historically have ignored this vital requirement.

The US dominates in this aspect again. With major access to the Arctic Ocean, Pacific Ocean, Gulf of America (Mexico?), Atlantic Ocean, and Great Lakes, Washington has multiple egress points and wide access to the high seas.

The US also has major ports and population centers like Seattle, San Francisco, San Diego, Corpus Christi, Houston, New Orleans, Tampa, New York & New Jersey, Savannah, Charleston, Hampton Roads, and many others. These are all geographically significant port regions, distributed and independent, with populations dense enough to support substantial economic activity.

While the mainland Chinese seaboard is densely populated with major cities, the CCP is actually extremely hemmed in. It has no direct access to the high seas of the Pacific Ocean.

Beijing is attempting to build corridors across Pakistan and Cambodia, but these will never rival a critical passage like the Panama Canal.

If Beijing could convince Thailand to construct the Kra Canal and lease the territory, it is possible that the CCP could improve its maritime position. Yet this is a far-flung proposition, and the effectiveness of the Kra is again not the same as Panama or the Suez.

America: A+

CCP: C-

Commerce Driven Economy: Fleets are EXPENSIVE. To support naval fleets, nations must be prosperous, possessing large and dynamic economies. A large volume of trade, deep financial markets, technical expertise, and a mastery of logistics are just a few of the required conditions and skills.

The US and the US Navy have been doing these things for over a century. Still, as the Carthaginians and the British learned, that’s no reason for complacency.

Beijing has taken the lead in commercial shipyard activity, but this industry is highly dependent on government subsidies. The primary reason the US no longer builds commercial ships is the end of government subsidies under the Reagan administration in the 1980s.

Beijing has also taken the lead in the volume of international trade. These are significant achievements, but expect the US and the CCP to begin battling on these fronts.

In terms of a commerce-driven economy, both the US and the CCP get high marks.

America: A+

CCP: A

Stable Government Institutions: Mahan believed that nations require stable political leadership to fund, execute, and plan naval power over the long term. Warships and fleets take decades to build. Massive numbers of people are necessary in the process.

Farsighted strategy development is required to create and deploy effective fleets.

The US maintains the oldest extant constitutional republic in the world and has a robust political process. Despite this, US Navy fleet construction and management has been totally mismanaged. With recently renewed bipartisan attention from Washington, this should turn around, but it dings the US scorecard.

In contrast, the CCP’s critical vulnerabilities lie in political durability and the power transition process. In totalitarian systems, power transitions are systemically threatening. It will be the same when Xi Jinping passes the baton or dies in office.

However, the CCP can plan in mechanistic 5-year blocks. This has aided Beijing’s ambitions to deploy a large fleet.

America: A-

CCP: C-

Total Report Card

As discussed in our previous article, it will be expensive and risky for the CCP to sustain an effective maritime strategy. Bold move, Cotton.

America: A+

CCP: C+

Operation Southern Spear

As Washington continues its military buildup in the Caribbean, it is increasingly likely that the administration will take action. There are three main possible scenarios, ranked from most to least beneficial.

Compellence

Such a buildup should allow Trump maximum leverage in negotiations with Maduro. Goals for such talks should include significant changes in Venezuela’s internal political system, eliminating PRC business ties and influence, expanding opportunities for US businesses and trade in the petroleum, natural gas, agriculture, manufacturing, and mineral sectors, improving the Venezuelan economy for the median family, supporting the Central Bank of Venezuela, and Caracas’ relationship to OPEC.

If significant and lasting changes on these issues can be achieved with the US military buildup, this would be an excellent example of compellence - changing the existing behavior of an adversary through the threat of force.

Limited Strikes and/or a Short Sharp War

Less preferred but still potentially fruitful would be a limited military operation designed to achieve the above outcomes. Venezuela is nothing like Afghanistan, and US military forces should be able to dismantle the Venezuelan military and impose change on the existing system with minimal investment.

The template for a limited option would be the smaller-scale Operation Urgent Fury and Operation Just Cause.

Long-Term Occupation

What the Trump administration cannot afford is a bungled military operation leading to a long-term occupation of the country. The US military is the smallest it has been since before WWI, with a near record-low share of budgetary resources since 1939. Sourcing an occupation of Venezuela would become an all-consuming task for the US armed forces.

Factors

Time: Continuing a buildup of forces gives Beijing time to respond. If action is to be taken, it must be swift and effective. As it stands, the PRC could deliver advanced surface-to-air missile systems to Caracas or offer security guarantees if Washington does not move fast enough.

Strategic: A successful move against Venezuela would eliminate a major partner of the CCP in the Western Hemisphere and sideline Cuba. Consolidating the American position in the Americas would form a better foundation for US grand strategy in dealing with China and Russia (similar to the effects of FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy in the 1930s).

Diplomatic: Success would give Washington much more leverage in negotiations throughout South America, focused on increasing cooperation with Washington and shutting out Beijing.

Information: If Washington uses military means to secure gains in South America, expect Beijing to make hay. The CCP will attempt to justify the use of force in Asia on the grounds of successful US operations in the Western Hemisphere. The Trump administration had better be thinking about prudent arguments for the use of force, both against Caracas and in support of Taipei, even if only deployed in confidential channels.

“We have no choice but to cut off that dirty head that has lunged at us without hesitation. Are you prepared?” These were the choice words of the Chinese Consul General in Osaka, Xue Jian. He deleted his post on X, but of course, the internet is permanent.

Xue was reacting to newly elected (in the National Diet) Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae’s comments to a parliamentary committee on Friday that a blockade of Taiwan would be a “survival-threatening situation for Japan.”

While this is not the first time Tokyo has made such a declaration, it is the first time that Takaichi has made such a statement to the Diet.

Most observers do not understand what the Japanese mean when they say “survival-threatening situation.” This is precise language that describes the Japanese Self-Defense Force’s authority to mobilize.

Under the Japanese constitution, the cabinet can determine a “survival-threatening situation for collective self-defense.” This would allow the Prime Minister to mobilize the JSDF and conduct combat operations.

Additionally, survival-threatening situations imply collective defense. Here, the Japanese are being ambiguous. Is Tokyo saying that Taiwan de facto falls under Japan’s collective defense umbrella? Or that Tokyo will trigger the bilateral mutual defense treaty with Washington and bring the US into the fight? Or both?

Asked for clarification of his remarks, Xue Jian said:

“I would like to reiterate that the root of the problem lies with the Japanese politicians who, disregarding our repeated and emphatic statements of opposition, casually and frequently declare that ‘a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency…[this claim would] surely constitute…[a threat of violence toward China.]”

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), China’s military, follows a doctrine of active defense outlined in a 2019 PLA Defense White Paper, which states, “we will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked.”

Xue is suggesting that Japanese mobilization constitutes an attack against Beijing.

Putting the legalese into plain language is simpler. Tokyo says a blockade of Taiwan would trigger Japanese mobilization and calls for collective defense.

In response, Xue (not the central government in Beijing) retorted that Japanese mobilization (the dirty head lunging at Beijing) will be cut off. Essentially, Japanese mobilization would result in Chinese offensive strikes.

And we’re off to the races. National dialogues haven’t been like this since before WWI and WWII. Except in our modern times, Xue Jian used an angry emoji. May we live in interesting times.

The 001 and 002 are smaller, with displacements of 60k and 70k tons, respectively. The 003 Fujian is about 80k without a full complement. The 003 should be able to carry twice as many aircraft (about 70-80) as previous models since most of the extra displacement can be used to increase hangar capacity.

The three electromagnetic catapults can launch heavier aircraft, including the KJ-600 (空警-600 / Kong Jing / Air Warning-600) airborne early warning aircraft, and the J-35 (歼击机-35 / Jian Ji Ji / Fighter-35).

KJ-600

The KJ-600 fills a role similar to the US Navy E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, a plane with multiple radars to gain airborne (or surface) awareness, pass targeting information, control air and missile defense, and potentially jam or conduct electronic warfare. Modern air combat is difficult, if not impossible, without supporting airborne radar planes quarterbacking the air fight.

J-35

The J-35 is supposedly a 5th generation fighter. While its avionics, radars, and missiles are certainly an upgrade from the existing J-15 carrier fighter, it remains to be seen if the J-35’s stealth works well, something the PLA has not yet achieved. The J-35 does have internal weapons bays to preserve stealth. Regardless, it should be better all around than the lowly J-15.

Simply by being commissioned recently, the 003 will have better radar, networking, and C2 capabilities than the 001 and 002.

The 003 is indigenously designed and built. Expect either more 003 class under construction to build out the carrier fleet or a jump to a 004 nuclear-powered supercarrier. Or both. Based on build and test time, if the PLA dual-tracks carrier builds, in about 15 years, the PLAN could be operating four more carriers, gaining ground on the US Navy’s current 11-carrier force.

What These Capabilities Mean

The 001 Liaoning and 002 Shandong are not real carriers. They can barely achieve more than 40 aircraft sorties a day. Compare this to the US Gerald Ford, which can launch 100 sorties a day at peak ops (the Ford’s numbers will likely improve in the future).

The J-15 Flying Sharks launched from the 001 and 002 are already terrible fighter attack aircraft, and they cannot take off with full fuel and weapons due to the lack of catapults. This severely limits the J-15’s strike range and ability to provide defense in depth to the carrier. The 001 and 002 cannot launch strikes at a long enough range to prevent the carriers from being targeted and destroyed.

These limiting factors do not apply to the 003. First, the 003’s ability to launch the J-35 should give it much enhanced situational awareness. Looking through the J-15’s radar is like looking through a soda straw to identify targets.

The J-35 should have a 5th gen wide area surveillance radar that soaks in data for hundreds of miles, painting an intelligence picture that can be fed to the 003’s command center or parsed to other platforms. The J-35 can do this at a longer range than the J-15, allowing for the 003 to have the minimum distances it needs to protect itself.

Second, the 003 can launch a new version of the Flying Shark called the J-15T. This new version has an AESA (active electronically scanned array) radar, a significant leap from the previous model.

J-15T landing. Background J-35 and Z-9 Helictoper

This means that a J-15T can launch with full fuel and a full load of large external weapons from the 003. Once airborne, its more sophisticated avionics and radar should be able to receive targeting data from the KJ-600, J-35, or the carrier itself, allowing it to launch large external long-range weapons (that cannot fit in the J-35’s internal weapons bays) at a distance. The J-15T can provide long-range fire support to the J-35 or strike surface targets at safer distances for the 003.

Third, the KJ-600 provides the minimum capability a PLA Navy carrier wing needs to survive and conduct missions. The KJ will have the best PLAN airborne radar by far.

This should allow it to track thousands of targets, maintaining situational awareness of the fight. The KJ should be able to prioritize engagement targets and work with other aircraft or surface warships to target and destroy them. The KJ can also track incoming threats, allowing them to be defeated by the same means.

This also applies to submarines, with assistance from anti-submarine warfare helicopters the 003 will carry. With the KJ-600, the 003 can actually see what is going on and defend itself.

The 003 should actually be a viable carrier.

The 003’s endurance means that cruising range for peacetime exercises comfortably extends to the Alaska, Hawaii, Australia, or the Maldives regions. However, under wartime conditions (high speeds, evasive maneuvers, constant launches, submarine patrols), this range shrinks down to the first and second island chains. The 003 brings the PLAN a little closer to a regional blue water capability, but global operations remain outside the PLA’s reach.

Cost

This is an audacious gamble. Deploying a single carrier is not effective. It requires cruisers, destroyers, submarines, oilers, auxiliary ships, national technical means, and extensive training.

The immense cost of the growing PLA naval fleet will induce a maintenance and repair overhang in the following decades. The daily upkeep, periodic maintenance, and cost of repairs for warships has been staggering since the age of the trireme.

Naval forces are fundamentally different than ground forces. A world-class navy requires the largest and most complex platforms humanity creates (with the possible new exception of semiconductor fabrication plants), and they do not come cheap.

The CCP could perhaps sustain these costs if it only required a small professional army. Yet the modern Chinese state has never maintained a large navy due to the overriding requirement to deploy a massive army necessary to secure mainland China’s borders and suppress the domestic population.

Therefore, the CCP seeks to maintain one of the largest armies in the world while building the largest navy in the world - something only the Romans have accomplished.

Of course, the CCP may simply be planning to deploy these vessels in anger (or have them sink) in less than 15 years. The breakneck speed of the PLA Navy buildup makes more sense if Beijing believes it will never have to seriously maintain these vessels.

Arms Racing

Naval arms races are surprisingly risky, with only the US/UK winning these contests since 1588. That’s over 400 years of Anglo-American maritime supremacy. Historically, naval buildups have caused international order to steer into highly volatile territory.

Some examples include the Athenian, Roman, Ottoman, Monarchical French, Imperial German, and Imperial Japanese naval buildups. These buildups all destabilized international relations and ended in the failure of the rising power, with the exception of the Roman Republic.

The CCP is taking its existence into its own hands with such a naval buildup. This signals a much higher appetite for risk, something Washington can exploit.

Limitations

The limiting factors of carriers are severe in modern wargaming. In most rules systems, the threat of long-range cruise missiles and anti-ship ballistic missiles is extremely high.

The PLA Rocket Force can launch land-based anti-carrier ballistic missiles (DF-21D, DF-26) or hypersonic glide vehicles (DF-17), which are highly effective at achieving mission kill or destruction of a US carrier strike group. The US is deploying systems superior to those the PLA fields after leaving the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, which blocked American development of such systems until 2019.

The US can launch stealthy long-range anti-ship cruise missiles (LRASM / AGM-158C) from stealth bombers, which clean up PLA Navy surface ships, including carriers. This capability will be greatly enhanced after the B-21 Raider is fielded, and the PLA Air Force is developing a similar system in the H-20.

This means the utility of aircraft carriers in a Pacific fight is extremely curtailed. The continued focus on and construction of carriers by the US Navy and PLA Navy has at least as much to do with bureaucratic politics as it does with combat capability.

However, the US will still need to invest in new classes of weapons and purchase more LRASMs to counter the growing PLAN carrier fleet.

Perhaps the PLAN carrier fleet is not intended to combat the US directly, but rather to protect the PRC’s global sea lanes and trade interests. While this is somewhat rational, the cost is enormous if the CCP believes it must first confront the US before taking its place as one of the superpowers.

Conclusion

Yes, the 003 is the PLAN’s first real carrier. But the significance is mostly in the tactical and operational details. Strategically, the PLA does not require carriers to attempt to control the first island chain or invade Taiwan.

At the grand strategic level, the CCP is taking on breathtaking risks by financing a large navy and arms racing with the US, all based on investing in a class of ships last employed in serious naval combat during WWII.

Maybe Washington and Beijing are not the greatest strategists.

The political officer (commissar) system is an important part of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). It is too often dismissed by American observers and analysts who do not understand it. We covered this topic in one of our recent articles, but we need to continue beating this drum due to the poorly informed hot takes that flood the information environment. The PLA is not ineffective simply because it does not follow American doctrine.

To ensure unity of effort and consistency with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) political goals, the PLA believes in the principle of division of command. Throughout the PLA in echelons from deputy company leader grade through theater leader grade, there is a defined Commander and Political Officer who are in equal command of nearly every echelon of the armed forces.

The political officer ensures that higher intent is understood throughout his echelon and builds, maintains, and runs that echelon of troops so that the echelon is ready to be employed by the commander through appropriate tactics and campaigning. In the PLA system, a division of labor does not mean a house divided; it means a house unified to achieve the political goals set out by the party.

Historically, this system has worked well for the PLA. The political officer system was key to the CCP’s survival and eventual victory in the Chinese Civil War against the Kuomintang (KMT). In particular, political work in the northern campaigns of 1945-1949 (Huai-Hai, Liao-Shen, Ping-Jin) was critical to preserving PLA combat power and paralyzing the Nationalist command structure at key points.

The political officer system sustained the PLA during the Korean War, when UN and American material overmatch was far wider than it is today. The PLA was able to march a second world army onto the peninsula and fight to a standstill with a superpower.

During the Vietnam War, the CCP and PLA advised and shaped the Northern Vietnamese forces in their own image. To this day, Vietnam maintains its own political officer system. During the war, political work was critical to the defeat of US forces.

Even the American side belatedly recognized the importance of political work, and by the end of the war, Taiwan's political warfare officers were deployed to the Republic of South Vietnam to consolidate the armed forces and counterattack in the political domain against the north.

In the US military, modern service members too often blow off the political officer system as ineffective while ignorant of the historical record. If you are serious about understanding the PLA problem set, start studying the history of PLA political work and the role of the commissar.

The US does a painfully poor job of negotiating with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This is an odd gap since, generally speaking, US diplomacy is far more effective than PRC diplomacy. Yet when directed at the CCP, American diplomatic efforts fall apart.

This is a catastrophic weakness. Washington seeks to manage the relationship with Beijing without conflict. Yet 1) Beijing will not negotiate in good faith and 2) Washington cannot effectively negotiate with the CCP to get things it wants.

If Washington cannot gain concessions from the CCP through diplomacy, it must resort to military or economic levers.

It is amazing that few observers, especially those who wish to engage with the CCP, identify this major problem at the heart of the relationship.

Rarely before has a superpower like the US had such a terrible track record of negotiating with an adversary, AND the lack of awareness to recognize it.

Truth #1: Washington cannot negotiate with the CCP like it negotiates with other nations.

This does not mean that Washington should forego diplomacy and negotiation. It means that these actions must be handled with greater skill.

The beliefs players in negotiations have about the world, their counterparts, and appropriate end goals influence the negotiations themselves. This sounds obvious, but American presidents and negotiators don’t get it.

The beliefs the CCP brings to the table are unique and dangerous. The party has defined the US as an existential threat to be overcome. The party believes that after a long, painful, arduous road of suffering, they will eventually defeat the US. The party has an extremely realist view of international relations, focusing on hard power, coercion, geography, and mercantilism.

The CCP is not a country, a nation, or a polity. It is an extremist political party. The CCP does not negotiate to reach mutually beneficial deals. It negotiates to buy time, test and confuse the enemy, obscure goals, gain advantages for the party, and misdirect.

This leads to numerous (but obvious) traps US negotiators fall into with their communist counterparts.

Timelines

The US has an electoral system, and US leaders often want to reach a deal before a domestic election or political event. From the perspective of the communists, this is an absolute gift. There can be no short, sharp negotiations with the CCP that deliver results, especially in the context of a US negotiation team that has a deadline. The CCP will simply use that deadline to strangle their counterparts. Every. Single. Time.

If negotiations are to proceed, Washington must have no deadlines and be willing to impose severe and painful consequences when the CCP drags its feet.

Concessions

The US should avoid at all costs making material concessions on important issues to the CCP unless the party offers serious tangible concessions and verification measures are put into effect. The US has made major non-reciprocal concessions time and time again in the hopes that the CCP will change their hearts.

There are at least nine unbelievably major concessions the US has offered to the CCP since 1980.

1) 1981-1989 sales of military equipment to the PLA.

2) The soft response to Tiananmen 1989.

3) Nearly unlimited access to the US economic market.

4) Access to listing PRC companies on US stock exchanges.

5) Support for PRC’s WTO accession.

6) Accepting the PRC’s tariff and non-tariff barriers against the US while not retaliating until 2019.

7) Nearly unlimited access to seats at US universities.

8) Self-imposed US limitations on Washington’s relationship with Taipei.

9) Continued US willingness to sell the PRC enterprise software.

Promises

The CCP will always seek to gain real concessions in exchange for promises they never intend to keep. Prosperous America maintains a good list of broken promises included in our list below:

2000: The CCP promised to lower tariffs, eliminate non-tariff barriers, protect intellectual property rights, and open its markets to US goods and services as part of its World Trade Organization (WTO) accession. Twenty years on, there have been no attempts to change this.

2014: The CCP committed to exchange rate liberalization in rounds of talks with the US. This would allow for foreign market forces to determine the value of the renminbi. More than a decade on, this has never occurred.

2014: In the same rounds of talks as above, the CCP promised to establish mechanisms that prevent the expansion of PRC crude steelmaking capacity. This never occurred.

2015: General Secretary Xi Jinping promised to President Barrack Obama during a White House Rose Garden press conference that he had no intention of militarizing the South China Sea. This was a bold faced lie.

2015: General Secretary Xi Jinping signed an agreement with President Barack Obama to prevent cyber-enabled theft of IP. The CCP never intended to hold its side of the bargain.

2019: As part of the Trump Phase 1 trade deal, the CCP agreed to import more manufactured goods from the US, including steel, aircraft, and cars. This never occurred.

2019: The CCP reneged on its commitment to maintain Hong Kong’s status as part of the 1997 agreement with the United Kingdom by cracking down and changing the administration and laws of the semi-independent enclave.

2019: The CCP agreed to curtail the flow of fentanyl to the US as part of the Trump trade deal. This never occured.

2022: CCP and US reached a deal to establish inspections and audit firms in mainland China and Hong Kong that audit PRC companies listed on US exchanges. The US has since sent delegations to the PRC to discuss implementation of the deal with no real results.

2023: The CCP agrees to curtail the flow of fentanyl to the US as part of talks with the Biden administration. This never occurred.

The Record is Clear

For decades, the US has offered major concessions and thrown lifelines the communist government in Beijing. Perhaps during the Cold War, there was some logic to this approach, but that time is long past.

In turn, the CCP consistently lies, cheats, steals, and spits in America’s face. And Washington thanks them for it. There may not be a single major deal or promise that Beijing has kept since 2000.

Looking over this track record, why would you change anything if you were Xi Jinping? You would continue to not follow through on any promises while demanding the US gives you concessions during negotiations.

Truth #2: The CCP is Irredeemable

The CCP is one of the most violent and repressive great powers in modern history. The early Anti-Rightist Campaigns, the Great Leap Forward, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the Tiananmen Square Massacre, and the ongoing repression against Uighers, Tibetans, the religious, and everyday PRC citizens make the crimes of the Soviet Union seem small in comparison. Please read a serious book about any one of these topics. It will change your life.

These crimes cannot be taken back, redeemed, or changed. These crimes are not a bug, but a feature of how the CCP must operate. These crimes form the dense, hateful nucleus of the CCP’s greatest weakness and must be fully exploited to Washington’s advantage.

There is no reforming the CCP or working together on long-term goals. The party either persists or collapses.

The Trump-Xi Agreement

On 1 Nov, the White House announced the outline of an initial agreement with the CCP, which includes the following:

1) Halt the flow of precursors used to make fentanyl into the United States.

The CCP sees shipping fentanyl to the US (and introducing a variety of other drugs, including tianeptine, xylazine, 7-OH, and others) as an extremely effective tactic to kill Americans, disband families, destroy social cohesion, and put pressure on US state and federal budgets.

The CCP accrues massive benefits by attacking Americans with drugs. There is no reason for the party to stop this tactic unless the US imposes severe retaliatory consequences.

2) Effectively eliminate China’s current and proposed export controls on rare earth elements and other critical minerals.

Based on other articles, this is likely only a one year pause. The CCP is creating new departments within the PRC to control and license the export of processed rare earths. Since it seems like the CCP's threat to limit processed rare earths worked during this round of negotiations, expect Xi to use this play more often.

With the licensing regime, the CCP is creating the internal tools to wield this weapon again. Washington has been on a spree of signing rare earths deals with Australia, Malaysia, Cambodia, and Japan. The CCP knows its ability to corner the rare earths processing market is coming to an end - another reason for Beijing to use the leverage while it still exists.

3) End Chinese retaliation against U.S. semiconductor manufacturers and other major U.S. companies.

The CCP wants high end US chips, but it will never end retaliation against US semiconductor manufacturers or other major US companies. There will be no rollback of barriers against US entry into the PRC market.

4) Open China’s market to U.S. soybeans and other agricultural exports.

This is simply a small step to return to the status quo. In the 2016 / 2017 timeframe, the PRC purchased more than half of the US soybean crop. Washington should not expect a return to this level of activity, as Beijing has sought to diversify its purchases across different countries, including Brazil.

The Trump administration’s framework for an initial deal with the CCP will not solve any fundamental issues, nor is it likely to make any tactical advances for the US.

Referring to the White House memo, the US concessions are concrete and time-bound. The CCP concessions are vague and not bound by specific times and actions.

Conclusion

If Washington desires to negotiate with the CCP, it must start from understanding how communists negotiate. The classic 1985 Rand study on Chinese negotiating behavior is as valid today as it was in the 1980s, yet it seems like American negotiators have never read it.

To gain real concessions from the CCP requires the US to truly wage a trade war. The US will have to accept some pain while applying serious consequences to the CCP, including touching pain points on Taiwan, PRC domestic stability, and structural trade weakness in areas like energy and food.

The Trump administration did the opposite in this round of talks, specifically by snubbing Taiwan President William Lai’s visit and downplaying the relationship with Taipei. From the US perspective, the talks were dead in the water before they began.

Notes on Sources

Here, we have a 2015-era example of the notional 15th Motorized Infantry Division in the attack. Our erudite readers will understand this is a pre-reform operational graphic. We are sourcing from the 2015 edition of the PLA’s 作战标图 Combat Plotting Doctrine. We have a collection of other PLA publications that corroborate the analysis in this post.

Post-2016 reforms graphics tend to replace regiments with the combined arms brigades (CABs) and divisions with Group Armies.

This article will discuss the division approach, the 44th Regiment attack, and the division's deep battle. For brevity, we will not cover the 43rd regiment.

For lessons learned, skip to the end of the article.

Understanding the Graphic I - Division Rear & Overview

In the rear, we see 15th division (15师 / Shi / S / division) rear headquarters labeled as a flag with double vertical lines labelled “15S.” This rear HQ contains the officers leading the logistics section and the equipment section of the division, with most of their sections (log, supply, medical, repair, maintenance) presumably co-located. This 15S HQ is logically located in a town along a road and forms the root of maneuver for the rest of the division.

Close to 15S is a rear guard detachment of roughly company size, the rectangle marked FW (防卫 / Fang Wei / FW / defense). While this detachment is located in the rear, the short westward-pointing arrow denotes that it is meant to be in the attack moving west.

The large kidney bean shape is the divisional artillery group (师炮兵群 / ShiPaoBingQun / SPBQ / Division Artillery Troop Group) consisting of 122mm howitzers and 130mm cannons.

Overlapping with the SPBQ is another fires position denoted by a triangle containing 57mm towed anti-aircraft artillery. This would normally be labelled FK (反空 / FanKong / FK / air defense), but this label has beeen ommitted.

Within the triangular 57mm AAA position, we spot another command post, marked S for division, with a flag consisting of dotted lines. This is the reserve command post, which contains the division deputy commander and deputy political commissar.

To the north, we see 45MHT (摩托化团 / Mo tua Hua Tuan / MHT / Motorized Regiment) within a U-shaped graphic containing a diamond and with a westward-pointing arrow. This denotes that the 45th motorized regiment, which contains tanks, will conduct an open order attack westward.

In the middle of the graphic, we see a flag denoting the main command post labelled 15MHS (摩托化师 / Mo tua Hua Shi / MHS / Motorized Division). This is the senior leadership of the division with the commander and commissar. We can see the HQ moving from an initial position (1) and advance closer to the line of departure (2).

Understanding the Graphic II - 44MHT Movement to Contact

In the approach, we see a truck company (line through a rectangle), mine clearance (two dots in a rectangle), ATGM team (rocket inside an oval), chemical (crossed retorts inside an oval), engineer (the character 工 for engineers inside an oval), electronic confrontation (lightning with an arrow inside a rectangle), and combined arms reserve (HC for 合成 / hecheng or combined arms/composite inside an oval) in the movement to contact.

The units enclosed by an oval are under the direct command of the closest CP and not delegated to lower units. The units enclosed by a rectangle are company size or below and are likely assigned as general support in a written operations order.

To the north is a separate corps, and to the south is a separate division of the same corps.

Note that the same units are depicted multiple times on the graphic in time sequence order. For example, the ATGM team is depicted north of the road to the right (1), then south of the road in the middle (2), finally unfolds in the attack in the north west part of the graphic (3), and conducts follow-on attacks to the left side of the graphic (4). The time phasing is marked by dots or hatches consistent with the table in the bottom left of the main ops graphic.

Interpreting the Graphic III - 44MHT Breach & Close Combat

At an undefined time, we see linear fires tasks against the main breach area, a blue minefield. Assisting with this breach by fire is the engineer mine removal team breaching with organic clearance equipment. These maneuvers support the main body of 44MHT attacking on line through the neutralized mine field.

Once passed the minefield, 44MHT dismounts attack through the blue defensive positions at A and B to assault blue defensive positions at A1 and A2. 44MHT armor splits and swings in flank attacks against A1 and A2. Additional infantry attacks A2.

This is a double-axis attack against A1 and a triple-axis attack against A2.

As these attacks are ongoing, we see an element of armored personnel carriers (APCs) in the north bypass B1, while the combined arms reserve in the south bypasses A2. These elements, including whatever forces are intact, are then to strike C1 in the north (5 axes of attack) and B2 in the south (also 5 axes of attack).

Interpreting the Graphic IV - Division Deep Combat

Once the near fight is complete, the 15th Division will re-task org and drive forward in column. The main attack (denoted by larger attack arrows) will be from the 43rd MHT. Blue positions on hilltops to the north and south are to be surrounded. The main blue counterattack is to be countered head-on by armor and an ATGM team, with a flanking attack against the softer blue APCs once most blue armor has committed to the assault.

Lessons Learned

Fires and the Rear CP are the Base of Maneuver

It is clear from this graphic and multiple other examples that PLA ground units doctrinally maneuver off a base. This base consists of the principal fire elements (artillery and air defense) along with the leaders of the logistics and equipment sections.

Finding and suppressing or neutralizing this base of maneuver will be critical to separate the command team from higher echelons, interrupt communications, depress handling of casualties, and strike at the PLA’s fires capabilities.

Locating the base and analyzing the terrain and blue force disposition will be the key to determining the attack axis.

The Command Team Controls Key Units

The command team (commander and commissar) will play a key battlefield role themselves by personally commanding important elements.

In this example these elements include the anti-tank weaponry, the combined arms reserve, chemical weapons (flamethrowers), and combat engineers. Locating these types of elements should help to locate the command team, which is a high priority C2 target.

Battlefield Geometry is Crazy

There are multiple instances in this graphic of units attacking from multiple directions simultaneously in order to overwhelm Blue. Deconflicting fires from these units will be difficult to impossible. The PLA seeks to create mass and chaos to overwhelm. If this is not orchestrated correctly or is thrown against a decoy or highly maneuverable unit, the PLA will have difficulty avoiding friendly fire, casualties, and internal disruption.

Casualty Acceptance is High

In accordance with the battlefield geometry, the PLA places its units into positions of high risk. In this particular example, infantry is often used to fix blue units with frontal attacks into defensive positions and high ground.

Expect the PLA to not be bashful about accepting high risk in applying elements to fix and cause casualties on both sides.

Task Org is Important

There are multiple natural break points in this attack graphic. During these pauses, expect political officers to reorganize and re-task the surviving units. Counterattacking the PLA during these intervals will be key to catching red units exhausted and internally focused, offering opportunities to push red off plan.

Forces and Positions Matter at Least as Much as Terrain

Red expects blue to anchor on key terrain in the defense and focus on key terrain in the attack. The PLA builds in these assumptions to predict where blue will defend and counterattack.

Using an unexpected tactical disposition or a shifting disposition will throw the PLA off balance, as they expect to fight a highly doctrinal blue force.

We see this especially in the deep fight, as red does not anchor a defensive line on terrain, nor do they attack utilizing favorable terrain. In fact, the PLA does the opposite and attacks into terrain favorable to the blue defender due to the assessment that blue will naturally anchor onto key terrain. PLA leadership would rather keep the tempo of the attack high to gain exploitation rather than work with the terrain.

Time Phasing is Important

The elements of this plan are anchored by time primarily and conditions less so. This has advantages in a comms denied environment, but gives less flexibility to the plan. Something as simple as giving ground and refusing to fight the PLA’s plan has the potential to disorient red leadership.